mirror of
https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
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1) Removes the key image DLEq on the Monero side of things, as the produced signature share serves as a DLEq for it. 2) Removes the nonce DLEqs from modular-frost as they're unnecessary for monero-serai. Updates documentation accordingly. Without the proof the nonces are internally consistent, the produced signatures from modular-frost can be argued as a batch-verifiable CP93 DLEq (R0, R1, s), or as a GSP for the CP93 DLEq statement (which naturally produces (R0, R1, s)). The lack of proving the nonces consistent does make the process weaker, yet it's also unnecessary for the class of protocols this is intended to service. To provide DLEqs for the nonces would be to provide PoKs for the nonce commitments (in the traditional Schnorr case).
343 lines
10 KiB
Rust
343 lines
10 KiB
Rust
#![allow(non_snake_case)]
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use core::ops::Deref;
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use std_shims::{
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vec::Vec,
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io::{self, Read, Write},
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};
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};
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use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, ConditionallySelectable};
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use curve25519_dalek::{
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constants::{ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT},
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scalar::Scalar,
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traits::{IsIdentity, MultiscalarMul, VartimePrecomputedMultiscalarMul},
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edwards::{EdwardsPoint, VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation},
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};
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use crate::{
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INV_EIGHT, BASEPOINT_PRECOMP, Commitment, random_scalar, hash_to_scalar, wallet::decoys::Decoys,
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ringct::hash_to_point, serialize::*,
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};
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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mod multisig;
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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pub use multisig::{ClsagDetails, ClsagAddendum, ClsagMultisig};
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/// Errors returned when CLSAG signing fails.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", derive(thiserror::Error))]
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pub enum ClsagError {
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("internal error ({0})"))]
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InternalError(&'static str),
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid ring"))]
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InvalidRing,
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid ring member (member {0}, ring size {1})"))]
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InvalidRingMember(u8, u8),
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid commitment"))]
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InvalidCommitment,
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid key image"))]
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InvalidImage,
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid D"))]
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InvalidD,
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid s"))]
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InvalidS,
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#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid c1"))]
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InvalidC1,
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}
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/// Input being signed for.
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
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pub struct ClsagInput {
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// The actual commitment for the true spend
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pub(crate) commitment: Commitment,
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// True spend index, offsets, and ring
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pub(crate) decoys: Decoys,
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}
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impl ClsagInput {
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pub fn new(commitment: Commitment, decoys: Decoys) -> Result<ClsagInput, ClsagError> {
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let n = decoys.len();
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if n > u8::MAX.into() {
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Err(ClsagError::InternalError("max ring size in this library is u8 max"))?;
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}
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let n = u8::try_from(n).unwrap();
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if decoys.i >= n {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidRingMember(decoys.i, n))?;
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}
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// Validate the commitment matches
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if decoys.ring[usize::from(decoys.i)][1] != commitment.calculate() {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidCommitment)?;
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}
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Ok(ClsagInput { commitment, decoys })
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}
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}
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#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
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enum Mode {
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Sign(usize, EdwardsPoint, EdwardsPoint),
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Verify(Scalar),
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}
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// Core of the CLSAG algorithm, applicable to both sign and verify with minimal differences
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// Said differences are covered via the above Mode
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fn core(
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ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
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I: &EdwardsPoint,
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pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
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msg: &[u8; 32],
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D: &EdwardsPoint,
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s: &[Scalar],
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A_c1: &Mode,
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) -> ((EdwardsPoint, Scalar, Scalar), Scalar) {
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let n = ring.len();
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let images_precomp = match A_c1 {
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Mode::Sign(..) => None,
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Mode::Verify(..) => Some(VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation::new([I, D])),
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};
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let D_INV_EIGHT = D * INV_EIGHT();
