mirror of
https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
synced 2025-12-11 13:39:25 +00:00
* dalek 4.0 * cargo update Moves to a version of Substrate which uses curve25519-dalek 4.0 (not a rc). Doesn't yet update the repo to curve25519-dalek 4.0 (as a branch does) due to the official schnorrkel using a conflicting curve25519-dalek. This would prevent installation of frost-schnorrkel without a patch. * use half-aggregation for tm messages * fmt * fix pr comments * cargo update Achieves three notable updates. 1) Resolves RUSTSEC-2022-0093 by updating libp2p-identity. 2) Removes 3 old rand crates via updating ed25519-dalek (a dependency of libp2p-identity). 3) Sets serde_derive to 1.0.171 via updating to time 0.3.26 which pins at up to 1.0.171. The last one is the most important. The former two are niceties. serde_derive, since 1.0.171, ships a non-reproducible binary blob in what's a complete compromise of supply chain security. This is done in order to reduce compile times, yet also for the maintainer of serde (dtolnay) to leverage serde's position as the 8th most downloaded crate to attempt to force changes to the Rust build pipeline. While dtolnay's contributions to Rust are respectable, being behind syn, quote, and proc-macro2 (the top three crates by downloads), along with thiserror, anyhow, async-trait, and more (I believe also being part of the Rust project), they have unfortunately decided to refuse to listen to the community on this issue (or even engage with counter-commentary). Given their political agenda they seem to try to be accomplishing with force, I'd go as far as to call their actions terroristic (as they're using the threat of the binary blob as justification for cargo to ship 'proper' support for binary blobs). This is arguably representative of dtolnay's past work on watt. watt was a wasm interpreter to execute a pre-compiled proc macro. This would save the compile time of proc macros, yet sandbox it so a full binary did not have to be run. Unfortunately, watt (while decreasing compile times) fails to be a valid solution to supply chain security (without massive ecosystem changes). It never implemented reproducible builds for its wasm blobs, and a malicious wasm blob could still fundamentally compromise a project. The only solution for an end user to achieve a secure pipeline would be to locally build the project, verifying the blob aligns, yet doing so would negate all advantages of the blob. dtolnay also seems to be giving up their role as a FOSS maintainer given that serde no longer works in several environments. While FOSS maintainers are not required to never implement breaking changes, the version number is still 1.0. While FOSS maintainers are not required to follow semver, releasing a very notable breaking change *without a new version number* in an ecosystem which *does follow semver*, then refusing to acknowledge bugs as bugs with their work does meet my personal definition of "not actively maintaining their existing work". Maintenance would be to fix bugs, not introduce and ignore. For now, serde > 1.0.171 has been banned. In the future, we may host a fork without the blobs (yet with the patches). It may be necessary to ban all of dtolnay's maintained crates, if they continue to force their agenda as such, yet I hope this may be resolved within the next week or so. Sources: https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538 - Binary blob discussion This includes several reports of various workflows being broken. https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538#issuecomment-1682519944 dtolnay commenting that security should be resolved via Rust toolchain edits, not via their own work being secure. This is why I say they're trying to leverage serde in a political game. https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2526 - Usage via git broken dtolnay explicitly asks the submitting user if they'd be willing to advocate for changes to Rust rather than actually fix the issue they created. This is further political arm wrestling. https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2530 - Usage via Bazel broken https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2575 - Unverifiable binary blob https://github.com/dtolnay/watt - dtolnay's prior work on precompilation * add Rs() api to SchnorrAggregate * Correct serai-processor-tests to dalek 4 * fmt + deny * Slash malevolent validators (#294) * add slash tx * ignore unsigned tx replays * verify that provided evidence is valid * fix clippy + fmt * move application tx handling to another module * partially handle the tendermint txs * fix pr comments * support unsigned app txs * add slash target to the votes * enforce provided, unsigned, signed tx ordering