Rename the coins folder to networks (#583)

* Rename the coins folder to networks

Ethereum isn't a coin. It's a network.

Resolves #357.

* More renames of coins -> networks in orchestration

* Correct paths in tests/

* cargo fmt

networks/monero/ringct/clsag/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg))]
+#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
+#![allow(non_snake_case)]
+
+use core::ops::Deref;
+use std_shims::{
+  vec,
+  vec::Vec,
+  io::{self, Read, Write},
+};
+
+use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
+
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop, Zeroizing};
+use subtle::{ConstantTimeEq, ConditionallySelectable};
+
+use curve25519_dalek::{
+  constants::{ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT},
+  scalar::Scalar,
+  traits::{IsIdentity, MultiscalarMul, VartimePrecomputedMultiscalarMul},
+  edwards::{EdwardsPoint, VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation},
+};
+
+use monero_io::*;
+use monero_generators::hash_to_point;
+use monero_primitives::{INV_EIGHT, G_PRECOMP, Commitment, Decoys, keccak256_to_scalar};
+
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+mod multisig;
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+pub use multisig::{ClsagMultisigMaskSender, ClsagAddendum, ClsagMultisig};
+
+#[cfg(all(feature = "std", test))]
+mod tests;
+
+/// Errors when working with CLSAGs.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", derive(thiserror::Error))]
+pub enum ClsagError {
+  /// The ring was invalid (such as being too small or too large).
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid ring"))]
+  InvalidRing,
+  /// The discrete logarithm of the key, scaling G, wasn't equivalent to the signing ring member.
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid commitment"))]
+  InvalidKey,
+  /// The commitment opening provided did not match the ring member's.
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid commitment"))]
+  InvalidCommitment,
+  /// The key image was invalid (such as being identity or torsioned)
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid key image"))]
+  InvalidImage,
+  /// The `D` component was invalid.
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid D"))]
+  InvalidD,
+  /// The `s` vector was invalid.
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid s"))]
+  InvalidS,
+  /// The `c1` variable was invalid.
+  #[cfg_attr(feature = "std", error("invalid c1"))]
+  InvalidC1,
+}
+
+/// Context on the input being signed for.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
+pub struct ClsagContext {
+  // The opening for the commitment of the signing ring member
+  commitment: Commitment,
+  // Selected ring members' positions, signer index, and ring
+  decoys: Decoys,
+}
+
+impl ClsagContext {
+  /// Create a new context, as necessary for signing.
+  pub fn new(decoys: Decoys, commitment: Commitment) -> Result<ClsagContext, ClsagError> {
+    if decoys.len() > u8::MAX.into() {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidRing)?;
+    }
+
+    // Validate the commitment matches
+    if decoys.signer_ring_members()[1] != commitment.calculate() {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidCommitment)?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(ClsagContext { commitment, decoys })
+  }
+}
+
+#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
+enum Mode {
+  Sign(usize, EdwardsPoint, EdwardsPoint),
+  Verify(Scalar),
+}
+
+// Core of the CLSAG algorithm, applicable to both sign and verify with minimal differences
+//
+// Said differences are covered via the above Mode
+fn core(
+  ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
+  I: &EdwardsPoint,
+  pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
+  msg: &[u8; 32],
+  D: &EdwardsPoint,
+  s: &[Scalar],
+  A_c1: &Mode,
+) -> ((EdwardsPoint, Scalar, Scalar), Scalar) {
+  let n = ring.len();
+
+  let images_precomp = match A_c1 {
+    Mode::Sign(..) => None,
+    Mode::Verify(..) => Some(VartimeEdwardsPrecomputation::new([I, D])),
+  };
+  let D_INV_EIGHT = D * INV_EIGHT();
+
+  // Generate the transcript
+  // Instead of generating multiple, a single transcript is created and then edited as needed
+  const PREFIX: &[u8] = b"CLSAG_";
+  #[rustfmt::skip]
+  const AGG_0: &[u8]  =       b"agg_0";
+  #[rustfmt::skip]
+  const ROUND: &[u8]  =       b"round";
+  const PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN: usize = PREFIX.len() + AGG_0.len();
+
+  let mut to_hash = Vec::with_capacity(((2 * n) + 5) * 32);
+  to_hash.extend(PREFIX);
+  to_hash.extend(AGG_0);
+  to_hash.extend([0; 32 - PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN]);
+
+  let mut P = Vec::with_capacity(n);