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// Generate the transcript
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// Instead of generating multiple, a single transcript is created and then edited as needed
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const PREFIX: &[u8] = b"CLSAG_";
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#[rustfmt::skip]
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const AGG_0: &[u8] = b"agg_0";
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#[rustfmt::skip]
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const ROUND: &[u8] = b"round";
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const PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN: usize = PREFIX.len() + AGG_0.len();
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let mut to_hash = Vec::with_capacity(((2 * n) + 5) * 32);
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to_hash.extend(PREFIX);
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to_hash.extend(AGG_0);
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to_hash.extend([0; 32 - PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN]);
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let mut P = Vec::with_capacity(n);
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for member in ring {
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P.push(member[0]);
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to_hash.extend(member[0].compress().to_bytes());
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}
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let mut C = Vec::with_capacity(n);
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for member in ring {
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C.push(member[1] - pseudo_out);
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to_hash.extend(member[1].compress().to_bytes());
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}
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to_hash.extend(I.compress().to_bytes());
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to_hash.extend(D_INV_EIGHT.compress().to_bytes());
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to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
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// mu_P with agg_0
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let mu_P = hash_to_scalar(&to_hash);
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// mu_C with agg_1
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to_hash[PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN - 1] = b'1';
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let mu_C = hash_to_scalar(&to_hash);
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// Truncate it for the round transcript, altering the DST as needed
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to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 1) * 32);
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for i in 0 .. ROUND.len() {
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to_hash[PREFIX.len() + i] = ROUND[i];
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}
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// Unfortunately, it's I D pseudo_out instead of pseudo_out I D, meaning this needs to be
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// truncated just to add it back
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to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
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to_hash.extend(msg);
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// Configure the loop based on if we're signing or verifying
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let start;
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let end;
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let mut c;
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match A_c1 {
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Mode::Sign(r, A, AH) => {
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start = r + 1;
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end = r + n;
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to_hash.extend(A.compress().to_bytes());
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to_hash.extend(AH.compress().to_bytes());
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c = hash_to_scalar(&to_hash);
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}
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Mode::Verify(c1) => {
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start = 0;
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end = n;
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c = *c1;
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}
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}
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// Perform the core loop
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let mut c1 = c;
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for i in (start .. end).map(|i| i % n) {
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let c_p = mu_P * c;
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let c_c = mu_C * c;
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// (s_i * G) + (c_p * P_i) + (c_c * C_i)
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let L = match A_c1 {
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Mode::Sign(..) => {
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EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([s[i], c_p, c_c], [ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT, P[i], C[i]])
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}
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Mode::Verify(..) => {
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BASEPOINT_PRECOMP().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([s[i]], [c_p, c_c], [P[i], C[i]])
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}
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};
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let PH = hash_to_point(&P[i]);
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// (c_p * I) + (c_c * D) + (s_i * PH)
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let R = match A_c1 {
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Mode::Sign(..) => EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c, s[i]], [I, D, &PH]),
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Mode::Verify(..) => {
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images_precomp.as_ref().unwrap().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c], [s[i]], [PH])
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}
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};
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to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 3) * 32);
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to_hash.extend(L.compress().to_bytes());
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to_hash.extend(R.compress().to_bytes());
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c = hash_to_scalar(&to_hash);
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// This will only execute once and shouldn't need to be constant time. Making it constant time
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// removes the risk of branch prediction creating timing differences depending on ring index
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// however
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c1.conditional_assign(&c, i.ct_eq(&(n - 1)));
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}
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// This first tuple is needed to continue signing, the latter is the c to be tested/worked with
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((D_INV_EIGHT, c * mu_P, c * mu_C), c1)
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}
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/// CLSAG signature, as used in Monero.
