serai/crypto/frost/src/sign.rs

use core::fmt;
use std::{
  io::{self, Read, Write},
  collections::HashMap,
};

use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};

use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};

use transcript::Transcript;

use group::{ff::PrimeField, GroupEncoding};

use crate::{
  curve::Curve,
  FrostError, ThresholdParams, ThresholdKeys, ThresholdView,
  algorithm::{WriteAddendum, Addendum, Algorithm},
  validate_map,
};

pub(crate) use crate::nonce::*;

/// Trait enabling writing preprocesses and signature shares.
pub trait Writable {
  fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>;

  fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
    let mut buf = vec![];
    self.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
    buf
  }
}

impl<T: Writable> Writable for Vec<T> {
  fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
    for w in self {
      w.write(writer)?;
    }
    Ok(())
  }
}

/// Pairing of an Algorithm with a ThresholdKeys instance and this specific signing set.
#[derive(Clone, Zeroize)]
pub struct Params<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> {
  #[zeroize(skip)]
  algorithm: A,
  keys: ThresholdKeys<C>,
  view: ThresholdView<C>,
}
impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> Drop for Params<C, A> {
  fn drop(&mut self) {
    self.zeroize()
  }
}
impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> ZeroizeOnDrop for Params<C, A> {}

impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> Params<C, A> {
  pub fn new(
    algorithm: A,
    keys: ThresholdKeys<C>,
    included: &[u16],
  ) -> Result<Params<C, A>, FrostError> {
    let params = keys.params();

    let mut included = included.to_vec();
    included.sort_unstable();

    // Included < threshold
    if included.len() < usize::from(params.t()) {
      Err(FrostError::InvalidSigningSet("not enough signers"))?;
    }
    // Invalid index
    if included[0] == 0 {
      Err(FrostError::InvalidParticipantIndex(included[0], params.n()))?;
    }
    // OOB index
    if included[included.len() - 1] > params.n() {
      Err(FrostError::InvalidParticipantIndex(included[included.len() - 1], params.n()))?;
    }
    // Same signer included multiple times
    for i in 0 .. (included.len() - 1) {
      if included[i] == included[i + 1] {
        Err(FrostError::DuplicatedIndex(included[i]))?;
      }
    }
    // Not included
    if !included.contains(&params.i()) {
      Err(FrostError::InvalidSigningSet("signing despite not being included"))?;
    }

    // Out of order arguments to prevent additional cloning
    Ok(Params { algorithm, view: keys.view(&included).unwrap(), keys })
  }

  pub fn multisig_params(&self) -> ThresholdParams {
    self.keys.params()
  }

  pub fn view(&self) -> ThresholdView<C> {
    self.view.clone()
  }
}

/// Preprocess for an instance of the FROST signing protocol.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Preprocess<C: Curve, A: Addendum> {
  pub(crate) commitments: Commitments<C>,
  pub addendum: A,
}

impl<C: Curve, A: Addendum> Writable for Preprocess<C, A> {
  fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
    self.commitments.write(writer)?;
    self.addendum.write(writer)
  }
}

/// Trait for the initial state machine of a two-round signing protocol.
pub trait PreprocessMachine {
  /// Preprocess message for this machine.
  type Preprocess: Clone + PartialEq + Writable;
  /// Signature produced by this machine.
  type Signature: Clone + PartialEq + fmt::Debug;
  /// SignMachine this PreprocessMachine turns into.
  type SignMachine: SignMachine<Self::Signature, Preprocess = Self::Preprocess>;

  /// Perform the preprocessing round required in order to sign.
  /// Returns a preprocess message to be broadcast to all participants, over an authenticated
  /// channel.
  fn preprocess<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(self, rng: &mut R)
    -> (Self::SignMachine, Self::Preprocess);
}

/// State machine which manages signing for an arbitrary signature algorithm.
pub struct AlgorithmMachine<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> {
  params: Params<C, A>,
}

impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> AlgorithmMachine<C, A> {
  /// Creates a new machine to generate a signature with the specified keys.
  pub fn new(
    algorithm: A,
    keys: ThresholdKeys<C>,
    included: &[u16],
  ) -> Result<AlgorithmMachine<C, A>, FrostError> {
    Ok(AlgorithmMachine { params: Params::new(algorithm, keys, included)? })
  }