+  for member in ring {
+    P.push(member[0]);
+    to_hash.extend(member[0].compress().to_bytes());
+  }
+
+  let mut C = Vec::with_capacity(n);
+  for member in ring {
+    C.push(member[1] - pseudo_out);
+    to_hash.extend(member[1].compress().to_bytes());
+  }
+
+  to_hash.extend(I.compress().to_bytes());
+  to_hash.extend(D_INV_EIGHT.compress().to_bytes());
+  to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
+  // mu_P with agg_0
+  let mu_P = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
+  // mu_C with agg_1
+  to_hash[PREFIX_AGG_0_LEN - 1] = b'1';
+  let mu_C = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
+
+  // Truncate it for the round transcript, altering the DST as needed
+  to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 1) * 32);
+  for i in 0 .. ROUND.len() {
+    to_hash[PREFIX.len() + i] = ROUND[i];
+  }
+  // Unfortunately, it's I D pseudo_out instead of pseudo_out I D, meaning this needs to be
+  // truncated just to add it back
+  to_hash.extend(pseudo_out.compress().to_bytes());
+  to_hash.extend(msg);
+
+  // Configure the loop based on if we're signing or verifying
+  let start;
+  let end;
+  let mut c;
+  match A_c1 {
+    Mode::Sign(r, A, AH) => {
+      start = r + 1;
+      end = r + n;
+      to_hash.extend(A.compress().to_bytes());
+      to_hash.extend(AH.compress().to_bytes());
+      c = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
+    }
+
+    Mode::Verify(c1) => {
+      start = 0;
+      end = n;
+      c = *c1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Perform the core loop
+  let mut c1 = c;
+  for i in (start .. end).map(|i| i % n) {
+    let c_p = mu_P * c;
+    let c_c = mu_C * c;
+
+    // (s_i * G) + (c_p * P_i) + (c_c * C_i)
+    let L = match A_c1 {
+      Mode::Sign(..) => {
+        EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([s[i], c_p, c_c], [ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT, P[i], C[i]])
+      }
+      Mode::Verify(..) => {
+        G_PRECOMP().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([s[i]], [c_p, c_c], [P[i], C[i]])
+      }
+    };
+
+    let PH = hash_to_point(P[i].compress().0);
+
+    // (c_p * I) + (c_c * D) + (s_i * PH)
+    let R = match A_c1 {
+      Mode::Sign(..) => EdwardsPoint::multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c, s[i]], [I, D, &PH]),
+      Mode::Verify(..) => {
+        images_precomp.as_ref().unwrap().vartime_mixed_multiscalar_mul([c_p, c_c], [s[i]], [PH])
+      }
+    };
+
+    to_hash.truncate(((2 * n) + 3) * 32);
+    to_hash.extend(L.compress().to_bytes());
+    to_hash.extend(R.compress().to_bytes());
+    c = keccak256_to_scalar(&to_hash);
+
+    // This will only execute once and shouldn't need to be constant time. Making it constant time
+    // removes the risk of branch prediction creating timing differences depending on ring index
+    // however
+    c1.conditional_assign(&c, i.ct_eq(&(n - 1)));
+  }
+
+  // This first tuple is needed to continue signing, the latter is the c to be tested/worked with
+  ((D_INV_EIGHT, c * mu_P, c * mu_C), c1)
+}
+
+/// The CLSAG signature, as used in Monero.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+pub struct Clsag {
+  /// The difference of the commitment randomnesses, scaling the key image generator.
+  pub D: EdwardsPoint,
+  /// The responses for each ring member.
+  pub s: Vec<Scalar>,
+  /// The first challenge in the ring.
+  pub c1: Scalar,
+}
+
+struct ClsagSignCore {
+  incomplete_clsag: Clsag,
+  pseudo_out: EdwardsPoint,
+  key_challenge: Scalar,
+  challenged_mask: Scalar,
+}
+
+impl Clsag {
+  // Sign core is the extension of core as needed for signing, yet is shared between single signer
+  // and multisig, hence why it's still core
+  fn sign_core<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    I: &EdwardsPoint,
+    input: &ClsagContext,
+    mask: Scalar,
+    msg: &[u8; 32],
+    A: EdwardsPoint,
+    AH: EdwardsPoint,
+  ) -> ClsagSignCore {
+    let r: usize = input.decoys.signer_index().into();
+
+    let pseudo_out = Commitment::new(mask, input.commitment.amount).calculate();
+    let mask_delta = input.commitment.mask - mask;
+
+    let H = hash_to_point(input.decoys.ring()[r][0].compress().0);
+    let D = H * mask_delta;
+    let mut s = Vec::with_capacity(input.decoys.ring().len());
+    for _ in 0 .. input.decoys.ring().len() {
+      s.push(Scalar::random(rng));
+    }
+    let ((D, c_p, c_c), c1) =
+      core(input.decoys.ring(), I, &pseudo_out, msg, &D, &s, &Mode::Sign(r, A, AH));
+
+    ClsagSignCore {
+      incomplete_clsag: Clsag { D, s, c1 },
+      pseudo_out,
+      key_challenge: c_p,
+      challenged_mask: c_c * mask_delta,
+    }
+  }
+
+  /// Sign CLSAG signatures for the provided inputs.
