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serai/crypto/frost/src/tests/mod.rs

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use std::collections::HashMap;
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
pub use dkg::tests::{key_gen, musig_key_gen, recover_key};
use crate::{
Curve, Participant, ThresholdKeys, FrostError,
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algorithm::{Algorithm, Hram, IetfSchnorr},
sign::{Writable, PreprocessMachine, SignMachine, SignatureMachine, AlgorithmMachine},
};
/// Tests for the nonce handling code.
pub mod nonces;
use nonces::test_multi_nonce;
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/// Vectorized test suite to ensure consistency.
pub mod vectors;
// Literal test definitions to run during `cargo test`
#[cfg(test)]
mod literal;
/// Constant amount of participants to use when testing.
pub const PARTICIPANTS: u16 = 5;
/// Constant threshold of participants to use when signing.
pub const THRESHOLD: u16 = ((PARTICIPANTS * 2) / 3) + 1;
/// Clone a map without a specific value.
pub fn clone_without<K: Clone + core::cmp::Eq + core::hash::Hash, V: Clone>(
map: &HashMap<K, V>,
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without: &K,
) -> HashMap<K, V> {
let mut res = map.clone();
res.remove(without).unwrap();
res
}
/// Spawn algorithm machines for a random selection of signers, each executing the given algorithm.
pub fn algorithm_machines<R: RngCore, C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>>(
rng: &mut R,
algorithm: &A,
keys: &HashMap<Participant, ThresholdKeys<C>>,
) -> HashMap<Participant, AlgorithmMachine<C, A>> {
let mut included = vec![];
while included.len() < usize::from(keys[&Participant::new(1).unwrap()].params().t()) {
let n = Participant::new(
u16::try_from((rng.next_u64() % u64::try_from(keys.len()).unwrap()) + 1).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
if included.contains(&n) {
continue;
}
included.push(n);
}
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keys
.iter()
.filter_map(|(i, keys)| {
if included.contains(i) {
Some((*i, AlgorithmMachine::new(algorithm.clone(), keys.clone())))
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} else {
None
}
})
.collect()
}
// Run the preprocess step
pub(crate) fn preprocess<
R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
M: PreprocessMachine,
F: FnMut(&mut R, &mut HashMap<Participant, M::SignMachine>),
>(
rng: &mut R,
mut machines: HashMap<Participant, M>,
mut cache: F,
) -> (HashMap<Participant, M::SignMachine>, HashMap<Participant, M::Preprocess>) {
let mut commitments = HashMap::new();
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let mut machines = machines
.drain()
.map(|(i, machine)| {
let (machine, preprocess) = machine.preprocess(rng);
commitments.insert(i, {
let mut buf = vec![];
preprocess.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
machine.read_preprocess::<&[u8]>(&mut buf.as_ref()).unwrap()
});
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(i, machine)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
cache(rng, &mut machines);
(machines, commitments)
}
// Run the preprocess and generate signature shares
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub(crate) fn preprocess_and_shares<
R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
M: PreprocessMachine,
F: FnMut(&mut R, &mut HashMap<Participant, M::SignMachine>),
>(
rng: &mut R,
machines: HashMap<Participant, M>,
cache: F,
msg: &[u8],
) -> (
HashMap<Participant, <M::SignMachine as SignMachine<M::Signature>>::SignatureMachine>,
HashMap<Participant, <M::SignMachine as SignMachine<M::Signature>>::SignatureShare>,
) {
let (mut machines, commitments) = preprocess(rng, machines, cache);
let mut shares = HashMap::new();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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let machines = machines
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.drain()
.map(|(i, machine)| {
let (machine, share) = machine.sign(clone_without(&commitments, &i), msg).unwrap();
shares.insert(i, {
let mut buf = vec![];
share.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
machine.read_share::<&[u8]>(&mut buf.as_ref()).unwrap()
});
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(i, machine)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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(machines, shares)
}
fn sign_internal<
R: RngCore + CryptoRng,
M: PreprocessMachine,
F: FnMut(&mut R, &mut HashMap<Participant, M::SignMachine>),
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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>(
rng: &mut R,
machines: HashMap<Participant, M>,
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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cache: F,
msg: &[u8],
) -> M::Signature {
let (mut machines, shares) = preprocess_and_shares(rng, machines, cache, msg);
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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let mut signature = None;
for (i, machine) in machines.drain() {
let sig = machine.complete(clone_without(&shares, &i)).unwrap();
if signature.is_none() {
signature = Some(sig.clone());
}
assert_eq!(&sig, signature.as_ref().unwrap());
}
signature.unwrap()
}
/// Execute the signing protocol, without caching any machines. This isn't as comprehensive at
/// testing as sign, and accordingly isn't preferred, yet is usable for machines not supporting
/// caching.
