* Remove NetworkId from processor-messages
Because intent binds to the sender/receiver, it's not needed for intent.
The processor knows what the network is.
The coordinator knows which to use because it's sending this message to the
processor for that network.
Also removes the unused zeroize.
* ProcessorMessage::Completed use Session instead of key
* Move SubstrateSignId to Session
* Finish replacing key with session
* Move message-queue to a fully binary representation
Additionally adds a timeout to the message queue test.
* coordinator clippy
* Remove contention for the message-queue socket by using per-request sockets
* clippy
* Add SignalsConfig to chain_spec
* Correct multiexp feature flagging for rand_core std
* Remove bincode for borsh
Replaces a non-canonical encoding with a canonical encoding which additionally
should be faster.
Also fixes an issue where we used bincode in transcripts where it cannot be
trusted.
This ended up fixing a myriad of other bugs observed, unfortunately.
Accordingly, it either has to be merged or the bug fixes from it must be ported
to a new PR.
* Make serde optional, minimize usage
* Make borsh an optional dependency of substrate/ crates
* Remove unused dependencies
* Use [u8; 64] where possible in the processor messages
* Correct borsh feature flagging
* Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed
Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency
before a co-sign is started.
* Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block
* Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX
* Split queued cosigns per network
* Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId
* Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it
* Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX
* Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work)
Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning
occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused.
We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower
specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly.
* Route cosigning through the processor
* Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR
I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity.
* Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator
* Get tests to compile
* Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned
* Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements
* Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns
* Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing
Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its
predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being
inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing
the batch).
Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block
the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in
order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated.
When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a
Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from
doing so.
This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It
should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a
new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable.
Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the
cosigning protocol.
* Working full-stack tests
After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout.
* Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier
* Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning
* Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation
Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
* Have processor report errors during the DKG to the coordinator
* Add RemoveParticipant, InvalidDkgShare to coordinator
* Route DKG blame around coordinator
* Allow public construction of AdditionalBlameMachine
Necessary for upcoming work on handling DKG blame in the processor and
coordinator.
Additionally fixes a publicly reachable panic when commitments parsed with one
ThresholdParams are used in a machine using another set of ThresholdParams.
Renames InvalidProofOfKnowledge to InvalidCommitments.
* Remove unused error from dleq
* Implement support for VerifyBlame in the processor
* Have coordinator send the processor share message relevant to Blame
* Remove desync between processors reporting InvalidShare and ones reporting GeneratedKeyPair
* Route blame on sign between processor and coordinator
Doesn't yet act on it in coordinator.
* Move txn usage as needed for stable Rust to build
* Correct InvalidDkgShare serialization
* Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence
Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles,
the following is unimplemented:
1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used
will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG.
2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the
processor.
* Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed
Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness +
validity. The current infra achieves both.
* Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count
* Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares
This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the
coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so
setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that
upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for
DoS attacks.
* Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured
It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now,
accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is
to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met.
* Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment
* Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer
* Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix
* Update tests/coordinator
This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing
single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the
coordinator.
* Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once
* Update SubstrateSigner
* Update signer, clippy
* Update processor tests
* Update processor docker tests
The tests have recently had their timing stilted, causing failures. The tests
are... fine. They're fragile, as obvious, yet they're logical. The simplest fix
is to unstilt their timing rather to make them non-fragile.
The recent change, which presumably caused said stilting, was the the
rebroadcasting added. This de-duplication prevents most of the impact of
rebroadcasting. While there's still the async task, and the lock acquisition on
attempt to rebroadcast, this hopefully is enough.
The new set publishing a `Batch` completes the handover protocol. The new set
should only publish a `Batch` once it believes the old set has completed all of
its on-external-chain activity, marking it honest and finite.
With the handover comes the acceptance of liability, hence the requirement for
all of the on-Serai-chain activity also needing verification. While most
activity would be verified in-real-time (upon ::Batch messages), the new set
will now explicitly verify the complete set of `Batch`s before beginning its
preprocess for its own `Batch` (the one accepting the handover).
* initial staking pallet
* add staking pallet to runtime
* support session rotation for serai
* optimizations & cleaning
* fix deny
* add serai network to initial networks
* a few tweaks & comments
* fix some pr comments
* Rewrite validator-sets with logarithmic algorithms
Uses the fact the underlying DB is sorted to achieve sorting of potential
validators by stake.