within a block * bug fixes * add unit test for tendermint txs * bug fixes * update tests for tendermint txs * add tx ordering test * tidy up tx ordering test * cargo +nightly fmt * Misc fixes from rebasing * Finish resolving clippy * Remove sha3 from tendermint-machine * Resolve a DoS in SlashEvidence's read Also moves Evidence from Vec<Message> to (Message, Option<Message>). That should meet all requirements while being a bit safer. * Make lazy_static a dev-depend for tributary * Various small tweaks One use of sort was inefficient, sorting unsigned || signed when unsigned was already properly sorted. Given how the unsigned TXs were given a nonce of 0, an unstable sort may swap places with an unsigned TX and a signed TX with a nonce of 0 (leading to a faulty block). The extra protection added here sorts signed, then concats. * Fix Tributary tests I broke, start review on tendermint/tx.rs * Finish reviewing everything outside tests and empty_signature * Remove empty_signature empty_signature led to corrupted local state histories. Unfortunately, the API is only sane with a signature. We now use the actual signature, which risks creating a signature over a malicious message if we have ever have an invariant producing malicious messages. Prior, we only signed the message after the local machine confirmed it was okay per the local view of consensus. This is tolerated/preferred over a corrupt state history since production of such messages is already an invariant. TODOs are added to make handling of this theoretical invariant further robust. * Remove async_sequential for tokio::test There was no competition for resources forcing them to be run sequentially. * Modify block order test to be statistically significant without multiple runs * Clean tests --------- Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com> * Add DSTs to Tributary TX sig_hash functions Prevents conflicts with other systems/other parts of the Tributary. --------- Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
791 lines
29 KiB
Rust
791 lines
29 KiB
Rust
use core::fmt::Debug;
|
|
|
|
use std::{
|
|
sync::Arc,
|
|
time::{SystemTime, Instant, Duration},
|
|
collections::VecDeque,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
use parity_scale_codec::{Encode, Decode};
|
|
|
|
use futures::{
|
|
FutureExt, StreamExt, SinkExt,
|
|
future::{self, Fuse},
|
|
channel::mpsc,
|
|
};
|
|
use tokio::time::sleep;
|
|
|
|
pub mod time;
|
|
use time::{sys_time, CanonicalInstant};
|
|
|
|
pub mod round;
|
|
|
|
mod block;
|
|
use block::BlockData;
|
|
|
|
pub(crate) mod message_log;
|
|
|
|
/// Traits and types of the external network being integrated with to provide consensus over.
|
|
pub mod ext;
|
|
use ext::*;
|
|
|
|
pub fn commit_msg(end_time: u64, id: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
[&end_time.to_le_bytes(), id].concat().to_vec()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
|
|
pub enum Step {
|
|
Propose,
|
|
Prevote,
|
|
Precommit,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone, Eq, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
|
|
pub enum Data<B: Block, S: Signature> {
|
|
Proposal(Option<RoundNumber>, B),
|
|
Prevote(Option<B::Id>),
|
|
Precommit(Option<(B::Id, S)>),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<B: Block, S: Signature> PartialEq for Data<B, S> {
|
|
fn eq(&self, other: &Data<B, S>) -> bool {
|
|
match (self, other) {
|
|
(Data::Proposal(valid_round, block), Data::Proposal(valid_round2, block2)) => {
|
|
(valid_round == valid_round2) && (block == block2)
|
|
}
|
|
(Data::Prevote(id), Data::Prevote(id2)) => id == id2,
|
|
(Data::Precommit(None), Data::Precommit(None)) => true,
|
|
(Data::Precommit(Some((id, _))), Data::Precommit(Some((id2, _)))) => id == id2,
|
|
_ => false,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<B: Block, S: Signature> Data<B, S> {
|
|
pub fn step(&self) -> Step {
|
|
match self {
|
|
Data::Proposal(..) => Step::Propose,
|
|
Data::Prevote(..) => Step::Prevote,
|
|
Data::Precommit(..) => Step::Precommit,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
|
|
pub struct Message<V: ValidatorId, B: Block, S: Signature> {
|
|
pub sender: V,
|
|
pub block: BlockNumber,
|
|
pub round: RoundNumber,
|
|
|
|
pub data: Data<B, S>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A signed Tendermint consensus message to be broadcast to the other validators.
|
|
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
|
|
pub struct SignedMessage<V: ValidatorId, B: Block, S: Signature> {
|
|
pub msg: Message<V, B, S>,
|
|
pub sig: S,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<V: ValidatorId, B: Block, S: Signature> SignedMessage<V, B, S> {
|
|
/// Number of the block this message is attempting to add to the chain.
