This helps identify where the various functionalities are used, or rather, not
used. The `Ciphersuite` trait present in `patches/ciphersuite`, facilitating
the entire FCMP++ tree, only requires the markers _and_ canonical point
decoding. I've opened a PR to upstream such a trait into `group`
(https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/pull/68).
`WrappedGroup` is still justified for as long as `Group::generator` exists.
Moving `::generator()` to its own trait, on an independent structure (upstream)
would be massively appreciated. @tarcieri also wanted to update from
`fn generator()` to `const GENERATOR`, which would encourage further discussion
on https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/32 and
https://github.com/zkcrypto/group/issues/45, which have been stagnant.
The `Id` trait is occasionally used yet really should be first off the chopping
block.
Finally, `WithPreferredHash` is only actually used around a third of the time,
which more than justifies it being a separate trait.
---
Updates `dalek_ff_group::Scalar` to directly re-export
`curve25519_dalek::Scalar`, as without issue. `dalek_ff_group::RistrettoPoint`
also could be replaced with an export of `curve25519_dalek::RistrettoPoint`,
yet the coordinator relies on how we implemented `Hash` on it for the hell of
it so it isn't worth it at this time. `dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint` can't be
replaced for an re-export of `curve25519_dalek::SubgroupPoint` as it doesn't
implement `zeroize`, `subtle` traits within a released, non-yanked version.
Relevance to https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/201 and
https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/811#issuecomment-3247732746.
Also updates the `Ristretto` ciphersuite to prefer `Blake2b-512` over
`SHA2-512`. In order to maintain compliance with FROST's IETF standard,
`modular-frost` defines its own ciphersuite for Ristretto which still uses
`SHA2-512`.
The prior-present `Ciphersuite::hash_to_F` was a sin. Implementations took a
DST, yet were not require to securely handle it. It was also biased towards the
requirements of `modular-frost` as `ciphersuite` was originally written all
those years ago, when `modular-frost` had needs exceeding what `ff`, `group`
satisfied.
Now, the hash is bound to produce an output which can be converted to a scalar
with `ff::FromUniformBytes`. A new `hash_to_F`, which accepts a single argument
of the value to hash (removing the potential to insecurely handle the DST by
removing the DST entirely). Due to `digest` yielding a `GenericArray`, yet
`FromUniformBytes` taking a `const usize`, the `ciphersuite` crate now defines
a `FromUniformBytes` trait taking an array (then implemented for all satisfiers
of `ff::FromUniformBytes`). In order to get the array type from the
`GenericArray`, the output of the hash, `digest` is updated to the `0.11`
release candidate which moves to `flexible-array` which solves that problem.
The existing, specific `hash_to_F` functions have been moved to `modular-frost`
as necessary.
`flexible-array` itself is patched to a fork due to
https://github.com/RustCrypto/hybrid-array/issues/131.
Fixes `no-std` builds for packages which intended to be `no-std` (without
`alloc`).
Updates a variety of MSRVs to 1.73 due to `flexible-transcript` no longer using
`std-shims` to achieve 1.66 (as `std-shims` requires `alloc`). A future
improvement would be for `std-shims` to have an `alloc` feature and only
provide MSRV shims without it.
flexible-transcript already had a shim to support <1.66. This was irrelevant
since flexible-transcript had a MSRV of 1.73. Due to how clunky it was, it has
been removed despite theoretically enabling an even lower MSRV.
If a crate has std set, it should enable std for all dependencies in order to
let them properly select which algorithms to use. Some crates fallback to
slower/worse algorithms on no-std.
Also more aggressively sets default-features = false leading to a *10%*
reduction in the amount of crates coordinator builds.
This will effectively add msrv protections to the entire project as almost
everything grabs from these.
Doesn't add msrv to coins as coins/bitcoin is still frozen.
Doesn't add msrv to services since cargo msrv doesn't play nice with anything
importing the runtime.
* Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming
They mismatched from the rest of the project.
This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate.
* Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects
This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll
correct for shortly.
Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame.
* Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG
Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that
and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser
or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is
in the wrong.
Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how
locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol
can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a
locally successful run.
If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able
(instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however.
Updates documentation on network behavior.
Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should
be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones.
* Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls
Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive.
Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to
CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done
and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32].
Removes private keys from Debug.
* Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages
Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed.
This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG
currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and
proper.
* Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read
* Add tests for dkg blame
* Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares
* Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
