mirror of
https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
synced 2025-12-08 12:19:24 +00:00
Transcript crate with both a merlin backend and a basic label len value backend
Moves binding factor/seeded RNGs over to the transcripts.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -11,13 +11,14 @@ lazy_static = "1"
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thiserror = "1"
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rand_core = "0.6"
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rand_chacha = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
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tiny-keccak = { version = "2.0", features = ["keccak"] }
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blake2 = "0.10"
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curve25519-dalek = { version = "3.2", features = ["std", "simd_backend"] }
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transcript = { path = "../../crypto/transcript" }
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ff = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
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group = { version = "0.11", optional = true }
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dalek-ff-group = { path = "../../crypto/dalek-ff-group", optional = true }
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@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ monero-epee-bin-serde = "1.0"
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reqwest = { version = "0.11", features = ["json"] }
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[features]
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multisig = ["ff", "group", "dalek-ff-group", "frost", "rand_chacha"]
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multisig = ["ff", "group", "dalek-ff-group", "frost"]
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[dev-dependencies]
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rand = "0.8"
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use thiserror::Error;
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use curve25519_dalek::{
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constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
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@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ pub enum Error {
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pub struct Input {
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// Ring, the index we're signing for, and the actual commitment behind it
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pub ring: Vec<[EdwardsPoint; 2]>,
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pub i: usize,
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pub commitment: Commitment,
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pub i: u8,
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pub commitment: Commitment
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}
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impl Input {
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@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl Input {
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ring: Vec<[EdwardsPoint; 2]>,
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i: u8,
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commitment: Commitment
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) -> Result<Input, Error> {
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) -> Result<Input, Error> {
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let n = ring.len();
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if n > u8::MAX.into() {
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Err(Error::InternalError("max ring size in this library is u8 max".to_string()))?;
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@@ -57,29 +57,14 @@ impl Input {
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if i >= (n as u8) {
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Err(Error::InvalidRingMember(i, n as u8))?;
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}
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let i: usize = i.into();
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// Validate the commitment matches
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if ring[i][1] != commitment.calculate() {
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if ring[usize::from(i)][1] != commitment.calculate() {
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Err(Error::InvalidCommitment)?;
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}
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Ok(Input { ring, i, commitment })
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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pub fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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// Ring index
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let mut context = u8::try_from(self.i).unwrap().to_le_bytes().to_vec();
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// Ring
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for pair in &self.ring {
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// Doesn't include key offsets as CLSAG doesn't care and won't be affected by it
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context.extend(&pair[0].compress().to_bytes());
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context.extend(&pair[1].compress().to_bytes());
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}
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// Doesn't include commitment as the above ring + index includes the commitment
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context
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}
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}
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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@@ -233,7 +218,7 @@ pub fn sign<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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&inputs[i].1,
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&inputs[i].2,
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mask,
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&nonce * &ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, nonce * hash_to_point(&inputs[i].1.ring[inputs[i].1.i][0])
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&nonce * &ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, nonce * hash_to_point(&inputs[i].1.ring[usize::from(inputs[i].1.i)][0])
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);
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clsag.s[inputs[i].1.i as usize] = Key {
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key: (nonce - (c * ((mu_C * z) + (mu_P * inputs[i].0)))).to_bytes()
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@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
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use core::fmt::Debug;
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use std::{rc::Rc, cell::RefCell};
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng, SeedableRng};
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use rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng;
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use blake2::{Digest, Blake2b512};
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use curve25519_dalek::{
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constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
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@@ -13,19 +10,43 @@ use curve25519_dalek::{