+  ///
+  /// Monero ensures the rerandomized input commitments have the same value as the outputs by
+  /// checking `sum(rerandomized_input_commitments) - sum(output_commitments) == 0`. This requires
+  /// not only the amounts balance, yet also
+  /// `sum(input_commitment_masks) - sum(output_commitment_masks)`.
+  ///
+  /// Monero solves this by following the wallet protocol to determine each output commitment's
+  /// randomness, then using random masks for all but the last input. The last input is
+  /// rerandomized to the necessary mask for the equation to balance.
+  ///
+  /// Due to Monero having this behavior, it only makes sense to sign CLSAGs as a list, hence this
+  /// API being the way it is.
+  ///
+  /// `inputs` is of the form (discrete logarithm of the key, context).
+  ///
+  /// `sum_outputs` is for the sum of the output commitments' masks.
+  pub fn sign<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+    rng: &mut R,
+    mut inputs: Vec<(Zeroizing<Scalar>, ClsagContext)>,
+    sum_outputs: Scalar,
+    msg: [u8; 32],
+  ) -> Result<Vec<(Clsag, EdwardsPoint)>, ClsagError> {
+    // Create the key images
+    let mut key_image_generators = vec![];
+    let mut key_images = vec![];
+    for input in &inputs {
+      let key = input.1.decoys.signer_ring_members()[0];
+
+      // Check the key is consistent
+      if (ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * input.0.deref()) != key {
+        Err(ClsagError::InvalidKey)?;
+      }
+
+      let key_image_generator = hash_to_point(key.compress().0);
+      key_image_generators.push(key_image_generator);
+      key_images.push(key_image_generator * input.0.deref());
+    }
+
+    let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(inputs.len());
+    let mut sum_pseudo_outs = Scalar::ZERO;
+    for i in 0 .. inputs.len() {
+      let mask;
+      // If this is the last input, set the mask as described above
+      if i == (inputs.len() - 1) {
+        mask = sum_outputs - sum_pseudo_outs;
+      } else {
+        mask = Scalar::random(rng);
+        sum_pseudo_outs += mask;
+      }
+
+      let mut nonce = Zeroizing::new(Scalar::random(rng));
+      let ClsagSignCore { mut incomplete_clsag, pseudo_out, key_challenge, challenged_mask } =
+        Clsag::sign_core(
+          rng,
+          &key_images[i],
+          &inputs[i].1,
+          mask,
+          &msg,
+          nonce.deref() * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE,
+          nonce.deref() * key_image_generators[i],
+        );
+      // Effectively r - c x, except c x is (c_p x) + (c_c z), where z is the delta between the
+      // ring member's commitment and our pseudo-out commitment (which will only have a known
+      // discrete log over G if the amounts cancel out)
+      incomplete_clsag.s[usize::from(inputs[i].1.decoys.signer_index())] =
+        nonce.deref() - ((key_challenge * inputs[i].0.deref()) + challenged_mask);
+      let clsag = incomplete_clsag;
+
+      // Zeroize private keys and nonces.
+      inputs[i].0.zeroize();
+      nonce.zeroize();
+
+      debug_assert!(clsag
+        .verify(inputs[i].1.decoys.ring(), &key_images[i], &pseudo_out, &msg)
+        .is_ok());
+
+      res.push((clsag, pseudo_out));
+    }
+
+    Ok(res)
+  }
+
+  /// Verify a CLSAG signature for the provided context.