|
|
pub fn block(&self) -> BlockNumber {
|
|
self.msg.block
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[must_use]
|
|
pub fn verify_signature<Scheme: SignatureScheme<ValidatorId = V, Signature = S>>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
signer: &Scheme,
|
|
) -> bool {
|
|
signer.verify(self.msg.sender, &self.msg.encode(), &self.sig)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
|
enum TendermintError<N: Network> {
|
|
Malicious(N::ValidatorId, Option<SignedMessageFor<N>>),
|
|
Temporal,
|
|
AlreadyHandled,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Type aliases to abstract over generic hell
|
|
pub type DataFor<N> =
|
|
Data<<N as Network>::Block, <<N as Network>::SignatureScheme as SignatureScheme>::Signature>;
|
|
pub(crate) type MessageFor<N> = Message<
|
|
<N as Network>::ValidatorId,
|
|
<N as Network>::Block,
|
|
<<N as Network>::SignatureScheme as SignatureScheme>::Signature,
|
|
>;
|
|
/// Type alias to the SignedMessage type for a given Network
|
|
pub type SignedMessageFor<N> = SignedMessage<
|
|
<N as Network>::ValidatorId,
|
|
<N as Network>::Block,
|
|
<<N as Network>::SignatureScheme as SignatureScheme>::Signature,
|
|
>;
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
|
|
pub enum SlashReason {
|
|
FailToPropose,
|
|
InvalidBlock,
|
|
InvalidMessage,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Move WithEvidence to a proper Evidence enum, denoting the explicit reason its faulty
|
|
// This greatly simplifies the checking process and prevents new-reasons added here not being
|
|
// handled elsewhere
|
|
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
|
|
pub enum SlashEvent<N: Network> {
|
|
Id(SlashReason, u64, u32),
|
|
WithEvidence(SignedMessageFor<N>, Option<SignedMessageFor<N>>),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// A machine executing the Tendermint protocol.
|
|
pub struct TendermintMachine<N: Network> {
|
|
network: N,
|
|
signer: <N::SignatureScheme as SignatureScheme>::Signer,
|
|
validators: N::SignatureScheme,
|
|
weights: Arc<N::Weights>,
|
|
|
|
queue: VecDeque<MessageFor<N>>,
|
|
msg_recv: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<SignedMessageFor<N>>,
|
|
synced_block_recv: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<SyncedBlock<N>>,
|
|
synced_block_result_send: mpsc::UnboundedSender<bool>,
|
|
|
|
block: BlockData<N>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub struct SyncedBlock<N: Network> {
|
|
pub number: BlockNumber,
|
|
pub block: <N as Network>::Block,
|
|
pub commit: Commit<<N as Network>::SignatureScheme>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub type SyncedBlockSender<N> = mpsc::UnboundedSender<SyncedBlock<N>>;
|
|
pub type SyncedBlockResultReceiver = mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<bool>;
|
|
|
|
pub type MessageSender<N> = mpsc::UnboundedSender<SignedMessageFor<N>>;
|
|
|
|
/// A Tendermint machine and its channel to receive messages from the gossip layer over.
|
|
pub struct TendermintHandle<N: Network> {
|
|
/// Channel to trigger the machine to move to the next block.
|
|
/// Takes in the the previous block's commit, along with the new proposal.
|
|
pub synced_block: SyncedBlockSender<N>,
|
|
/// A channel to communicate the result of a synced_block message.
|
|
pub synced_block_result: SyncedBlockResultReceiver,
|
|
/// Channel to send messages received from the P2P layer.
|
|
pub messages: MessageSender<N>,
|
|
/// Tendermint machine to be run on an asynchronous task.