  #[cfg(any(test, feature = "tests"))]
  pub(crate) fn unsafe_override_preprocess(
    self,
    nonces: Vec<Nonce<C>>,
    preprocess: Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>,
  ) -> AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A> {
    AlgorithmSignMachine { params: self.params, nonces, preprocess }
  }
}

impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> PreprocessMachine for AlgorithmMachine<C, A> {
  type Preprocess = Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>;
  type Signature = A::Signature;
  type SignMachine = AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A>;

  fn preprocess<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
    self,
    rng: &mut R,
  ) -> (Self::SignMachine, Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>) {
    let mut params = self.params;

    let (nonces, commitments) = Commitments::new::<_, A::Transcript>(
      &mut *rng,
      params.view().secret_share(),
      &params.algorithm.nonces(),
    );
    let addendum = params.algorithm.preprocess_addendum(rng, &params.view);

    let preprocess = Preprocess { commitments, addendum };
    (AlgorithmSignMachine { params, nonces, preprocess: preprocess.clone() }, preprocess)
  }
}

/// Share of a signature produced via FROST.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SignatureShare<C: Curve>(C::F);
impl<C: Curve> Writable for SignatureShare<C> {
  fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
    writer.write_all(self.0.to_repr().as_ref())
  }
}

/// Trait for the second machine of a two-round signing protocol.
pub trait SignMachine<S> {
  /// Preprocess message for this machine.
  type Preprocess: Clone + PartialEq + Writable;
  /// SignatureShare message for this machine.
  type SignatureShare: Clone + PartialEq + Writable;
  /// SignatureMachine this SignMachine turns into.
  type SignatureMachine: SignatureMachine<S, SignatureShare = Self::SignatureShare>;

  /// Read a Preprocess message.
  fn read_preprocess<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self::Preprocess>;

  /// Sign a message.
  /// Takes in the participants' preprocess messages. Returns the signature share to be broadcast
  /// to all participants, over an authenticated channel.
  fn sign(
    self,
    commitments: HashMap<u16, Self::Preprocess>,
    msg: &[u8],
  ) -> Result<(Self::SignatureMachine, Self::SignatureShare), FrostError>;
}

/// Next step of the state machine for the signing process.
pub struct AlgorithmSignMachine<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> {
  params: Params<C, A>,
  pub(crate) nonces: Vec<Nonce<C>>,
  pub(crate) preprocess: Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>,
}
impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> Zeroize for AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A> {
  fn zeroize(&mut self) {
    self.nonces.zeroize()
  }
}
impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> Drop for AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A> {
  fn drop(&mut self) {
    self.zeroize()
  }
}
impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> ZeroizeOnDrop for AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A> {}

impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> SignMachine<A::Signature> for AlgorithmSignMachine<C, A> {
  type Preprocess = Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>;
  type SignatureShare = SignatureShare<C>;
  type SignatureMachine = AlgorithmSignatureMachine<C, A>;

  fn read_preprocess<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self::Preprocess> {
    Ok(Preprocess {
      commitments: Commitments::read::<_, A::Transcript>(reader, &self.params.algorithm.nonces())?,
      addendum: self.params.algorithm.read_addendum(reader)?,
    })
  }

  fn sign(
    mut self,
    mut preprocesses: HashMap<u16, Preprocess<C, A::Addendum>>,
    msg: &[u8],
  ) -> Result<(Self::SignatureMachine, SignatureShare<C>), FrostError> {
    let multisig_params = self.params.multisig_params();
    validate_map(&preprocesses, &self.params.view.included(), multisig_params.i())?;

    {
      // Domain separate FROST
      self.params.algorithm.transcript().domain_separate(b"FROST");
    }

    let nonces = self.params.algorithm.nonces();
    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
    let mut B = BindingFactor(HashMap::<u16, _>::with_capacity(self.params.view.included().len()));
    {
      // Parse the preprocesses
      for l in &self.params.view.included() {
        {
          self
            .params
            .algorithm
            .transcript()
            .append_message(b"participant", C::F::from(u64::from(*l)).to_repr().as_ref());
        }

        if *l == self.params.keys.params().i() {
          let commitments = self.preprocess.commitments.clone();
          commitments.transcript(self.params.algorithm.transcript());

          let addendum = self.preprocess.addendum.clone();
          {
            let mut buf = vec![];
            addendum.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
            self.params.algorithm.transcript().append_message(b"addendum", &buf);
          }

          B.insert(*l, commitments);
          self.params.algorithm.process_addendum(&self.params.view, *l, addendum)?;
        } else {
          let preprocess = preprocesses.remove(l).unwrap();
          preprocess.commitments.transcript(self.params.algorithm.transcript());
          {
            let mut buf = vec![];
            preprocess.addendum.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
            self.params.algorithm.transcript().append_message(b"addendum", &buf);
          }

