Rename the coins folder to networks (#583)

* Rename the coins folder to networks

Ethereum isn't a coin. It's a network.

Resolves #357.

* More renames of coins -> networks in orchestration

* Correct paths in tests/

* cargo fmt
This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker
2024-07-18 12:16:45 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 40cc180853
commit 7d2d739042
244 changed files with 102 additions and 99 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg))]
#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
#![deny(missing_docs)]
#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
#![allow(non_snake_case)]
use core::ops::Deref;
use std_shims::{
vec,
vec::Vec,
io::{self, Read, Write},
};
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};
use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, ConditionallySelectable};
use curve25519_dalek::{
constants::{ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT},
scalar::Scalar,
traits::{IsIdentity, MultiscalarMul, VartimePrecomputedMultiscalarMul},
edwards::{EdwardsPoint, VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation},
};
use monero_io::*;
use monero_generators::hash_to_point;
use monero_primitives::{INV_EIGHT, G_PRECOMP, Commitment, Decoys, keccak256_to_scalar};
#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
mod multisig;
#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
pub use multisig::{ClsagMultisigMaskSender, ClsagAddendum, ClsagMultisig};
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", test))]
mod tests;
/// Errors when working with CLSAGs.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", derive(thiserror::Error))]
pub enum ClsagError {
/// The ring was invalid (such as being too small or too large).
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid ring"))]
InvalidRing,
/// The discrete logarithm of the key, scaling G, wasn't equivalent to the signing ring member.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid commitment"))]
InvalidKey,
/// The commitment opening provided did not match the ring member's.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid commitment"))]
InvalidCommitment,
/// The key image was invalid (such as being identity or torsioned)
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid key image"))]
InvalidImage,
/// The `D` component was invalid.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid D"))]
InvalidD,
/// The `s` vector was invalid.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid s"))]
InvalidS,
/// The `c1` variable was invalid.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid c1"))]
InvalidC1,
}
/// Context on the input being signed for.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct ClsagContext {
// The opening for the commitment of the signing ring member
commitment: Commitment,
// Selected ring members' positions, signer index, and ring
decoys: Decoys,
}
impl ClsagContext {
/// Create a new context, as necessary for signing.
pub fn new(decoys: Decoys, commitment: Commitment) -> Result<ClsagContext, ClsagError> {
if decoys.len() > u8::MAX.into() {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidRing)?;
}
// Validate the commitment matches
if decoys.signer_ring_members()[1] != commitment.calculate() {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidCommitment)?;
}
Ok(ClsagContext { commitment, decoys })
}
}
#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
enum Mode {
Sign(usize, EdwardsPoint, EdwardsPoint),
Verify(Scalar),
}
// Core of the CLSAG algorithm, applicable to both sign and verify with minimal differences
//
// Said differences are covered via the above Mode
fn core(
ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
I: &EdwardsPoint,
pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
msg: &[u8; 32],
D: &EdwardsPoint,
s: &[Scalar],
A_c1: &Mode,
) -> ((EdwardsPoint, Scalar, Scalar), Scalar) {
let n = ring.len();
let images_precomp = match A_c1 {
Mode::Sign(..) => None,
Mode::Verify(..) => Some(VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation::new([I, D])),
};
let D_INV_EIGHT = D * INV_EIGHT();
// Generate the transcript
// Instead of generating multiple, a single transcript is created and then edited as needed
const PREFIX: &[u8] = b"CLSAG_";
#[rustfmt::skip]
const AGG_0: &[u8] = b"agg_0";
#[rustfmt::skip]
const ROUND: &[u8] = b"round";
const PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN: usize = PREFIX.len() + AGG_0.len();
let mut to_hash = Vec::with_capacity(((2 * n) + 5) * 32);
to_hash.extend(PREFIX);
to_hash.extend(AGG_0);
to_hash.extend([0; 32 - PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN]);
let mut P = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for member in ring {
P.push(member[0]);
to_hash.extend(member[0].compress().to_bytes());
}
let mut C = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for member in ring {
C.push(member[1] - pseudo_out);
to_hash.extend(member[1].compress().to_bytes());
}
to_hash.extend(I.compress().to_bytes());
to_hash.extend(D_INV_EIGHT.compress().to_bytes());
to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
// mu_P with agg_0
let mu_P = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
// mu_C with agg_1
to_hash[PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN - 1] = b'1';
let mu_C = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
// Truncate it for the round transcript, altering the DST as needed
to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 1) * 32);
for i in 0 .. ROUND.len() {
to_hash[PREFIX.len() + i] = ROUND[i];
}
// Unfortunately, it's I D pseudo_out instead of pseudo_out I D, meaning this needs to be
// truncated just to add it back
to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
to_hash.extend(msg);
// Configure the loop based on if we're signing or verifying
let start;
let end;
let mut c;
match A_c1 {
Mode::Sign(r, A, AH) => {
start = r + 1;
end = r + n;
to_hash.extend(A.compress().to_bytes());
to_hash.extend(AH.compress().to_bytes());
c = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
}
Mode::Verify(c1) => {
start = 0;
end = n;
c = *c1;
}
}
// Perform the core loop
let mut c1 = c;
for i in (start .. end).map(|i| i % n) {
let c_p = mu_P * c;
let c_c = mu_C * c;
// (s_i * G) + (c_p * P_i) + (c_c * C_i)
let L = match A_c1 {
Mode::Sign(..) => {
EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([s[i], c_p, c_c], [ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT, P[i], C[i]])
}
Mode::Verify(..) => {
G_PRECOMP().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([s[i]], [c_p, c_c], [P[i], C[i]])
}
};
let PH = hash_to_point(P[i].compress().0);
// (c_p * I) + (c_c * D) + (s_i * PH)
let R = match A_c1 {
Mode::Sign(..) => EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c, s[i]], [I, D, &PH]),
Mode::Verify(..) => {
images_precomp.as_ref().unwrap().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c], [s[i]], [PH])
}
};
to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 3) * 32);
to_hash.extend(L.compress().to_bytes());
to_hash.extend(R.compress().to_bytes());
c = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
// This will only execute once and shouldn't need to be constant time. Making it constant time
// removes the risk of branch prediction creating timing differences depending on ring index
// however
c1.conditional_assign(&c, i.ct_eq(&(n - 1)));
}
// This first tuple is needed to continue signing, the latter is the c to be tested/worked with
((D_INV_EIGHT, c * mu_P, c * mu_C), c1)
}
/// The CLSAG signature, as used in Monero.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct Clsag {
/// The difference of the commitment randomnesses, scaling the key image generator.
pub D: EdwardsPoint,
/// The responses for each ring member.
pub s: Vec<Scalar>,
/// The first challenge in the ring.
pub c1: Scalar,
}
struct ClsagSignCore {
incomplete_clsag: Clsag,
pseudo_out: EdwardsPoint,
key_challenge: Scalar,
challenged_mask: Scalar,
}
impl Clsag {
// Sign core is the extension of core as needed for signing, yet is shared between single signer
// and multisig, hence why it's still core
fn sign_core<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
rng: &mut R,
I: &EdwardsPoint,
input: &ClsagContext,
mask: Scalar,
msg: &[u8; 32],
A: EdwardsPoint,
AH: EdwardsPoint,
) -> ClsagSignCore {
let r: usize = input.decoys.signer_index().into();
let pseudo_out = Commitment::new(mask, input.commitment.amount).calculate();
let mask_delta = input.commitment.mask - mask;
let H = hash_to_point(input.decoys.ring()[r][0].compress().0);
let D = H * mask_delta;
let mut s = Vec::with_capacity(input.decoys.ring().len());
for _ in 0 .. input.decoys.ring().len() {
s.push(Scalar::random(rng));
}
let ((D, c_p, c_c), c1) =