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edwards::EdwardsPoint
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};
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use group::Group;
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use dalek_ff_group as dfg;
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use frost::{Curve, FrostError, algorithm::Algorithm, MultisigView};
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use monero::util::ringct::{Key, Clsag};
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use group::Group;
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use dalek_ff_group as dfg;
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use transcript::Transcript as TranscriptTrait;
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use frost::{Curve, FrostError, algorithm::Algorithm, MultisigView};
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use crate::{
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Transcript,
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hash_to_point,
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frost::{MultisigError, Ed25519, DLEqProof},
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key_image,
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clsag::{Input, sign_core, verify}
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};
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impl Input {
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pub fn transcript<T: TranscriptTrait>(&self, transcript: &mut T) {
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// Ring index
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transcript.append_message(b"ring_index", &[self.i]);
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// Ring
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let mut ring = vec![];
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for pair in &self.ring {
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// Doesn't include global output indexes as CLSAG doesn't care and won't be affected by it
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// They're just a mutable reference to this data
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ring.extend(&pair[0].compress().to_bytes());
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ring.extend(&pair[1].compress().to_bytes());
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}
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transcript.append_message(b"ring", &ring);
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// Doesn't include the commitment's parts as the above ring + index includes the commitment
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// The only potential malleability would be if the G/H relationship is known breaking the
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// discrete log problem, which breaks everything already
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}
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}
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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struct ClsagSignInterim {
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@@ -39,15 +60,14 @@ struct ClsagSignInterim {
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct Multisig {
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entropy: Vec<u8>,
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commitments_H: Vec<u8>,
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image: EdwardsPoint,
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AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint, dfg::EdwardsPoint),
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input: Input,
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image: EdwardsPoint,
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msg: Rc<RefCell<[u8; 32]>>,
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mask_sum: Rc<RefCell<Scalar>>,
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mask: Rc<RefCell<Scalar>>,
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interim: Option<ClsagSignInterim>
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}
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@@ -56,19 +76,18 @@ impl Multisig {
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pub fn new(
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input: Input,
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msg: Rc<RefCell<[u8; 32]>>,
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mask_sum: Rc<RefCell<Scalar>>,
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mask: Rc<RefCell<Scalar>>,
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) -> Result<Multisig, MultisigError> {
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Ok(
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Multisig {
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entropy: vec![],
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commitments_H: vec![],
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image: EdwardsPoint::identity(),
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AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity(), dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity()),
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input,
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image: EdwardsPoint::identity(),
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msg,
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mask_sum,
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mask,
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interim: None
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}
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@@ -81,16 +100,9 @@ impl Multisig {
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}
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impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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type Transcript = Transcript;
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type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
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// We arguably don't have to commit to the nonces at all thanks to xG and yG being committed to,
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// both of those being proven to have the same scalar as xH and yH, yet it doesn't hurt
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// As for the image, that should be committed to by the msg, yet putting it here as well ensures
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// the security bounds of this
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fn addendum_commit_len() -> usize {
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3 * 32
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}
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fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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view: &MultisigView<Ed25519>,
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@@ -125,15 +137,14 @@ impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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Err(FrostError::InvalidCommitmentQuantity(l, 9, serialized.len() / 32))?;
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}
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// Use everyone's commitments to derive a random source all signers can agree upon
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// Cannot be manipulated to effect and all signers must, and will, know this
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self.entropy.extend(&l.to_le_bytes());