          B.insert(*l, preprocess.commitments);
          self.params.algorithm.process_addendum(&self.params.view, *l, preprocess.addendum)?;
        }
      }

      // Re-format into the FROST-expected rho transcript
      let mut rho_transcript = A::Transcript::new(b"FROST_rho");
      rho_transcript.append_message(b"message", &C::hash_msg(msg));
      rho_transcript.append_message(
        b"preprocesses",
        &C::hash_commitments(
          self.params.algorithm.transcript().challenge(b"preprocesses").as_ref(),
        ),
      );

      // Include the offset, if one exists
      // While this isn't part of the FROST-expected rho transcript, the offset being here
      // coincides with another specification (despite the transcript format still being distinct)
      if let Some(offset) = self.params.keys.current_offset() {
        // Transcript as a point
        // Under a coordinated model, the coordinater can be the only party to know the discrete
        // log of the offset. This removes the ability for any signer to provide the discrete log,
        // proving a key is related to another, slightly increasing security
        // While further code edits would still be required for such a model (having the offset
        // communicated as a point along with only a single party applying the offset), this means
        // it wouldn't require a transcript change as well
        rho_transcript.append_message(b"offset", (C::generator() * offset).to_bytes().as_ref());
      }

      // Generate the per-signer binding factors
      B.calculate_binding_factors(&mut rho_transcript);

      // Merge the rho transcript back into the global one to ensure its advanced, while
      // simultaneously committing to everything
      self
        .params
        .algorithm
        .transcript()
        .append_message(b"rho_transcript", rho_transcript.challenge(b"merge").as_ref());
    }

    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
    let Rs = B.nonces(&nonces);

    let our_binding_factors = B.binding_factors(multisig_params.i());
    let mut nonces = self
      .nonces
      .iter()
      .enumerate()
      .map(|(n, nonces)| nonces.0[0] + (nonces.0[1] * our_binding_factors[n]))
      .collect::<Vec<_>>();
    self.nonces.zeroize();

    let share = self.params.algorithm.sign_share(&self.params.view, &Rs, &nonces, msg);
    nonces.zeroize();

    Ok((
      AlgorithmSignatureMachine { params: self.params.clone(), B, Rs, share },
      SignatureShare(share),
    ))
  }
}

/// Trait for the final machine of a two-round signing protocol.
pub trait SignatureMachine<S> {
  /// SignatureShare message for this machine.
  type SignatureShare: Clone + PartialEq + Writable;

  /// Read a Signature Share message.
  fn read_share<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self::SignatureShare>;

  /// Complete signing.
  /// Takes in everyone elses' shares. Returns the signature.
  fn complete(self, shares: HashMap<u16, Self::SignatureShare>) -> Result<S, FrostError>;
}

/// Final step of the state machine for the signing process.
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
pub struct AlgorithmSignatureMachine<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> {
  params: Params<C, A>,
  B: BindingFactor<C>,
  Rs: Vec<Vec<C::G>>,
  share: C::F,
}

impl<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>> SignatureMachine<A::Signature> for AlgorithmSignatureMachine<C, A> {
  type SignatureShare = SignatureShare<C>;

  fn read_share<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<SignatureShare<C>> {
    Ok(SignatureShare(C::read_F(reader)?))
  }

  fn complete(
    self,
    mut shares: HashMap<u16, SignatureShare<C>>,
  ) -> Result<A::Signature, FrostError> {
    let params = self.params.multisig_params();
    validate_map(&shares, &self.params.view.included(), params.i())?;

    let mut responses = HashMap::new();
    responses.insert(params.i(), self.share);
    let mut sum = self.share;
    for (l, share) in shares.drain() {
      responses.insert(l, share.0);
      sum += share.0;
    }

    // Perform signature validation instead of individual share validation
    // For the success route, which should be much more frequent, this should be faster
    // It also acts as an integrity check of this library's signing function
    if let Some(sig) = self.params.algorithm.verify(self.params.view.group_key(), &self.Rs, sum) {
      return Ok(sig);
    }

    // Find out who misbehaved. It may be beneficial to randomly sort this to have detection be
    // within n / 2 on average, and not gameable to n, though that should be minor
    // TODO
    for l in &self.params.view.included() {
      if !self.params.algorithm.verify_share(
        self.params.view.verification_share(*l),
        &self.B.bound(*l),
        responses[l],
      ) {
        Err(FrostError::InvalidShare(*l))?;
      }
    }

    // If everyone has a valid share and there were enough participants, this should've worked
    Err(FrostError::InternalError("everyone had a valid share yet the signature was still invalid"))
  }
}