|
|
pub machine: TendermintMachine<N>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<N: Network + 'static> TendermintMachine<N> {
|
|
// Broadcast the given piece of data
|
|
// Tendermint messages always specify their block/round, yet Tendermint only ever broadcasts for
|
|
// the current block/round. Accordingly, instead of manually fetching those at every call-site,
|
|
// this function can simply pass the data to the block which can contextualize it
|
|
fn broadcast(&mut self, data: DataFor<N>) {
|
|
if let Some(msg) = self.block.message(data) {
|
|
// Push it on to the queue. This is done so we only handle one message at a time, and so we
|
|
// can handle our own message before broadcasting it. That way, we fail before before
|
|
// becoming malicious
|
|
self.queue.push_back(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start a new round. Returns true if we were the proposer
|
|
fn round(&mut self, round: RoundNumber, time: Option<CanonicalInstant>) -> bool {
|
|
if let Some(data) =
|
|
self.block.new_round(round, self.weights.proposer(self.block.number, round), time)
|
|
{
|
|
self.broadcast(data);
|
|
true
|
|
} else {
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 53-54
|
|
async fn reset(&mut self, end_round: RoundNumber, proposal: Option<N::Block>) {
|
|
// Ensure we have the end time data for the last round
|
|
self.block.populate_end_time(end_round);
|
|
|
|
// Sleep until this round ends
|
|
let round_end = self.block.end_time[&end_round];
|
|
let time_until_round_end = round_end.instant().saturating_duration_since(Instant::now());
|
|
log::trace!("sleeping until round ends in {}ms", time_until_round_end.as_millis());
|
|
sleep(time_until_round_end).await;
|
|
|
|
// Clear our outbound message queue
|
|
self.queue = VecDeque::new();
|
|
|
|
// Create the new block
|
|
self.block = BlockData::new(
|
|
self.weights.clone(),
|
|
BlockNumber(self.block.number.0 + 1),
|
|
self.signer.validator_id().await,
|
|
proposal,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Start the first round
|
|
self.round(RoundNumber(0), Some(round_end));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn reset_by_commit(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
commit: Commit<N::SignatureScheme>,
|
|
proposal: Option<N::Block>,
|
|
) {
|
|
let mut round = self.block.round().number;
|
|
// If this commit is for a round we don't have, jump up to it
|
|
while self.block.end_time[&round].canonical() < commit.end_time {
|
|
round.0 += 1;
|
|
self.block.populate_end_time(round);
|
|
}
|
|
// If this commit is for a prior round, find it
|
|
while self.block.end_time[&round].canonical() > commit.end_time {
|
|
if round.0 == 0 {
|
|
panic!("commit isn't for this machine's next block");
|
|
}
|
|
round.0 -= 1;
|
|
}
|
|
debug_assert_eq!(self.block.end_time[&round].canonical(), commit.end_time);
|
|
|
|
self.reset(round, proposal).await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn slash(&mut self, validator: N::ValidatorId, slash_event: SlashEvent<N>) {
|
|
// TODO: If the new slash event has evidence, emit to prevent a low-importance slash from
|
|
// cancelling emission of high-importance slashes
|
|
if !self.block.slashes.contains(&validator) {
|
|
log::info!(target: "tendermint", "Slashing validator {}", hex::encode(validator.encode()));
|
|
self.block.slashes.insert(validator);
|
|
self.network.slash(validator, slash_event).await;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Create a new Tendermint machine, from the specified point, with the specified block as the
|
|
/// one to propose next. This will return a channel to send messages from the gossip layer and
|
|
/// the machine itself. The machine should have `run` called from an asynchronous task.
|
|
#[allow(clippy::new_ret_no_self)]
|
|
pub async fn new(
|
|
network: N,
|
|
last_block: BlockNumber,
|
|
last_time: u64,
|
|
proposal: N::Block,
|
|
) -> TendermintHandle<N> {
|
|
let (msg_send, msg_recv) = mpsc::unbounded();
|
|
let (synced_block_send, synced_block_recv) = mpsc::unbounded();
|
|
let (synced_block_result_send, synced_block_result_recv) = mpsc::unbounded();
|
|
TendermintHandle {
|
|
synced_block: synced_block_send,
|
|
synced_block_result: synced_block_result_recv,
|
|
messages: msg_send,
|
|
machine: {
|
|
let now = SystemTime::now();
|
|
let sys_time = sys_time(last_time);
|
|
let mut negative = false;
|
|
let time_until = sys_time.duration_since(now).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
|
|
negative = true;
|
|
now.duration_since(sys_time).unwrap_or(Duration::ZERO)
|
|
});
|
|
log::info!(
|
|
target: "tendermint",
|
|
"new TendermintMachine building off block {} is scheduled to start in {}{}s",
|
|
last_block.0,
|
|
if negative { "-" } else { "" },
|
|
time_until.as_secs(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// If the last block hasn't ended yet, sleep until it has
|
|
if !negative {
|
|