core(input.decoys.ring(), I, &pseudo_out, msg, &D, &s, &Mode::Sign(r, A, AH));
ClsagSignCore {
incomplete_clsag: Clsag { D, s, c1 },
pseudo_out,
key_challenge: c_p,
challenged_mask: c_c * mask_delta,
}
}
/// Sign CLSAG signatures for the provided inputs.
///
/// Monero ensures the rerandomized input commitments have the same value as the outputs by
/// checking `sum(rerandomized_input_commitments) - sum(output_commitments) == 0`. This requires
/// not only the amounts balance, yet also
/// `sum(input_commitment_masks) - sum(output_commitment_masks)`.
///
/// Monero solves this by following the wallet protocol to determine each output commitment's
/// randomness, then using random masks for all but the last input. The last input is
/// rerandomized to the necessary mask for the equation to balance.
///
/// Due to Monero having this behavior, it only makes sense to sign CLSAGs as a list, hence this
/// API being the way it is.
///
/// `inputs` is of the form (discrete logarithm of the key, context).
///
/// `sum_outputs` is for the sum of the output commitments' masks.
pub fn sign<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
rng: &mut R,
mut inputs: Vec<(Zeroizing<Scalar>, ClsagContext)>,
sum_outputs: Scalar,
msg: [u8; 32],
) -> Result<Vec<(Clsag, EdwardsPoint)>, ClsagError> {
// Create the key images
let mut key_image_generators = vec![];
let mut key_images = vec![];
for input in &inputs {
let key = input.1.decoys.signer_ring_members()[0];
// Check the key is consistent
if (ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * input.0.deref()) != key {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidKey)?;
}
let key_image_generator = hash_to_point(key.compress().0);
key_image_generators.push(key_image_generator);
key_images.push(key_image_generator * input.0.deref());
}
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(inputs.len());
let mut sum_pseudo_outs = Scalar::ZERO;
for i in 0 .. inputs.len() {
let mask;
// If this is the last input, set the mask as described above
if i == (inputs.len() - 1) {
mask = sum_outputs - sum_pseudo_outs;
} else {
mask = Scalar::random(rng);
sum_pseudo_outs += mask;
}
let mut nonce = Zeroizing::new(Scalar::random(rng));
let ClsagSignCore { mut incomplete_clsag, pseudo_out, key_challenge, challenged_mask } =
Clsag::sign_core(
rng,
&key_images[i],
&inputs[i].1,
mask,
&msg,
nonce.deref() * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
nonce.deref() * key_image_generators[i],
);
// Effectively r - c x, except c x is (c_p x) + (c_c z), where z is the delta between the
// ring member's commitment and our pseudo-out commitment (which will only have a known
// discrete log over G if the amounts cancel out)
incomplete_clsag.s[usize::from(inputs[i].1.decoys.signer_index())] =
nonce.deref() - ((key_challenge * inputs[i].0.deref()) + challenged_mask);
let clsag = incomplete_clsag;
// Zeroize private keys and nonces.
inputs[i].0.zeroize();
nonce.zeroize();
debug_assert!(clsag
.verify(inputs[i].1.decoys.ring(), &key_images[i], &pseudo_out, &msg)
.is_ok());
res.push((clsag, pseudo_out));
}
Ok(res)
}
/// Verify a CLSAG signature for the provided context.
pub fn verify(
&self,
ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
I: &EdwardsPoint,
pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
msg: &[u8; 32],
) -> Result<(), ClsagError> {
// Preliminary checks
// s, c1, and points must also be encoded canonically, which is checked at time of decode
if ring.is_empty() {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidRing)?;
}
if ring.len() != self.s.len() {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidS)?;
}
if I.is_identity() || (!I.is_torsion_free()) {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidImage)?;
}
let D = self.D.mul_by_cofactor();
if D.is_identity() {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidD)?;
}
let (_, c1) = core(ring, I, pseudo_out, msg, &D, &self.s, &Mode::Verify(self.c1));
if c1 != self.c1 {
Err(ClsagError::InvalidC1)?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Write a CLSAG.
pub fn write<W: Write>(&self, w: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
write_raw_vec(write_scalar, &self.s, w)?;
w.write_all(&self.c1.to_bytes())?;
write_point(&self.D, w)
}
/// Read a CLSAG.
pub fn read<R: Read>(decoys: usize, r: &mut R) -> io::Result<Clsag> {
Ok(Clsag { s: read_raw_vec(read_scalar, decoys, r)?, c1: read_scalar(r)?, D: read_point(r)? })
}
}