Files
serai/coordinator/tributary-sdk/src/transaction.rs
Luke Parker a141deaf36 Smash the singular Ciphersuite trait into multiple
This helps identify where the various functionalities are used, or rather, not
used. The `Ciphersuite` trait present in `patches/ciphersuite`, facilitating
the entire FCMP++ tree, only requires the markers _and_ canonical point
decoding. I've opened a PR to upstream such a trait into `group`
(https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/pull/68).

`WrappedGroup` is still justified for as long as `Group::generator` exists.
Moving `::generator()` to its own trait, on an independent structure (upstream)
would be massively appreciated. @tarcieri also wanted to update from
`fn generator()` to `const GENERATOR`, which would encourage further discussion
on https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/32 and
https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/45, which have been stagnant.

The `Id` trait is occasionally used yet really should be first off the chopping
block.

Finally, `WithPreferredHash` is only actually used around a third of the time,
which more than justifies it being a separate trait.

---

Updates `dalek_ff_group::Scalar` to directly re-export
`curve25519_dalek::Scalar`, as without issue. `dalek_ff_group::RistrettoPoint`
also could be replaced with an export of `curve25519_dalek::RistrettoPoint`,
yet the coordinator relies on how we implemented `Hash` on it for the hell of
it so it isn't worth it at this time. `dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint` can't be
replaced for an re-export of `curve25519_dalek::SubgroupPoint` as it doesn't
implement `zeroize`, `subtle` traits within a released, non-yanked version.
Relevance to https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/201 and
https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/811#issuecomment-3247732746.

Also updates the `Ristretto` ciphersuite to prefer `Blake2b-512` over
`SHA2-512`. In order to maintain compliance with FROST's IETF standard,
`modular-frost` defines its own ciphersuite for Ristretto which still uses
`SHA2-512`.
2025-09-03 13:50:20 -04:00