sleep(time_until).await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let signer = network.signer();
|
|
let validators = network.signature_scheme();
|
|
let weights = Arc::new(network.weights());
|
|
let validator_id = signer.validator_id().await;
|
|
// 01-10
|
|
let mut machine = TendermintMachine {
|
|
network,
|
|
signer,
|
|
validators,
|
|
weights: weights.clone(),
|
|
|
|
queue: VecDeque::new(),
|
|
msg_recv,
|
|
synced_block_recv,
|
|
synced_block_result_send,
|
|
|
|
block: BlockData::new(
|
|
weights,
|
|
BlockNumber(last_block.0 + 1),
|
|
validator_id,
|
|
Some(proposal),
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// The end time of the last block is the start time for this one
|
|
// The Commit explicitly contains the end time, so loading the last commit will provide
|
|
// this. The only exception is for the genesis block, which doesn't have a commit
|
|
// Using the genesis time in place will cause this block to be created immediately
|
|
// after it, without the standard amount of separation (so their times will be
|
|
// equivalent or minimally offset)
|
|
// For callers wishing to avoid this, they should pass (0, GENESIS + N::block_time())
|
|
machine.round(RoundNumber(0), Some(CanonicalInstant::new(last_time)));
|
|
machine
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub async fn run(mut self) {
|
|
log::debug!(target: "tendermint", "running TendermintMachine");
|
|
|
|
loop {
|
|
// Also create a future for if the queue has a message
|
|
// Does not pop_front as if another message has higher priority, its future will be handled
|
|
// instead in this loop, and the popped value would be dropped with the next iteration
|
|
// While no other message has a higher priority right now, this is a safer practice
|
|
let mut queue_future =
|
|
if self.queue.is_empty() { Fuse::terminated() } else { future::ready(()).fuse() };
|
|
|
|
if let Some((our_message, msg, mut sig)) = futures::select_biased! {
|
|
// Handle a new block occurring externally (an external sync loop)
|
|
// Has the highest priority as it makes all other futures here irrelevant
|
|
msg = self.synced_block_recv.next() => {
|
|
if let Some(SyncedBlock { number, block, commit }) = msg {
|
|
// Commit is for a block we've already moved past
|
|
if number != self.block.number {
|
|
self.synced_block_result_send.send(false).await.unwrap();
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Commit is invalid
|
|
if !self.network.verify_commit(block.id(), &commit) {
|
|
self.synced_block_result_send.send(false).await.unwrap();
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log::debug!(
|
|
target: "tendermint",
|
|
"TendermintMachine received a block from the external sync loop",
|
|
);
|
|
let proposal = self.network.add_block(block, commit.clone()).await;
|
|
self.reset_by_commit(commit, proposal).await;
|
|
self.synced_block_result_send.send(true).await.unwrap();
|
|
None
|
|
} else {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
// Handle our messages
|
|
_ = queue_future => {
|
|
Some((true, self.queue.pop_front().unwrap(), None))
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
// Handle any timeouts
|
|
step = self.block.round().timeout_future().fuse() => {
|
|
// Remove the timeout so it doesn't persist, always being the selected future due to bias
|
|
// While this does enable the timeout to be entered again, the timeout setting code will
|
|
// never attempt to add a timeout after its timeout has expired
|
|
self.block.round_mut().timeouts.remove(&step);
|
|
// Only run if it's still the step in question
|
|
if self.block.round().step == step {
|
|
match step {
|
|
Step::Propose => {
|
|
// Slash the validator for not proposing when they should've
|
|
log::debug!(target: "tendermint", "Validator didn't propose when they should have");
|
|
// this slash will be voted on.
|
|
self.slash(
|
|
self.weights.proposer(self.block.number, self.block.round().number),
|
|
SlashEvent::Id(
|
|
SlashReason::FailToPropose,
|
|
self.block.number.0,
|
|
self.block.round().number.0
|
|
),
|
|
).await;
|
|
self.broadcast(Data::Prevote(None));
|
|
},
|
|
Step::Prevote => self.broadcast(Data::Precommit(None)),
|
|
Step::Precommit => {
|
|
self.round(RoundNumber(self.block.round().number.0 + 1), None);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
// Handle any received messages
|
|
msg = self.msg_recv.next() => {
|
|
if let Some(msg) = msg {
|
|
if !msg.verify_signature(&self.validators) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
Some((false, msg.msg, Some(msg.sig)))
|
|
} else {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} {
|
|
if our_message {
|
|
assert!(sig.is_none());
|
|
sig = Some(self.signer.sign(&msg.encode()).await);
|
|
}
|
|
let sig = sig.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// TODO: message may internally call broadcast. We should check within broadcast it's not
|
|
// broadcasting our own message at this time.