pub fn sign_without_caching<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, M: PreprocessMachine>(
rng: &mut R,
machines: HashMap<Participant, M>,
msg: &[u8],
) -> M::Signature {
sign_internal(rng, machines, |_, _| {}, msg)
}
/// Execute the signing protocol, randomly caching various machines to ensure they can cache
/// successfully.
pub fn sign<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, M: PreprocessMachine>(
rng: &mut R,
params: &<M::SignMachine as SignMachine<M::Signature>>::Params,
mut keys: HashMap<Participant, <M::SignMachine as SignMachine<M::Signature>>::Keys>,
machines: HashMap<Participant, M>,
msg: &[u8],
) -> M::Signature {
sign_internal(
rng,
machines,
|rng, machines| {
// Cache and rebuild half of the machines
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let included = machines.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
for i in included {
if (rng.next_u64() % 2) == 0 {
let cache = machines.remove(&i).unwrap().cache();
machines.insert(
i,
Coordinator Cleanup (#481) * Move logic for evaluating if a cosign should occur to its own file Cleans it up and makes it more robust. * Have expected_next_batch return an error instead of retrying While convenient to offer an error-free implementation, it potentially caused very long lived lock acquisitions in handle_processor_message. * Unify and clean DkgConfirmer and DkgRemoval Does so via adding a new file for the common code, SigningProtocol. Modifies from_cache to return the preprocess with the machine, as there's no reason not to. Also removes an unused Result around the type. Clarifies the security around deterministic nonces, removing them for saved-to-disk cached preprocesses. The cached preprocesses are encrypted as the DB is not a proper secret store. Moves arguments always present in the protocol from function arguments into the struct itself. Removes the horribly ugly code in DkgRemoval, fixing multiple issues present with it which would cause it to fail on use. * Set SeraiBlockNumber in cosign.rs as it's used by the cosigning protocol * Remove unnecessary Clone from lambdas in coordinator * Remove the EventDb from Tributary scanner We used per-Transaction DB TXNs so on error, we don't have to rescan the entire block yet only the rest of it. We prevented scanning multiple transactions by tracking which we already had. This is over-engineered and not worth it. * Implement borsh for HasEvents, removing the manual encoding * Merge DkgConfirmer and DkgRemoval into signing_protocol.rs Fixes a bug in DkgConfirmer which would cause it to improperly handle indexes if any validator had multiple key shares. * Strictly type DataSpecification's Label * Correct threshold_i_map_to_keys_and_musig_i_map It didn't include the participant's own index and accordingly was offset. * Create TributaryBlockHandler This struct contains all variables prior passed to handle_block and stops them from being passed around again and again. This also ensures fatal_slash is only called while handling a block, as needed as it expects to operate under perfect consensus. * Inline accumulate, store confirmation nonces with shares Inlining accumulate makes sense due to the amount of data accumulate needed to be passed. Storing confirmation nonces with shares ensures that both are available or neither. Prior, one could be yet the other may not have been (requiring an assert in runtime to ensure we didn't bungle it somehow). * Create helper functions for handling DkgRemoval/SubstrateSign/Sign Tributary TXs * Move Label into SignData All of our transactions which use SignData end up with the same common usage pattern for Label, justifying this. Removes 3 transactions, explicitly de-duplicating their handlers. * Remove CurrentlyCompletingKeyPair for the non-contextual DkgKeyPair * Remove the manual read/write for TributarySpec for borsh This struct doesn't have any optimizations booned by the manual impl. Using borsh reduces our scope. * Use temporary variables to further minimize LoC in tributary handler * Remove usage of tuples for non-trivial Tributary transactions * Remove serde from dkg serde could be used to deserialize intenrally inconsistent objects which could lead to panics or faults. The BorshDeserialize derives have been replaced with a manual implementation which won't produce inconsistent objects. * Abstract Future generics using new trait definitions in coordinator * Move published_signed_transaction to tributary/mod.rs to reduce the size of main.rs * Split coordinator/src/tributary/mod.rs into spec.rs and transaction.rs
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M::SignMachine::from_cache(params.clone(), keys.remove(&i).unwrap(), cache).0,
);
}
}
},
msg,
)
}
/// Test a basic Schnorr signature with the provided keys.