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self.entropy.extend(&serialized[0 .. Multisig::addendum_commit_len()]);
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let (share, serialized) = key_image::verify_share(view, l, serialized).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidShare(l))?;
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self.image += share;
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let alt = &hash_to_point(&self.input.ring[self.input.i][0]);
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let alt = &hash_to_point(&self.input.ring[usize::from(self.input.i)][0]);
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// Uses the same format FROST does for the expected commitments (nonce * G where this is nonce * H)
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self.commitments_H.extend(&u64::try_from(l).unwrap().to_le_bytes());
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self.commitments_H.extend(&serialized[0 .. 64]);
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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let H = (
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@@ -159,12 +170,20 @@ impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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Ok(())
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}
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fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut context = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 32 + 1 + (2 * 11 * 32));
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context.extend(&*self.msg.borrow());
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context.extend(&self.mask_sum.borrow().to_bytes());
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context.extend(&self.input.context());
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context
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fn transcript(&self) -> Option<Self::Transcript> {
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let mut transcript = Self::Transcript::new(b"CLSAG");
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self.input.transcript(&mut transcript);
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// Given the fact there's only ever one possible value for this, this may technically not need
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// to be committed to. If signing a TX, it's be double committed to thanks to the message
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// It doesn't hurt to have though and ensures security boundaries are well formed
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transcript.append_message(b"image", &self.image.compress().to_bytes());
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// Given this is guaranteed to match commitments, which FROST commits to, this also technically
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// doesn't need to be committed to if a canonical serialization is guaranteed
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// It, again, doesn't hurt to include and ensures security boundaries are well formed
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transcript.append_message(b"commitments_H", &self.commitments_H);
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transcript.append_message(b"message", &*self.msg.borrow());
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transcript.append_message(b"mask", &self.mask.borrow().to_bytes());
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Some(transcript)
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}
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fn sign_share(
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@@ -178,13 +197,12 @@ impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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// Apply the binding factor to the H variant of the nonce
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self.AH.0 += self.AH.1 * b;
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// Use the context with the entropy to prevent passive observers of messages from being able to
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// break privacy, as the context includes the index of the output in the ring, which can only
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// be known if you have the view key and know which of the wallet's TXOs is being spent
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let mut seed = b"CLSAG_randomness".to_vec();
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seed.extend(&self.context());
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seed.extend(&self.entropy);
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let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::from_seed(Blake2b512::digest(seed)[0 .. 32].try_into().unwrap());
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// Use the transcript to get a seeded random number generator
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// The transcript contains private data, preventing passive adversaries from recreating this
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// process even if they have access to commitments (specifically, the ring index being signed
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// for, along with the mask which should not only require knowing the shared keys yet also the
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// input commitment mask)
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let mut rng = self.transcript().unwrap().seeded_rng(b"decoy_responses", None);
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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let (clsag, c, mu_C, z, mu_P, C_out) = sign_core(
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@@ -192,7 +210,7 @@ impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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&self.msg.borrow(),
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&self.input,
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&self.image,
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*self.mask_sum.borrow(),
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*self.mask.borrow(),
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nonce_sum.0,
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self.AH.0.0
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);
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@@ -212,7 +230,7 @@ impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig {
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let interim = self.interim.as_ref().unwrap();
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let mut clsag = interim.clsag.clone();
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clsag.s[self.input.i] = Key { key: (sum.0 - interim.s).to_bytes() };
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clsag.s[usize::from(self.input.i)] = Key { key: (sum.0 - interim.s).to_bytes() };
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if verify(&clsag, &self.msg.borrow(), self.image, &self.input.ring, interim.C_out) {
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return Some((clsag, interim.C_out));
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}
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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use core::convert::TryInto;
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use thiserror::Error;
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use blake2::{digest::Update, Digest, Blake2b512};