+  pub fn verify(
+    &self,
+    ring: &[[EdwardsPoint; 2]],
+    I: &EdwardsPoint,
+    pseudo_out: &EdwardsPoint,
+    msg: &[u8; 32],
+  ) -> Result<(), ClsagError> {
+    // Preliminary checks
+    // s, c1, and points must also be encoded canonically, which is checked at time of decode
+    if ring.is_empty() {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidRing)?;
+    }
+    if ring.len() != self.s.len() {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidS)?;
+    }
+    if I.is_identity() || (!I.is_torsion_free()) {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidImage)?;
+    }
+
+    let D = self.D.mul_by_cofactor();
+    if D.is_identity() {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidD)?;
+    }
+
+    let (_, c1) = core(ring, I, pseudo_out, msg, &D, &self.s, &Mode::Verify(self.c1));
+    if c1 != self.c1 {
+      Err(ClsagError::InvalidC1)?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+  }
+
+  /// Write a CLSAG.
+  pub fn write<W: Write>(&self, w: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
+    write_raw_vec(write_scalar, &self.s, w)?;
+    w.write_all(&self.c1.to_bytes())?;
+    write_point(&self.D, w)
+  }
+
+  /// Read a CLSAG.
+  pub fn read<R: Read>(decoys: usize, r: &mut R) -> io::Result<Clsag> {
+    Ok(Clsag { s: read_raw_vec(read_scalar, decoys, r)?, c1: read_scalar(r)?, D: read_point(r)? })
+  }
+}

networks/monero/ringct/clsag/src/multisig.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+use core::{ops::Deref, fmt::Debug};
+use std_shims::{
+  sync::{Arc, Mutex},
+  io::{self, Read, Write},
+  collections::HashMap,
+};
+
+use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng, SeedableRng};
+use rand_chacha::ChaCha20Rng;
+
+use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
+
+use curve25519_dalek::{scalar::Scalar, edwards::EdwardsPoint};
+
+use group::{
+  ff::{Field, PrimeField},
+  Group, GroupEncoding,
+};
+
+use transcript::{Transcript, RecommendedTranscript};
+use dalek_ff_group as dfg;
+use frost::{
+  dkg::lagrange,
+  curve::Ed25519,
+  Participant, FrostError, ThresholdKeys, ThresholdView,
+  algorithm::{WriteAddendum, Algorithm},
+};
+
+use monero_generators::hash_to_point;
+
+use crate::{ClsagContext, Clsag};
+
+impl ClsagContext {
+  fn transcript<T: Transcript>(&self, transcript: &mut T) {
+    // Doesn't domain separate as this is considered part of the larger CLSAG proof
+
+    // Ring index
+    transcript.append_message(b"signer_index", [self.decoys.signer_index()]);
+
+    // Ring
+    for (i, pair) in self.decoys.ring().iter().enumerate() {
+      // Doesn't include global output indexes as CLSAG doesn't care/won't be affected by it
+      // They're just a unreliable reference to this data which will be included in the message
+      // if somehow relevant
+      transcript.append_message(b"member", [u8::try_from(i).expect("ring size exceeded 255")]);
+      // This also transcripts the key image generator since it's derived from this key
+      transcript.append_message(b"key", pair[0].compress().to_bytes());
+      transcript.append_message(b"commitment", pair[1].compress().to_bytes())
+    }
+
+    // Doesn't include the commitment's parts as the above ring + index includes the commitment
+    // The only potential malleability would be if the G/H relationship is known, breaking the
+    // discrete log problem, which breaks everything already
+  }
+}
+
+/// A channel to send the mask to use for the pseudo-out (rerandomized commitment) with.
+///
+/// A mask must be sent along this channel before any preprocess addendums are handled. Breaking
+/// this rule will cause a panic.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ClsagMultisigMaskSender {
+  buf: Arc<Mutex<Option<Scalar>>>,
+}
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+struct ClsagMultisigMaskReceiver {
+  buf: Arc<Mutex<Option<Scalar>>>,
+}
+impl ClsagMultisigMaskSender {
+  fn new() -> (ClsagMultisigMaskSender, ClsagMultisigMaskReceiver) {
+    let buf = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));
+    (ClsagMultisigMaskSender { buf: buf.clone() }, ClsagMultisigMaskReceiver { buf })
+  }
+
+  /// Send a mask to a CLSAG multisig instance.
+  pub fn send(self, mask: Scalar) {
+    *self.buf.lock() = Some(mask);
+  }
+}
+impl ClsagMultisigMaskReceiver {
+  fn recv(self) -> Scalar {
+    self.buf.lock().unwrap()
+  }
+}
+
+/// Addendum produced during the signing process.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Zeroize, Debug)]
+pub struct ClsagAddendum {
+  key_image_share: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
+}
+
+impl ClsagAddendum {
+  /// The key image share within this addendum.