220 lines
7.4 KiB
Rust

use core::fmt::Debug;
use std::io;
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use thiserror::Error;
use blake2::{Digest, Blake2b512};
use ciphersuite::{
group::{Group, GroupEncoding},
*,
};
use dalek_ff_group::Ristretto;
use schnorr::SchnorrSignature;
use crate::{TRANSACTION_SIZE_LIMIT, ReadWrite};
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Error)]
pub enum TransactionError {
/// Transaction exceeded the size limit.
#[error("transaction is too large")]
TooLargeTransaction,
/// Transaction's signer isn't a participant.
#[error("invalid signer")]
InvalidSigner,
/// Transaction's nonce isn't the prior nonce plus one.
#[error("invalid nonce")]
InvalidNonce,
/// Transaction's signature is invalid.
#[error("invalid signature")]
InvalidSignature,
/// Transaction's content is invalid.
#[error("transaction content is invalid")]
InvalidContent,
/// Transaction's signer has too many transactions in the mempool.
#[error("signer has too many transactions in the mempool")]
TooManyInMempool,
/// Provided Transaction added to mempool.
#[error("provided transaction added to mempool")]
ProvidedAddedToMempool,
}
/// Data for a signed transaction.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct Signed {
pub signer: <Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::G,
pub nonce: u32,
pub signature: SchnorrSignature<Ristretto>,
}
impl ReadWrite for Signed {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self> {
let signer = Ristretto::read_G(reader)?;
let mut nonce = [0; 4];
reader.read_exact(&mut nonce)?;
let nonce = u32::from_le_bytes(nonce);
if nonce >= (u32::MAX - 1) {
Err(io::Error::other("nonce exceeded limit"))?;
}
let mut signature = SchnorrSignature::<Ristretto>::read(reader)?;
if signature.R.is_identity().into() {
// Anyone malicious could remove this and try to find zero signatures
// We should never produce zero signatures though meaning this should never come up
// If it does somehow come up, this is a decent courtesy
signature.zeroize();
Err(io::Error::other("signature nonce was identity"))?;
}
Ok(Signed { signer, nonce, signature })
}
fn write<W: io::Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
// This is either an invalid signature or a private key leak
if self.signature.R.is_identity().into() {
Err(io::Error::other("signature nonce was identity"))?;
}
writer.write_all(&self.signer.to_bytes())?;
writer.write_all(&self.nonce.to_le_bytes())?;
self.signature.write(writer)
}
}
impl Signed {
pub fn read_without_nonce<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, nonce: u32) -> io::Result<Self> {
let signer = Ristretto::read_G(reader)?;
let mut signature = SchnorrSignature::<Ristretto>::read(reader)?;
if signature.R.is_identity().into() {
// Anyone malicious could remove this and try to find zero signatures
// We should never produce zero signatures though meaning this should never come up
// If it does somehow come up, this is a decent courtesy
signature.zeroize();
Err(io::Error::other("signature nonce was identity"))?;
}
Ok(Signed { signer, nonce, signature })
}
pub fn write_without_nonce<W: io::Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
// This is either an invalid signature or a private key leak
if self.signature.R.is_identity().into() {
Err(io::Error::other("signature nonce was identity"))?;
}
writer.write_all(&self.signer.to_bytes())?;
self.signature.write(writer)
}
}
#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub enum TransactionKind {
/// This transaction should be provided by every validator, in an exact order.
///
/// The contained static string names the orderer to use. This allows two distinct provided
/// transaction kinds, without a synchronized order, to be ordered within their own kind without
/// requiring ordering with each other.
///
/// The only malleability is in when this transaction appears on chain. The block producer will
/// include it when they have it. Block verification will fail for validators without it.
///
/// If a supermajority of validators produce a commit for a block with a provided transaction
/// which isn't locally held, the block will be added to the local chain. When the transaction is
/// locally provided, it will be compared for correctness to the on-chain version
///
/// In order to ensure TXs aren't accidentally provided multiple times, all provided transactions
/// must have a unique hash which is also unique to all Unsigned transactions.
Provided(&'static str),
/// An unsigned transaction, only able to be included by the block producer.
///
/// Once an Unsigned transaction is included on-chain, it may not be included again. In order to
/// have multiple Unsigned transactions with the same values included on-chain, some distinct
/// nonce must be included in order to cause a distinct hash.
///
/// The hash must also be unique with all Provided transactions.
Unsigned,
/// A signed transaction.
Signed(Vec<u8>, Signed),
}
// TODO: Should this be renamed TransactionTrait now that a literal Transaction exists?
// Or should the literal Transaction be renamed to Event?
pub trait Transaction: 'static + Send + Sync + Clone + Eq + Debug + ReadWrite {
/// Return what type of transaction this is.
fn kind(&self) -> TransactionKind;
/// Return the hash of this transaction.
///
/// The hash must NOT commit to the signature.
fn hash(&self) -> [u8; 32];
/// Perform transaction-specific verification.
fn verify(&self) -> Result<(), TransactionError>;
/// Obtain the challenge for this transaction's signature.
///
/// Do not override this unless you know what you're doing.
///
/// Panics if called on non-signed transactions.
fn sig_hash(&self, genesis: [u8; 32]) -> <Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::F {
match self.kind() {
TransactionKind::Signed(order, Signed { signature, .. }) => {
<Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::F::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(
&Blake2b512::digest(
[
b"Tributary Signed Transaction",
genesis.as_ref(),
&self.hash(),
order.as_ref(),
signature.R.to_bytes().as_ref(),
]
.concat(),
)
.into(),
)
}
_ => panic!("sig_hash called on non-signed transaction"),
}
}
}
pub trait GAIN: FnMut(&<Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::G, &[u8]) -> Option<u32> {}
impl<F: FnMut(&<Ristretto as WrappedGroup>::G, &[u8]) -> Option<u32>> GAIN for F {}
pub(crate) fn verify_transaction<F: GAIN, T: Transaction>(
tx: &T,
genesis: [u8; 32],
get_and_increment_nonce: &mut F,
) -> Result<(), TransactionError> {
if tx.serialize().len() > TRANSACTION_SIZE_LIMIT {
Err(TransactionError::TooLargeTransaction)?;
}
tx.verify()?;
match tx.kind() {
TransactionKind::Provided(_) | TransactionKind::Unsigned => {}
TransactionKind::Signed(order, Signed { signer, nonce, signature }) => {
if let Some(next_nonce) = get_and_increment_nonce(&signer, &order) {
if nonce != next_nonce {
Err(TransactionError::InvalidNonce)?;
}
} else {
// Not a participant
Err(TransactionError::InvalidSigner)?;
}
// TODO: Use a batch verification here
if !signature.verify(signer, tx.sig_hash(genesis)) {
Err(TransactionError::InvalidSignature)?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}