|
|
let signed_msg = SignedMessage { msg: msg.clone(), sig: sig.clone() };
|
|
let res = self.message(&signed_msg).await;
|
|
if res.is_err() && our_message {
|
|
panic!("honest node (ourselves) had invalid behavior");
|
|
}
|
|
// Only now should we allow broadcasts since we're sure an invariant wasn't reached causing
|
|
// us to have invalid messages.
|
|
|
|
if res.is_ok() {
|
|
// Re-broadcast this since it's an original consensus message
|
|
self.network.broadcast(signed_msg).await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
match res {
|
|
Ok(None) => {}
|
|
Ok(Some(block)) => {
|
|
let mut validators = vec![];
|
|
let mut sigs = vec![];
|
|
// Get all precommits for this round
|
|
for (validator, msgs) in &self.block.log.log[&msg.round] {
|
|
if let Some(signed) = msgs.get(&Step::Precommit) {
|
|
if let Data::Precommit(Some((id, sig))) = &signed.msg.data {
|
|
// If this precommit was for this block, include it
|
|
if *id == block.id() {
|
|
validators.push(*validator);
|
|
sigs.push(sig.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let commit_msg = commit_msg(
|
|
self.block.end_time[&self.block.round().number].canonical(),
|
|
block.id().as_ref(),
|
|
);
|
|
let commit = Commit {
|
|
end_time: self.block.end_time[&msg.round].canonical(),
|
|
validators: validators.clone(),
|
|
signature: self.network.signature_scheme().aggregate(&validators, &commit_msg, &sigs),
|
|
};
|
|
debug_assert!(self.network.verify_commit(block.id(), &commit));
|
|
|
|
log::info!(
|
|
target: "tendermint",
|
|
"TendermintMachine produced block {}",
|
|
hex::encode(block.id().as_ref()),
|
|
);
|
|
let id = block.id();
|
|
let proposal = self.network.add_block(block, commit).await;
|
|
log::trace!("added block {} (produced by machine)", hex::encode(id.as_ref()));
|
|
self.reset(msg.round, proposal).await;
|
|
}
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(sender, evidence_msg)) => {
|
|
let current_msg = SignedMessage { msg: msg.clone(), sig: sig.clone() };
|
|
|
|
let slash = if let Some(old_msg) = evidence_msg {
|
|
// if the malicious message contains a block, only vote to slash
|
|
// TODO: Should this decision be made at a higher level?
|
|
if let Data::Proposal(_, _) = ¤t_msg.msg.data {
|
|
SlashEvent::Id(
|
|
SlashReason::InvalidBlock,
|
|
self.block.number.0,
|
|
self.block.round().number.0,
|
|
)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// if old msg and new msg is not the same, use both as evidence.
|
|
SlashEvent::WithEvidence(
|
|
old_msg.clone(),
|
|
if old_msg != current_msg { Some(current_msg.clone()) } else { None },
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// we don't have evidence. Slash with vote.
|
|
SlashEvent::Id(
|
|
SlashReason::InvalidMessage,
|
|
self.block.number.0,
|
|
self.block.round().number.0,
|
|
)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Each message that we're voting to slash over needs to be re-broadcasted so other
|
|
// validators also trigger their own votes
|
|
// TODO: should this be inside slash function?