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
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pub struct Clsag {
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pub D: EdwardsPoint,
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pub s: Vec<Scalar>,
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pub c1: Scalar,
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}
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impl Clsag {
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// Sign core is the extension of core as needed for signing, yet is shared between single signer
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// and multisig, hence why it's still core
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pub(crate) fn sign_core<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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I: &EdwardsPoint,
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input: &ClsagInput,
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mask: Scalar,
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msg: &[u8; 32],
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A: EdwardsPoint,
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AH: EdwardsPoint,
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) -> (Clsag, EdwardsPoint, Scalar, Scalar) {
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let r: usize = input.decoys.i.into();
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let pseudo_out = Commitment::new(mask, input.commitment.amount).calculate();
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let z = input.commitment.mask - mask;
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let H = hash_to_point(&input.decoys.ring[r][0]);
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let D = H * z;
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let mut s = Vec::with_capacity(input.decoys.ring.len());
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for _ in 0 .. input.decoys.ring.len() {
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s.push(random_scalar(rng));
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}
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let ((D, p, c), c1) =
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core(&input.decoys.ring, I, &pseudo_out, msg, &D, &s, &Mode::Sign(r, A, AH));
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(Clsag { D, s, c1 }, pseudo_out, p, c * z)
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}
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/// Generate CLSAG signatures for the given inputs.
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/// inputs is of the form (private key, key image, input).
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/// sum_outputs is for the sum of the outputs' commitment masks.
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pub fn sign<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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mut inputs: Vec<(Zeroizing<Scalar>, EdwardsPoint, ClsagInput)>,
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sum_outputs: Scalar,
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msg: [u8; 32],
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) -> Vec<(Clsag, EdwardsPoint)> {
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let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(inputs.len());
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let mut sum_pseudo_outs = Scalar::ZERO;
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for i in 0 .. inputs.len() {
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let mut mask = random_scalar(rng);
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if i == (inputs.len() - 1) {
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mask = sum_outputs - sum_pseudo_outs;
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} else {
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sum_pseudo_outs += mask;
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}
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let mut nonce = Zeroizing::new(random_scalar(rng));
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let (mut clsag, pseudo_out, p, c) = Clsag::sign_core(
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rng,
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&inputs[i].1,
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&inputs[i].2,
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mask,
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&msg,
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nonce.deref() * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
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nonce.deref() *
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hash_to_point(&inputs[i].2.decoys.ring[usize::from(inputs[i].2.decoys.i)][0]),
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);
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// Effectively r - cx, except cx is (c_p x) + (c_c z), where z is the delta between a ring
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// member's commitment and our input commitment (which will only have a known discrete log
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// over G if the amounts cancel out)
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clsag.s[usize::from(inputs[i].2.decoys.i)] = nonce.deref() - ((p * inputs[i].0.deref()) + c);
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inputs[i].0.zeroize();
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nonce.zeroize();
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debug_assert!(clsag
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.verify(&inputs[i].2.decoys.ring, &inputs[i].1, &pseudo_out, &msg)
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.is_ok());
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res.push((clsag, pseudo_out));
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}
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res
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}
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/// Verify the CLSAG signature against the given Transaction data.
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pub fn verify(
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&self,
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ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
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I: &EdwardsPoint,
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pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
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msg: &[u8; 32],
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) -> Result<(), ClsagError> {
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// Preliminary checks. s, c1, and points must also be encoded canonically, which isn't checked
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// here
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if ring.is_empty() {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidRing)?;
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}
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if ring.len() != self.s.len() {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidS)?;
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}
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if I.is_identity() {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidImage)?;
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}
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let D = self.D.mul_by_cofactor();
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if D.is_identity() {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidD)?;
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}
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let (_, c1) = core(ring, I, pseudo_out, msg, &D, &self.s, &Mode::Verify(self.c1));
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if c1 != self.c1 {
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Err(ClsagError::InvalidC1)?;
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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pub(crate) fn fee_weight(ring_len: usize) -> usize {
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(ring_len * 32) + 32 + 32
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}
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pub fn write<W: Write>(&self, w: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
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write_raw_vec(write_scalar, &self.s, w)?;
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w.write_all(&self.c1.to_bytes())?;
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write_point(&self.D, w)
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}
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pub fn read<R: Read>(decoys: usize, r: &mut R) -> io::Result<Clsag> {
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Ok(Clsag { s: read_raw_vec(read_scalar, decoys, r)?, c1: read_scalar(r)?, D: read_point(r)? })
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}
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}
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