Meaningful changes from aggressive-clippy

I do want to enable a few specific lints, yet aggressive-clippy as a whole
isn't worthwhile.
This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker
2023-07-08 11:29:05 -04:00
parent 3c6cc42c23
commit 93b1656f86
39 changed files with 127 additions and 143 deletions

View File

@@ -390,9 +390,10 @@ impl<C: Ciphersuite> Encryption<C> {
participant: Participant,
msg: EncryptionKeyMessage<C, M>,
) -> M {
if self.enc_keys.contains_key(&participant) {
panic!("Re-registering encryption key for a participant");
}
assert!(
!self.enc_keys.contains_key(&participant),
"Re-registering encryption key for a participant"
);
self.enc_keys.insert(participant, msg.enc_key);
msg.msg
}

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@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ pub struct KeyGenMachine<C: Ciphersuite> {
impl<C: Ciphersuite> KeyGenMachine<C> {
/// Create a new machine to generate a key.
// The context string should be unique among multisigs.
///
/// The context string should be unique among multisigs.
pub fn new(params: ThresholdParams, context: String) -> KeyGenMachine<C> {
KeyGenMachine { params, context, _curve: PhantomData }
}
@@ -171,7 +172,6 @@ fn polynomial<F: PrimeField + Zeroize>(
/// channel.
///
/// If any participant sends multiple secret shares to another participant, they are faulty.
// This should presumably be written as SecretShare(Zeroizing<F::Repr>).
// It's unfortunately not possible as F::Repr doesn't have Zeroize as a bound.
// The encryption system also explicitly uses Zeroizing<M> so it can ensure anything being
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ impl<C: Ciphersuite> Zeroize for KeyMachine<C> {
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
self.params.zeroize();
self.secret.zeroize();
for (_, commitments) in self.commitments.iter_mut() {
for commitments in self.commitments.values_mut() {
commitments.zeroize();
}
self.encryption.zeroize();
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ impl<C: Ciphersuite> fmt::Debug for BlameMachine<C> {
impl<C: Ciphersuite> Zeroize for BlameMachine<C> {
fn zeroize(&mut self) {
for (_, commitments) in self.commitments.iter_mut() {
for commitments in self.commitments.values_mut() {
commitments.zeroize();
}
self.encryption.zeroize();
@@ -536,10 +536,9 @@ impl<C: Ciphersuite> BlameMachine<C> {
Err(DecryptionError::InvalidProof) => return recipient,
};
let share = match Option::<C::F>::from(C::F::from_repr(share_bytes.0)) {
Some(share) => share,
let Some(share) = Option::<C::F>::from(C::F::from_repr(share_bytes.0)) else {
// If this isn't a valid scalar, the sender is faulty
None => return sender,
return sender;
};
// If this isn't a valid share, the sender is faulty

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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ pub const PARTICIPANTS: u16 = 5;
pub const THRESHOLD: u16 = ((PARTICIPANTS * 2) / 3) + 1;
/// Clone a map without a specific value.
pub fn clone_without<K: Clone + std::cmp::Eq + std::hash::Hash, V: Clone>(
pub fn clone_without<K: Clone + core::cmp::Eq + core::hash::Hash, V: Clone>(
map: &HashMap<K, V>,
without: &K,
) -> HashMap<K, V> {
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ pub fn clone_without<K: Clone + std::cmp::Eq + std::hash::Hash, V: Clone>(
pub fn recover_key<C: Ciphersuite>(keys: &HashMap<Participant, ThresholdKeys<C>>) -> C::F {
let first = keys.values().next().expect("no keys provided");
assert!(keys.len() >= first.params().t().into(), "not enough keys provided");
let included = keys.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>();
let included = keys.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
let group_private = keys.iter().fold(C::F::ZERO, |accum, (i, keys)| {
accum + (lagrange::<C::F>(*i, &included) * keys.secret_share().deref())

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@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ pub fn test_musig<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Ciphersuite>(rng: &mut R) {
const CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"MuSig Test";
// Empty signing set
assert!(musig::<C>(CONTEXT, &Zeroizing::new(C::F::ZERO), &[]).is_err());
musig::<C>(CONTEXT, &Zeroizing::new(C::F::ZERO), &[]).unwrap_err();
// Signing set we're not part of
assert!(musig::<C>(CONTEXT, &Zeroizing::new(C::F::ZERO), &[C::generator()]).is_err());
musig::<C>(CONTEXT, &Zeroizing::new(C::F::ZERO), &[C::generator()]).unwrap_err();
// Test with n keys
{