pub fn test_schnorr_with_keys<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(
rng: &mut R,
keys: &HashMap<Participant, ThresholdKeys<C>>,
) {
const MSG: &[u8] = b"Hello, World!";
let machines = algorithm_machines(&mut *rng, &IetfSchnorr::<C, H>::ietf(), keys);
let sig = sign(&mut *rng, &IetfSchnorr::<C, H>::ietf(), keys.clone(), machines, MSG);
let group_key = keys[&Participant::new(1).unwrap()].group_key();
assert!(sig.verify(group_key, H::hram(&sig.R, &group_key, MSG)));
}
/// Test a basic Schnorr signature.
pub fn test_schnorr<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(rng: &mut R) {
let keys = key_gen(&mut *rng);
test_schnorr_with_keys::<_, _, H>(&mut *rng, &keys)
}
/// Test a basic Schnorr signature, yet with MuSig.
pub fn test_musig_schnorr<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(rng: &mut R) {
let keys = musig_key_gen(&mut *rng);
test_schnorr_with_keys::<_, _, H>(&mut *rng, &keys)
}
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/// Test an offset Schnorr signature.
pub fn test_offset_schnorr<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(rng: &mut R) {
const MSG: &[u8] = b"Hello, World!";
let mut keys = key_gen(&mut *rng);
let group_key = keys[&Participant::new(1).unwrap()].group_key();
let offset = C::F::from(5);
let offset_key = group_key + (C::generator() * offset);
for keys in keys.values_mut() {
*keys = keys.offset(offset);
assert_eq!(keys.group_key(), offset_key);
}
let machines = algorithm_machines(&mut *rng, &IetfSchnorr::<C, H>::ietf(), &keys);
let sig = sign(&mut *rng, &IetfSchnorr::<C, H>::ietf(), keys.clone(), machines, MSG);
let group_key = keys[&Participant::new(1).unwrap()].group_key();
assert!(sig.verify(offset_key, H::hram(&sig.R, &group_key, MSG)));
}
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/// Test blame for an invalid Schnorr signature share.
pub fn test_schnorr_blame<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(rng: &mut R) {
const MSG: &[u8] = b"Hello, World!";
let keys = key_gen(&mut *rng);
let machines = algorithm_machines(&mut *rng, &IetfSchnorr::<C, H>::ietf(), &keys);
let (mut machines, shares) = preprocess_and_shares(&mut *rng, machines, |_, _| {}, MSG);
for (i, machine) in machines.drain() {
let mut shares = clone_without(&shares, &i);
// Select a random participant to give an invalid share
let participants = shares.keys().collect::<Vec<_>>();
let faulty = *participants
[usize::try_from(rng.next_u64() % u64::try_from(participants.len()).unwrap()).unwrap()];
shares.get_mut(&faulty).unwrap().invalidate();
assert_eq!(machine.complete(shares).err(), Some(FrostError::InvalidShare(faulty)));
}
}
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/// Run a variety of tests against a ciphersuite.
pub fn test_ciphersuite<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(rng: &mut R) {
test_schnorr::<R, C, H>(rng);
test_musig_schnorr::<R, C, H>(rng);
test_offset_schnorr::<R, C, H>(rng);
test_schnorr_blame::<R, C, H>(rng);
test_multi_nonce::<R, C>(rng);
}