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* Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
129 lines
4.2 KiB
Rust
129 lines
4.2 KiB
Rust
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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use core::ops::Deref;
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use std_shims::{vec, vec::Vec, collections::HashSet};
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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use std_shims::collections::HashMap;
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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use zeroize::Zeroizing;
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use ciphersuite::{
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group::{Group, GroupEncoding},
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Ciphersuite,
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};
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use crate::DkgError;
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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use crate::{Participant, ThresholdParams, Interpolation, ThresholdCore};
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fn check_keys<C: Ciphersuite>(keys: &[C::G]) -> Result<u16, DkgError<()>> {
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if keys.is_empty() {
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Err(DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?;
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}
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// Too many signers
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let keys_len = u16::try_from(keys.len()).map_err(|_| DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?;
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// Duplicated public keys
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if keys.iter().map(|key| key.to_bytes().as_ref().to_vec()).collect::<HashSet<_>>().len() !=
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keys.len()
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{
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Err(DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?;
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}
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Ok(keys_len)
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}
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// This function panics if called with keys whose length exceed 2**16.
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// This is fine since it's internal and all calls occur after calling check_keys, which does check
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// the keys' length.
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fn binding_factor_transcript<C: Ciphersuite>(
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context: &[u8],
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keys: &[C::G],
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DkgError<()>> {
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let mut transcript = vec![];
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transcript.push(u8::try_from(context.len()).map_err(|_| DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?);
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transcript.extend(context);
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transcript.extend(u16::try_from(keys.len()).unwrap().to_le_bytes());
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for key in keys {
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transcript.extend(key.to_bytes().as_ref());
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}
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Ok(transcript)
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}
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fn binding_factor<C: Ciphersuite>(mut transcript: Vec<u8>, i: u16) -> C::F {
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transcript.extend(i.to_le_bytes());
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C::hash_to_F(b"musig", &transcript)
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}
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/// The group key resulting from using this library's MuSig key gen.
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///
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/// This function will return an error if the context is longer than 255 bytes.
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///
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/// Creating an aggregate key with a list containing duplicated public keys will return an error.
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pub fn musig_key<C: Ciphersuite>(context: &[u8], keys: &[C::G]) -> Result<C::G, DkgError<()>> {
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let keys_len = check_keys::<C>(keys)?;
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let transcript = binding_factor_transcript::<C>(context, keys)?;
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let mut res = C::G::identity();
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for i in 1 ..= keys_len {
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// TODO: Calculate this with a multiexp
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res += keys[usize::from(i - 1)] * binding_factor::<C>(transcript.clone(), i);
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}
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Ok(res)
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}
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/// A n-of-n non-interactive DKG which does not guarantee the usability of the resulting key.
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///
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/// Creating an aggregate key with a list containing duplicated public keys returns an error.
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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pub fn musig<C: Ciphersuite>(
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context: &[u8],
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private_key: &Zeroizing<C::F>,
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keys: &[C::G],
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) -> Result<ThresholdCore<C>, DkgError<()>> {
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let keys_len = check_keys::<C>(keys)?;
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let our_pub_key = C::generator() * private_key.deref();
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let Some(pos) = keys.iter().position(|key| *key == our_pub_key) else {
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// Not present in signing set
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Err(DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?
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};
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let params = ThresholdParams::new(
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keys_len,
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keys_len,
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// These errors shouldn't be possible, as pos is bounded to len - 1
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// Since len is prior guaranteed to be within u16::MAX, pos + 1 must also be
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Participant::new((pos + 1).try_into().map_err(|_| DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?)
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.ok_or(DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?,
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)?;
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// Calculate the binding factor per-key
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let transcript = binding_factor_transcript::<C>(context, keys)?;
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let mut binding = Vec::with_capacity(keys.len());
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for i in 1 ..= keys_len {
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binding.push(binding_factor::<C>(transcript.clone(), i));
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}
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// Our secret share is our private key
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let secret_share = private_key.clone();
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// Calculate verification shares
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let mut verification_shares = HashMap::new();
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let mut group_key = C::G::identity();
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for l in 1 ..= keys_len {
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let key = keys[usize::from(l) - 1];
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group_key += key * binding[usize::from(l - 1)];
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// These errors also shouldn't be possible, for the same reasons as documented above
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verification_shares.insert(Participant::new(l).ok_or(DkgError::InvalidSigningSet)?, key);
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}
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debug_assert_eq!(C::generator() * secret_share.deref(), verification_shares[¶ms.i()]);
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debug_assert_eq!(musig_key::<C>(context, keys).unwrap(), group_key);
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Ok(ThresholdCore::new(
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params,
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Interpolation::Constant(binding),
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secret_share,
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verification_shares,
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))
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}
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