Files
serai/coordinator/tributary-sdk/src/tests/transaction/tendermint.rs
Luke Parker a141deaf36 Smash the singular Ciphersuite trait into multiple
This helps identify where the various functionalities are used, or rather, not
used. The `Ciphersuite` trait present in `patches/ciphersuite`, facilitating
the entire FCMP++ tree, only requires the markers _and_ canonical point
decoding. I've opened a PR to upstream such a trait into `group`
(https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/pull/68).

`WrappedGroup` is still justified for as long as `Group::generator` exists.
Moving `::generator()` to its own trait, on an independent structure (upstream)
would be massively appreciated. @tarcieri also wanted to update from
`fn generator()` to `const GENERATOR`, which would encourage further discussion
on https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/32 and
https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/45, which have been stagnant.

The `Id` trait is occasionally used yet really should be first off the chopping
block.

Finally, `WithPreferredHash` is only actually used around a third of the time,
which more than justifies it being a separate trait.

---

Updates `dalek_ff_group::Scalar` to directly re-export
`curve25519_dalek::Scalar`, as without issue. `dalek_ff_group::RistrettoPoint`
also could be replaced with an export of `curve25519_dalek::RistrettoPoint`,
yet the coordinator relies on how we implemented `Hash` on it for the hell of
it so it isn't worth it at this time. `dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint` can't be
replaced for an re-export of `curve25519_dalek::SubgroupPoint` as it doesn't
implement `zeroize`, `subtle` traits within a released, non-yanked version.
Relevance to https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/201 and
https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/811#issuecomment-3247732746.

Also updates the `Ristretto` ciphersuite to prefer `Blake2b-512` over
`SHA2-512`. In order to maintain compliance with FROST's IETF standard,
`modular-frost` defines its own ciphersuite for Ristretto which still uses
`SHA2-512`.
2025-09-03 13:50:20 -04:00

