Files
serai/crypto/schnorr/src/tests/mod.rs
Luke Parker a141deaf36 Smash the singular Ciphersuite trait into multiple
This helps identify where the various functionalities are used, or rather, not
used. The `Ciphersuite` trait present in `patches/ciphersuite`, facilitating
the entire FCMP++ tree, only requires the markers _and_ canonical point
decoding. I've opened a PR to upstream such a trait into `group`
(https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/pull/68).

`WrappedGroup` is still justified for as long as `Group::generator` exists.
Moving `::generator()` to its own trait, on an independent structure (upstream)
would be massively appreciated. @tarcieri also wanted to update from
`fn generator()` to `const GENERATOR`, which would encourage further discussion
on https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/32 and
https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/45, which have been stagnant.

The `Id` trait is occasionally used yet really should be first off the chopping
block.

Finally, `WithPreferredHash` is only actually used around a third of the time,
which more than justifies it being a separate trait.

---

Updates `dalek_ff_group::Scalar` to directly re-export
`curve25519_dalek::Scalar`, as without issue. `dalek_ff_group::RistrettoPoint`
also could be replaced with an export of `curve25519_dalek::RistrettoPoint`,
yet the coordinator relies on how we implemented `Hash` on it for the hell of
it so it isn't worth it at this time. `dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint` can't be
replaced for an re-export of `curve25519_dalek::SubgroupPoint` as it doesn't
implement `zeroize`, `subtle` traits within a released, non-yanked version.
Relevance to https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/201 and
https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/811#issuecomment-3247732746.

Also updates the `Ristretto` ciphersuite to prefer `Blake2b-512` over
`SHA2-512`. In order to maintain compliance with FROST's IETF standard,
`modular-frost` defines its own ciphersuite for Ristretto which still uses
`SHA2-512`.
2025-09-03 13:50:20 -04:00

124 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust

use core::ops::Deref;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use rand_core::OsRng;
use dalek_ff_group::Ed25519;
use ciphersuite::{
group::{ff::Field, Group},
GroupIo, WithPreferredHash,
};
use multiexp::BatchVerifier;
use crate::SchnorrSignature;
#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
use crate::aggregate::{SchnorrAggregator, SchnorrAggregate};
mod rfc8032;
pub(crate) fn sign<C: GroupIo>() {
let private_key = Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
let nonce = Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
let challenge = C::F::random(&mut OsRng); // Doesn't bother to craft an HRAm
assert!(SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(&private_key, nonce, challenge)
.verify(C::generator() * private_key.deref(), challenge));
}
// The above sign function verifies signing works
// This verifies invalid signatures don't pass, using zero signatures, which should effectively be
// random
pub(crate) fn verify<C: GroupIo>() {
assert!(!SchnorrSignature::<C> { R: C::G::identity(), s: C::F::ZERO }
.verify(C::generator() * C::F::random(&mut OsRng), C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
}
pub(crate) fn batch_verify<C: GroupIo>() {
// Create 5 signatures
let mut keys = vec![];
let mut challenges = vec![];
let mut sigs = vec![];
for i in 0 .. 5 {
keys.push(Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
challenges.push(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
sigs.push(SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(
&keys[i],
Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)),
challenges[i],
));
}
// Batch verify
{
let mut batch = BatchVerifier::new(5);
for (i, sig) in sigs.iter().enumerate() {
sig.batch_verify(&mut OsRng, &mut batch, i, C::generator() * keys[i].deref(), challenges[i]);
}
batch.verify_vartime_with_vartime_blame().unwrap();
}
// Shift 1 from s from one to another and verify it fails
// This test will fail if unique factors aren't used per-signature, hence its inclusion
{
let mut batch = BatchVerifier::new(5);
for (i, mut sig) in sigs.clone().drain(..).enumerate() {
if i == 1 {
sig.s += C::F::ONE;
}
if i == 2 {
sig.s -= C::F::ONE;
}
sig.batch_verify(&mut OsRng, &mut batch, i, C::generator() * keys[i].deref(), challenges[i]);
}
if let Err(blame) = batch.verify_vartime_with_vartime_blame() {
assert!((blame == 1) || (blame == 2));
} else {
panic!("Batch verification considered malleated signatures valid");
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
pub(crate) fn aggregate<C: GroupIo + WithPreferredHash>() {
const DST: &[u8] = b"Schnorr Aggregator Test";
// Create 5 signatures
let mut keys = vec![];
let mut challenges = vec![];
let mut aggregator = SchnorrAggregator::<C>::new(DST);
for i in 0 .. 5 {
keys.push(Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
// In practice, this MUST be a secure challenge binding to the nonce, key, and any message
challenges.push(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
aggregator.aggregate(
challenges[i],
SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(
&keys[i],
Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)),
challenges[i],
),
);
}
let aggregate = aggregator.complete().unwrap();
let aggregate =
SchnorrAggregate::<C>::read::<&[u8]>(&mut aggregate.serialize().as_ref()).unwrap();
assert!(aggregate.verify(
DST,
keys
.iter()
.map(|key| C::generator() * key.deref())
.zip(challenges.iter().copied())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.as_ref(),
));
}
#[test]
fn test() {
sign::<Ed25519>();
verify::<Ed25519>();
batch_verify::<Ed25519>();
#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
aggregate::<Ed25519>();
}