Removes release of deallocated stake for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
This isn't an unacceptable timeout. It matches a prior timeout. I'm unsure why
it's now needed to be extended though. My best guess is the test runtime is
single threaded and there's now new overhead in the task management (or perhaps
higher latency now that messages per-tributary is serialized).
It was a piece of duplicated data used to achieve context-less
de)serialization. This new Vec code is a bit tricker to first read, yet overall
clean and removes a potential fault.
Saves 2 bytes from DkgShares messages.
See prior commit message for more info.
With the plan for the batch sign ID to be just 5 bytes (potentially 4), this
does incur a +5 bytes cost compared to the ExternalBlock system *even in the
standard case*. The simplicity remains preferred at this time.
The initial TODO was simply to use one ExternalBlock per all batches in the
block. This would require publishing ExternalBlock after the last batch,
requiring knowing the last batch. While we could add such a pipeline, it'd
require:
1) Initial preprocesses using a distinct message from BatchPreprocess
2) An additional message sent after all BatchPreprocess are sent
Unfortunately, both would require tweaks to the SubstrateSigner which aren't
worth the complexity compared to the solution here, at least, not at this time.
While this will cause, if a Tributary is signing a block whose total batch data
exceeds 25 kB, to use multiple transactions which could be optimized out by
'better' local data pipelining, that's an extreme edge case. Given the temporal
nature of each Tributary, it's also an acceptable edge.
This does no longer achieve synchrony over external blocks accordingly. While
signed batches have synchrony, as they embed their block hash, batches being
signed don't have cryptographic synchrony on their contents. This means
validators who are eclipsed may produce invalid shares, as they sign a
different batch. This will be introduced in a follow-up commit.
Prior to the previous commit, whatever async scheduling occurred caused them to
all have the same tip. Now, some are one block ahead of others. This adds
tolerance for that, as it's an acceptable variance, so long as it's solely one
block.
* add slash tx
* ignore unsigned tx replays
* verify that provided evidence is valid
* fix clippy + fmt
* move application tx handling to another module
* partially handle the tendermint txs
* fix pr comments
* support unsigned app txs
* add slash target to the votes
* enforce provided, unsigned, signed tx ordering within a block
* bug fixes
* add unit test for tendermint txs
* bug fixes
* update tests for tendermint txs
* add tx ordering test
* tidy up tx ordering test
* cargo +nightly fmt
* Misc fixes from rebasing
* Finish resolving clippy
* Remove sha3 from tendermint-machine
* Resolve a DoS in SlashEvidence's read
Also moves Evidence from Vec<Message> to (Message, Option<Message>). That
should meet all requirements while being a bit safer.
* Make lazy_static a dev-depend for tributary
* Various small tweaks
One use of sort was inefficient, sorting unsigned || signed when unsigned was
already properly sorted. Given how the unsigned TXs were given a nonce of 0, an
unstable sort may swap places with an unsigned TX and a signed TX with a nonce
of 0 (leading to a faulty block).
The extra protection added here sorts signed, then concats.
* Fix Tributary tests I broke, start review on tendermint/tx.rs
* Finish reviewing everything outside tests and empty_signature
* Remove empty_signature
empty_signature led to corrupted local state histories. Unfortunately, the API
is only sane with a signature.
We now use the actual signature, which risks creating a signature over a
malicious message if we have ever have an invariant producing malicious
messages. Prior, we only signed the message after the local machine confirmed
it was okay per the local view of consensus.
This is tolerated/preferred over a corrupt state history since production of
such messages is already an invariant. TODOs are added to make handling of this
theoretical invariant further robust.
* Remove async_sequential for tokio::test
There was no competition for resources forcing them to be run sequentially.
* Modify block order test to be statistically significant without multiple runs
* Clean tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
It's largely unoptimized, and not yet exclusive to validators, yet has basic
sanity (using message content for ID instead of sender + index).
Fixes bugs as found. Notably, we used a time in milliseconds where the
Tributary expected seconds.
Also has Tributary::new jump to the presumed round number. This reduces slashes
when starting new chains (whose times will be before the current time) and was
the only way I was able to observe successful confirmations given current
surrounding infrastructure.
Reduces lock contention.
Additionally changes block_key to include the genesis. While not technically
needed, the lack of genesis introduced a side effect where any Tributary on the
the database could return the block of any other Tributary. While that wasn't a
security issue, returning it suggested it was on-chain when it wasn't. This may
have been usable to create issues.