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@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ use curve25519_dalek::{
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edwards::EdwardsPoint as DPoint
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};
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use dalek_ff_group::EdwardsPoint;
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use ff::PrimeField;
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use group::Group;
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@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ impl Curve for Ed25519 {
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}
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fn multiexp_vartime(scalars: &[Self::F], points: &[Self::G]) -> Self::G {
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EdwardsPoint(DPoint::vartime_multiscalar_mul(scalars, points))
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dfg::EdwardsPoint(DPoint::vartime_multiscalar_mul(scalars, points))
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}
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fn hash_msg(msg: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use curve25519_dalek::edwards::{EdwardsPoint, CompressedEdwardsY};
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use frost::MultisigView;
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use crate::{hash_to_point, frost::{MultisigError, Ed25519, DLEqProof}};
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@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ use curve25519_dalek::{
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use monero::util::key::H;
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use transcript::DigestTranscript;
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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pub mod frost;
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@@ -48,6 +50,8 @@ lazy_static! {
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static ref H_TABLE: EdwardsBasepointTable = EdwardsBasepointTable::create(&H.point.decompress().unwrap());
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}
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pub(crate) type Transcript = DigestTranscript::<blake2::Blake2b512>;
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
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pub struct Commitment {
|
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|
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@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
|
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng, SeedableRng};
|
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use rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng;
|
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use thiserror::Error;
|
||||
|
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use blake2::{Digest, Blake2b512};
|
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
|
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|
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use curve25519_dalek::{
|
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constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
|
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@@ -26,10 +24,13 @@ use monero::{
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
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|
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use transcript::Transcript as TranscriptTrait;
|
||||
|
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
|
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use frost::FrostError;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
Transcript,
|
||||
Commitment,
|
||||
random_scalar,
|
||||
hash, hash_to_scalar,
|
||||
@@ -264,6 +265,9 @@ impl SignableTransaction {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// This could be refactored so prep, a multisig-required variable, is used only by multisig
|
||||
// Not shimmed by the single signer API as well
|
||||
// This would enable moving Transcript as a whole to the multisig feature
|
||||
fn prepare_outputs<'a, R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
prep: &mut Preparation<'a, R>
|
||||
@@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ impl SignableTransaction {
|
||||
match prep {
|
||||
Preparation::Leader(ref mut rng) => {
|
||||
// The Leader generates the entropy for the one time keys and the bulletproof
|
||||
// This prevents de-anonymization via recalculation of the randomness which is deterministic
|
||||
rng.fill_bytes(&mut entropy);
|
||||
},
|
||||
Preparation::Follower(e, b) => {
|
||||
@@ -297,16 +302,14 @@ impl SignableTransaction {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut seed = b"StealthAddress_randomness".to_vec();
|
||||
// Leader selected entropy to prevent de-anonymization via recalculation of randomness
|
||||
seed.extend(&entropy);
|
||||
let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"StealthAddress");
|
||||
// This output can only be spent once. Therefore, it forces all one time keys used here to be
|
||||
// unique, even if the leader reuses entropy. While another transaction could use a different
|
||||
// input ordering to swap which 0 is, that input set can't contain this input without being a
|
||||
// double spend
|
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seed.extend(&self.inputs[0].tx.0);
|
||||
seed.extend(&self.inputs[0].o.to_le_bytes());
|
||||
let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::from_seed(Blake2b512::digest(seed)[0 .. 32].try_into().unwrap());
|
||||
transcript.append_message(b"hash", &self.inputs[0].tx.0);
|
||||
transcript.append_message(b"index", &u64::try_from(self.inputs[0].o).unwrap().to_le_bytes());
|
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let mut rng = transcript.seeded_rng(b"tx_keys", Some(entropy));
|
||||
|
||||
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(payments.len());
|
||||
let mut commitments = Vec::with_capacity(payments.len());
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,9 @@
|
||||
use std::{rc::Rc, cell::RefCell};
|
||||
|
||||
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
|
||||
use rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng;
|
||||
|
||||
use curve25519_dalek::{scalar::Scalar, edwards::{EdwardsPoint, CompressedEdwardsY}};
|
||||
|
||||
use frost::{FrostError, MultisigKeys, MultisigParams, sign::{State, StateMachine, AlgorithmMachine}};
|
||||
|
||||
use monero::{
|
||||
Hash, VarInt,
|
||||
consensus::deserialize,
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +11,11 @@ use monero::{
|
||||
blockdata::transaction::{KeyImage, TxIn, Transaction}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use transcript::Transcript as TranscriptTrait;
|
||||
use frost::{FrostError, MultisigKeys, MultisigParams, sign::{State, StateMachine, AlgorithmMachine}};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
Transcript,
|
||||
frost::Ed25519,
|
||||
key_image,
|
||||
clsag,
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ impl StateMachine for TransactionMachine {
|
||||
let prep = prep.as_ref().unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// Handle the prep with a seeded RNG type to make rustc happy
|
||||
let (_, mask_sum, tx_inner) = self.signable.prepare_outputs::<ChaCha12Rng>(
|
||||
let (_, mask_sum, tx_inner) = self.signable.prepare_outputs::<<Transcript as TranscriptTrait>::SeededRng>(
|
||||
&mut Preparation::Follower(
|
||||
prep[clsag_lens .. (clsag_lens + 32)].try_into().map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?,
|
||||
deserialize(&prep[(clsag_lens + 32) .. prep.len()]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user