301 lines
10 KiB
Rust

use std::sync::Arc;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use rand::{RngCore, rngs::OsRng};
use dalek_ff_group::Ristretto;
use ciphersuite::*;
use scale::Encode;
use tendermint::{
time::CanonicalInstant,
round::RoundData,
Data, commit_msg, Evidence,
ext::{RoundNumber, Commit, Signer as SignerTrait},
};
use serai_db::MemDb;
use crate::{
ReadWrite,
tendermint::{
tx::{TendermintTx, verify_tendermint_tx},
TendermintBlock, Signer, Validators, TendermintNetwork,
},
tests::{
p2p::DummyP2p, SignedTransaction, random_evidence_tx, tendermint_meta, signed_from_data,
},
};
type N = TendermintNetwork<MemDb, SignedTransaction, DummyP2p>;
#[tokio::test]
async fn serialize_tendermint() {
// make a tendermint tx with random evidence
let (_, signer, _, _) = tendermint_meta().await;
let tx = random_evidence_tx::<N>(signer.into(), TendermintBlock(vec![])).await;
let res = TendermintTx::read::<&[u8]>(&mut tx.serialize().as_ref()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(res, tx);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn invalid_valid_round() {
// signer
let (_, signer, signer_id, validators) = tendermint_meta().await;
let commit = |_: u64| -> Option<Commit<Arc<Validators>>> {
Some(Commit::<Arc<Validators>> { end_time: 0, validators: vec![], signature: vec![] })
};
let valid_round_tx = |valid_round| {
let signer = signer.clone();
async move {
let data = Data::Proposal(valid_round, TendermintBlock(vec![]));
let signed = signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 0, 0, data).await;
(signed.clone(), TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidValidRound(signed.encode())))
}
};
// This should be invalid evidence if a valid valid round is specified
let (_, tx) = valid_round_tx(None).await;
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
// If an invalid valid round is specified (>= current), this should be invalid evidence
let (mut signed, tx) = valid_round_tx(Some(RoundNumber(0))).await;
// should pass
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap();
// change the signature
let mut random_sig = [0u8; 64];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut random_sig);
signed.sig = random_sig;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidValidRound(signed.encode()));
// should fail
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn invalid_precommit_signature() {
let (_, signer, signer_id, validators) = tendermint_meta().await;
let commit = |i: u64| -> Option<Commit<Arc<Validators>>> {
assert_eq!(i, 0);
Some(Commit::<Arc<Validators>> { end_time: 0, validators: vec![], signature: vec![] })
};
let precommit = |precommit| {
let signer = signer.clone();
async move {
let signed =
signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 1, 0, Data::Precommit(precommit))
.await;
(signed.clone(), TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidPrecommit(signed.encode())))
}
};
// Empty Precommit should fail.
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&precommit(None).await.1, &validators, commit).is_err());
// valid precommit signature should fail.
let block_id = [0x22u8; 32];
let last_end_time =
RoundData::<N>::new(RoundNumber(0), CanonicalInstant::new(commit(0).unwrap().end_time))
.end_time();
let commit_msg = commit_msg(last_end_time.canonical(), block_id.as_ref());
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(
&precommit(Some((block_id, signer.clone().sign(&commit_msg).await))).await.1,
&validators,
commit
)
.is_err());
// any other signature can be used as evidence.
{
let (mut signed, tx) = precommit(Some((block_id, signer.sign(&[]).await))).await;
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap();
// So long as we can authenticate where it came from
let mut random_sig = [0u8; 64];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut random_sig);
signed.sig = random_sig;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidPrecommit(signed.encode()));
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn evidence_with_prevote() {
let (_, signer, signer_id, validators) = tendermint_meta().await;
let commit = |_: u64| -> Option<Commit<Arc<Validators>>> {
Some(Commit::<Arc<Validators>> { end_time: 0, validators: vec![], signature: vec![] })
};
let prevote = |block_id| {
let signer = signer.clone();
async move {
// it should fail for all reasons.
let mut txs = vec![];
txs.push(TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidPrecommit(
signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 0, 0, Data::Prevote(block_id))
.await
.encode(),
)));
txs.push(TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::InvalidValidRound(
signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 0, 0, Data::Prevote(block_id))
.await
.encode(),
)));
// Since these require a second message, provide this one again
// ConflictingMessages can be fired for actually conflicting Prevotes however
txs.push(TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 0, 0, Data::Prevote(block_id))
.await
.encode(),
signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, 0, 0, Data::Prevote(block_id))
.await
.encode(),
)));
txs
}
};
// No prevote message alone should be valid as slash evidence at this time
for prevote in prevote(None).await {
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&prevote, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
for prevote in prevote(Some([0x22u8; 32])).await {
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&prevote, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn conflicting_msgs_evidence_tx() {
let (genesis, signer, signer_id, validators) = tendermint_meta().await;
let commit = |i: u64| -> Option<Commit<Arc<Validators>>> {
assert_eq!(i, 0);
Some(Commit::<Arc<Validators>> { end_time: 0, validators: vec![], signature: vec![] })
};
// Block b, round n
let signed_for_b_r = |block, round, data| {
let signer = signer.clone();
async move { signed_from_data::<N>(signer.clone().into(), signer_id, block, round, data).await }
};
// Proposal
{
// non-conflicting data should fail
let signed_1 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x11]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_1.encode(),
));
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
// conflicting data should pass
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x22]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap();
// Except if it has a distinct round number, as we don't check cross-round conflicts
// (except for Precommit)
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(0, 1, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x22]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap_err();
// Proposals for different block numbers should also fail as evidence
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(1, 0, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x22]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap_err();
}
// Prevote
{
// non-conflicting data should fail
let signed_1 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Prevote(Some([0x11; 32]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_1.encode(),
));
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
// conflicting data should pass
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Prevote(Some([0x22; 32]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap();
// Except if it has a distinct round number, as we don't check cross-round conflicts
// (except for Precommit)
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(0, 1, Data::Prevote(Some([0x22; 32]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap_err();
// Proposals for different block numbers should also fail as evidence
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(1, 0, Data::Prevote(Some([0x22; 32]))).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).unwrap_err();
}
// msgs from different senders should fail
{
let signed_1 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x11]))).await;
let signer_2 =
Signer::new(genesis, Zeroizing::new(<Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::F::random(&mut OsRng)));
let signed_id_2 = signer_2.validator_id().await.unwrap();
let signed_2 = signed_from_data::<N>(
signer_2.into(),
signed_id_2,
0,
0,
Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![0x22])),
)
.await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
// update schema so that we don't fail due to invalid signature
let signer_pub = <Ristretto as GroupIo>::read_G::<&[u8]>(&mut signer_id.as_slice()).unwrap();
let signer_pub_2 =
<Ristretto as GroupIo>::read_G::<&[u8]>(&mut signed_id_2.as_slice()).unwrap();
let validators =
Arc::new(Validators::new(genesis, vec![(signer_pub, 1), (signer_pub_2, 1)]).unwrap());
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
// msgs with different steps should fail
{
let signed_1 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Proposal(None, TendermintBlock(vec![]))).await;
let signed_2 = signed_for_b_r(0, 0, Data::Prevote(None)).await;
let tx = TendermintTx::SlashEvidence(Evidence::ConflictingMessages(
signed_1.encode(),
signed_2.encode(),
));
assert!(verify_tendermint_tx::<N>(&tx, &validators, commit).is_err());
}
}