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This helps identify where the various functionalities are used, or rather, not used. The `Ciphersuite` trait present in `patches/ciphersuite`, facilitating the entire FCMP++ tree, only requires the markers _and_ canonical point decoding. I've opened a PR to upstream such a trait into `group` (https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/pull/68). `WrappedGroup` is still justified for as long as `Group::generator` exists. Moving `::generator()` to its own trait, on an independent structure (upstream) would be massively appreciated. @tarcieri also wanted to update from `fn generator()` to `const GENERATOR`, which would encourage further discussion on https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/32 and https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/45, which have been stagnant. The `Id` trait is occasionally used yet really should be first off the chopping block. Finally, `WithPreferredHash` is only actually used around a third of the time, which more than justifies it being a separate trait. --- Updates `dalek_ff_group::Scalar` to directly re-export `curve25519_dalek::Scalar`, as without issue. `dalek_ff_group::RistrettoPoint` also could be replaced with an export of `curve25519_dalek::RistrettoPoint`, yet the coordinator relies on how we implemented `Hash` on it for the hell of it so it isn't worth it at this time. `dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint` can't be replaced for an re-export of `curve25519_dalek::SubgroupPoint` as it doesn't implement `zeroize`, `subtle` traits within a released, non-yanked version. Relevance to https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/201 and https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/811#issuecomment-3247732746. Also updates the `Ristretto` ciphersuite to prefer `Blake2b-512` over `SHA2-512`. In order to maintain compliance with FROST's IETF standard, `modular-frost` defines its own ciphersuite for Ristretto which still uses `SHA2-512`.
124 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
124 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
use core::ops::Deref;
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use zeroize::Zeroizing;
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use rand_core::OsRng;
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use dalek_ff_group::Ed25519;
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use ciphersuite::{
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group::{ff::Field, Group},
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GroupIo, WithPreferredHash,
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};
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use multiexp::BatchVerifier;
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use crate::SchnorrSignature;
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#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
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use crate::aggregate::{SchnorrAggregator, SchnorrAggregate};
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mod rfc8032;
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pub(crate) fn sign<C: GroupIo>() {
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let private_key = Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
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let nonce = Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
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let challenge = C::F::random(&mut OsRng); // Doesn't bother to craft an HRAm
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assert!(SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(&private_key, nonce, challenge)
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.verify(C::generator() * private_key.deref(), challenge));
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}
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// The above sign function verifies signing works
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// This verifies invalid signatures don't pass, using zero signatures, which should effectively be
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// random
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pub(crate) fn verify<C: GroupIo>() {
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assert!(!SchnorrSignature::<C> { R: C::G::identity(), s: C::F::ZERO }
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.verify(C::generator() * C::F::random(&mut OsRng), C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
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}
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pub(crate) fn batch_verify<C: GroupIo>() {
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// Create 5 signatures
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let mut keys = vec![];
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let mut challenges = vec![];
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let mut sigs = vec![];
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for i in 0 .. 5 {
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keys.push(Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
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challenges.push(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
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sigs.push(SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(
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&keys[i],
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Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)),
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challenges[i],
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));
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}
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// Batch verify
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{
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let mut batch = BatchVerifier::new(5);
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for (i, sig) in sigs.iter().enumerate() {
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sig.batch_verify(&mut OsRng, &mut batch, i, C::generator() * keys[i].deref(), challenges[i]);
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}
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batch.verify_vartime_with_vartime_blame().unwrap();
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}
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// Shift 1 from s from one to another and verify it fails
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// This test will fail if unique factors aren't used per-signature, hence its inclusion
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{
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let mut batch = BatchVerifier::new(5);
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for (i, mut sig) in sigs.clone().drain(..).enumerate() {
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if i == 1 {
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sig.s += C::F::ONE;
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}
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if i == 2 {
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sig.s -= C::F::ONE;
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}
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sig.batch_verify(&mut OsRng, &mut batch, i, C::generator() * keys[i].deref(), challenges[i]);
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}
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if let Err(blame) = batch.verify_vartime_with_vartime_blame() {
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assert!((blame == 1) || (blame == 2));
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} else {
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panic!("Batch verification considered malleated signatures valid");
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
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pub(crate) fn aggregate<C: GroupIo + WithPreferredHash>() {
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const DST: &[u8] = b"Schnorr Aggregator Test";
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// Create 5 signatures
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let mut keys = vec![];
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let mut challenges = vec![];
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let mut aggregator = SchnorrAggregator::<C>::new(DST);
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for i in 0 .. 5 {
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keys.push(Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
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// In practice, this MUST be a secure challenge binding to the nonce, key, and any message
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challenges.push(C::F::random(&mut OsRng));
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aggregator.aggregate(
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challenges[i],
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SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(
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&keys[i],
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Zeroizing::new(C::F::random(&mut OsRng)),
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challenges[i],
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),
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);
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}
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let aggregate = aggregator.complete().unwrap();
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let aggregate =
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SchnorrAggregate::<C>::read::<&[u8]>(&mut aggregate.serialize().as_ref()).unwrap();
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assert!(aggregate.verify(
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DST,
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keys
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.iter()
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.map(|key| C::generator() * key.deref())
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.zip(challenges.iter().copied())
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.collect::<Vec<_>>()
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.as_ref(),
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));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test() {
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sign::<Ed25519>();
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verify::<Ed25519>();
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batch_verify::<Ed25519>();
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#[cfg(feature = "aggregate")]
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aggregate::<Ed25519>();
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}
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