|
|
if let SlashEvent::Id(_, _, _) = slash {
|
|
self.network.broadcast(current_msg).await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.slash(sender, slash).await
|
|
}
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Temporal) => (),
|
|
Err(TendermintError::AlreadyHandled) => (),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Returns Ok(true) if this was a Precommit which had its signature validated
|
|
// Returns Ok(false) if it wasn't a Precommit or the signature wasn't validated yet
|
|
// Returns Err if the signature was invalid
|
|
fn verify_precommit_signature(
|
|
&self,
|
|
signed: &SignedMessageFor<N>,
|
|
) -> Result<bool, TendermintError<N>> {
|
|
let msg = &signed.msg;
|
|
if let Data::Precommit(Some((id, sig))) = &msg.data {
|
|
// Also verify the end_time of the commit
|
|
// Only perform this verification if we already have the end_time
|
|
// Else, there's a DoS where we receive a precommit for some round infinitely in the future
|
|
// which forces us to calculate every end time
|
|
if let Some(end_time) = self.block.end_time.get(&msg.round) {
|
|
if !self.validators.verify(msg.sender, &commit_msg(end_time.canonical(), id.as_ref()), sig)
|
|
{
|
|
log::warn!(target: "tendermint", "Validator produced an invalid commit signature");
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(msg.sender, Some(signed.clone())))?;
|
|
}
|
|
return Ok(true);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn message(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
signed: &SignedMessageFor<N>,
|
|
) -> Result<Option<N::Block>, TendermintError<N>> {
|
|
let msg = &signed.msg;
|
|
if msg.block != self.block.number {
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Temporal)?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If this is a precommit, verify its signature
|
|
self.verify_precommit_signature(signed)?;
|
|
|
|
// Only let the proposer propose
|
|
if matches!(msg.data, Data::Proposal(..)) &&
|
|
(msg.sender != self.weights.proposer(msg.block, msg.round))
|
|
{
|
|
log::warn!(target: "tendermint", "Validator who wasn't the proposer proposed");
|
|
// TODO: This should have evidence
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(msg.sender, None))?;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if !self.block.log.log(signed.clone())? {
|
|
return Err(TendermintError::AlreadyHandled);
|
|
}
|
|
log::debug!(target: "tendermint", "received new tendermint message");
|
|
|
|
// All functions, except for the finalizer and the jump, are locked to the current round
|
|
|
|
// Run the finalizer to see if it applies
|
|
// 49-52
|
|
if matches!(msg.data, Data::Proposal(..)) || matches!(msg.data, Data::Precommit(_)) {
|
|
let proposer = self.weights.proposer(self.block.number, msg.round);
|
|
|
|
// Get the proposal
|
|
if let Some(proposal_signed) = self.block.log.get(msg.round, proposer, Step::Propose) {
|
|
if let Data::Proposal(_, block) = &proposal_signed.msg.data {
|
|
// Check if it has gotten a sufficient amount of precommits
|
|
// Use a junk signature since message equality disregards the signature
|
|
if self.block.log.has_consensus(
|
|
msg.round,
|
|
Data::Precommit(Some((block.id(), self.signer.sign(&[]).await))),
|
|
) {
|
|
log::debug!(target: "tendermint", "block {} has consensus", msg.block.0);
|
|
return Ok(Some(block.clone()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Else, check if we need to jump ahead
|
|
#[allow(clippy::comparison_chain)]
|
|
if msg.round.0 < self.block.round().number.0 {
|
|
// Prior round, disregard if not finalizing
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
} else if msg.round.0 > self.block.round().number.0 {
|
|
// 55-56
|
|
// Jump, enabling processing by the below code
|
|
if self.block.log.round_participation(msg.round) > self.weights.fault_threshold() {
|
|
// If this round already has precommit messages, verify their signatures
|
|
let round_msgs = self.block.log.log[&msg.round].clone();
|
|
for (validator, msgs) in &round_msgs {
|
|
if let Some(existing) = msgs.get(&Step::Precommit) {
|
|
if let Ok(res) = self.verify_precommit_signature(existing) {
|
|
// Ensure this actually verified the signature instead of believing it shouldn't yet
|
|
assert!(res);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Remove the message so it isn't counted towards forming a commit/included in one
|
|
// This won't remove the fact the precommitted for this block hash in the MessageLog
|
|
// TODO: Don't even log these in the first place until we jump, preventing needing
|
|
// to do this in the first place
|
|
let msg = self
|
|
.block
|
|
.log
|
|
.log
|
|
.get_mut(&msg.round)
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get_mut(validator)
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.remove(&Step::Precommit)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Slash the validator for publishing an invalid commit signature
|
|
self.slash(*validator, SlashEvent::WithEvidence(msg, None)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If we're the proposer, return now so we re-run processing with our proposal
|
|
// If we continue now, it'd just be wasted ops
|
|
if self.round(msg.round, None) {
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Future round which we aren't ready to jump to, so return for now
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// msg.round is now guaranteed to be equal to self.block.round().number
|
|
debug_assert_eq!(msg.round, self.block.round().number);
|
|
|
|
// The paper executes these checks when the step is prevote. Making sure this message warrants
|
|
// rerunning these checks is a sane optimization since message instances is a full iteration
|
|
// of the round map
|
|
if (self.block.round().step == Step::Prevote) && matches!(msg.data, Data::Prevote(_)) {
|
|
let (participation, weight) =
|
|
self.block.log.message_instances(self.block.round().number, Data::Prevote(None));
|
|
// 34-35
|
|
if participation >= self.weights.threshold() {
|
|
self.block.round_mut().set_timeout(Step::Prevote);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 44-46
|
|
if weight >= self.weights.threshold() {
|
|
self.broadcast(Data::Precommit(None));
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 47-48
|
|
if matches!(msg.data, Data::Precommit(_)) &&
|
|
self.block.log.has_participation(self.block.round().number, Step::Precommit)
|
|
{
|
|
self.block.round_mut().set_timeout(Step::Precommit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All further operations require actually having the proposal in question
|
|
let proposer = self.weights.proposer(self.block.number, self.block.round().number);
|
|
let (vr, block) = if let Some(proposal_signed) =
|
|
self.block.log.get(self.block.round().number, proposer, Step::Propose)
|
|
{
|
|
if let Data::Proposal(vr, block) = &proposal_signed.msg.data {
|
|
(vr, block)
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("message for Step::Propose didn't have Data::Proposal");
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// 22-33
|
|
if self.block.round().step == Step::Propose {
|
|
// Delay error handling (triggering a slash) until after we vote.
|
|
let (valid, err) = match self.network.validate(block).await {
|
|
Ok(_) => (true, Ok(None)),
|
|
Err(BlockError::Temporal) => (false, Ok(None)),
|
|
Err(BlockError::Fatal) => (false, {
|
|
log::warn!(target: "tendermint", "Validator proposed a fatally invalid block");
|
|
// TODO: Produce evidence of this for the higher level code to decide what to do with
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(proposer, None))
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
// Create a raw vote which only requires block validity as a basis for the actual vote.
|
|
let raw_vote = Some(block.id()).filter(|_| valid);
|
|
|
|
// If locked is none, it has a round of -1 according to the protocol. That satisfies
|
|
// 23 and 29. If it's some, both are satisfied if they're for the same ID. If it's some
|
|
// with different IDs, the function on 22 rejects yet the function on 28 has one other
|
|
// condition
|
|
let locked = self.block.locked.as_ref().map(|(_, id)| id == &block.id()).unwrap_or(true);
|
|
let mut vote = raw_vote.filter(|_| locked);
|
|
|
|
if let Some(vr) = vr {
|
|
// Malformed message
|
|
if vr.0 >= self.block.round().number.0 {
|
|
log::warn!(target: "tendermint", "Validator claimed a round from the future was valid");
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(msg.sender, Some(signed.clone())))?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if self.block.log.has_consensus(*vr, Data::Prevote(Some(block.id()))) {
|
|
// Allow differing locked values if the proposal has a newer valid round
|
|
// This is the other condition described above
|
|
if let Some((locked_round, _)) = self.block.locked.as_ref() {
|
|
vote = vote.or_else(|| raw_vote.filter(|_| locked_round.0 <= vr.0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.broadcast(Data::Prevote(vote));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
self.broadcast(Data::Prevote(vote));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if self
|
|
.block
|
|
.valid
|
|
.as_ref()
|
|
.map(|(round, _)| round != &self.block.round().number)
|
|
.unwrap_or(true)
|
|
{
|
|
// 36-43
|
|
|
|
// The run once condition is implemented above. Since valid will always be set by this, it
|
|
// not being set, or only being set historically, means this has yet to be run
|
|
|
|
if self.block.log.has_consensus(self.block.round().number, Data::Prevote(Some(block.id()))) {
|
|
match self.network.validate(block).await {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(BlockError::Temporal) => (),
|
|
Err(BlockError::Fatal) => {
|
|
log::warn!(target: "tendermint", "Validator proposed a fatally invalid block");
|
|
// TODO: Produce evidence of this for the higher level code to decide what to do with
|
|
Err(TendermintError::Malicious(proposer, None))?
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
self.block.valid = Some((self.block.round().number, block.clone()));
|
|
if self.block.round().step == Step::Prevote {
|
|
self.block.locked = Some((self.block.round().number, block.id()));
|
|
self.broadcast(Data::Precommit(Some((
|
|
block.id(),
|
|
self
|
|
.signer
|
|
.sign(&commit_msg(
|
|
self.block.end_time[&self.block.round().number].canonical(),
|
|
block.id().as_ref(),
|
|
))
|
|
.await,
|
|
))));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|