+  pub fn key_image_share(&self) -> dfg::EdwardsPoint {
+    self.key_image_share
+  }
+}
+
+impl WriteAddendum for ClsagAddendum {
+  fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
+    writer.write_all(self.key_image_share.compress().to_bytes().as_ref())
+  }
+}
+
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
+struct Interim {
+  p: Scalar,
+  c: Scalar,
+
+  clsag: Clsag,
+  pseudo_out: EdwardsPoint,
+}
+
+/// FROST-inspired algorithm for producing a CLSAG signature.
+///
+/// Before this has its `process_addendum` called, a mask must be set. Else this will panic.
+///
+/// The message signed is expected to be a 32-byte value. Per Monero, it's the keccak256 hash of
+/// the transaction data which is signed. This will panic if the message is not a 32-byte value.
+#[allow(non_snake_case)]
+#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
+pub struct ClsagMultisig {
+  transcript: RecommendedTranscript,
+
+  key_image_generator: EdwardsPoint,
+  key_image_shares: HashMap<[u8; 32], dfg::EdwardsPoint>,
+  image: Option<dfg::EdwardsPoint>,
+
+  context: ClsagContext,
+
+  mask_recv: Option<ClsagMultisigMaskReceiver>,
+  mask: Option<Scalar>,
+
+  msg: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+  interim: Option<Interim>,
+}
+
+impl ClsagMultisig {
+  /// Construct a new instance of multisignature CLSAG signing.
+  pub fn new(
+    transcript: RecommendedTranscript,
+    context: ClsagContext,
+  ) -> (ClsagMultisig, ClsagMultisigMaskSender) {
+    let (mask_send, mask_recv) = ClsagMultisigMaskSender::new();
+    (
+      ClsagMultisig {
+        transcript,
+
+        key_image_generator: hash_to_point(context.decoys.signer_ring_members()[0].compress().0),
+        key_image_shares: HashMap::new(),
+        image: None,
+
+        context,
+
+        mask_recv: Some(mask_recv),
+        mask: None,
+
+        msg: None,
+        interim: None,
+      },
+      mask_send,
+    )
+  }
+
+  /// The key image generator used by the signer.
+  pub fn key_image_generator(&self) -> EdwardsPoint {
+    self.key_image_generator
+  }
+}
+
+impl Algorithm<Ed25519> for ClsagMultisig {
+  type Transcript = RecommendedTranscript;
+  type Addendum = ClsagAddendum;
+  // We output the CLSAG and the key image, which requires an interactive protocol to obtain
+  type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
+
+  // We need the nonce represented against both G and the key image generator
+  fn nonces(&self) -> Vec<Vec<dfg::EdwardsPoint>> {
+    vec![vec![dfg::EdwardsPoint::generator(), dfg::EdwardsPoint(self.key_image_generator)]]
+  }
+
+  // We also publish our share of the key image
+  fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+    &mut self,
+    _rng: &mut R,
+    keys: &ThresholdKeys<Ed25519>,
+  ) -> ClsagAddendum {
+    ClsagAddendum {
+      key_image_share: dfg::EdwardsPoint(self.key_image_generator) * keys.secret_share().deref(),
+    }
+  }
+
+  fn read_addendum<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<ClsagAddendum> {
+    let mut bytes = [0; 32];
+    reader.read_exact(&mut bytes)?;
+    // dfg ensures the point is torsion free
+    let xH = Option::<dfg::EdwardsPoint>::from(dfg::EdwardsPoint::from_bytes(&bytes))
+      .ok_or_else(|| io::Error::other("invalid key image"))?;
+    // Ensure this is a canonical point
+    if xH.to_bytes() != bytes {
+      Err(io::Error::other("non-canonical key image"))?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(ClsagAddendum { key_image_share: xH })
+  }
+
+  fn process_addendum(
+    &mut self,
+    view: &ThresholdView<Ed25519>,
+    l: Participant,
+    addendum: ClsagAddendum,
+  ) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
+    if self.image.is_none() {
+      self.transcript.domain_separate(b"CLSAG");
+      // Transcript the ring
+      self.context.transcript(&mut self.transcript);
+      // Fetch the mask from the Mutex
+      // We set it to a variable to ensure our view of it is consistent
+      // It was this or a mpsc channel... std doesn't have oneshot :/
+      self.mask = Some(self.mask_recv.take().unwrap().recv());
+      // Transcript the mask
+      self.transcript.append_message(b"mask", self.mask.expect("mask wasn't set").to_bytes());
+
+      // Init the image to the offset
+      self.image = Some(dfg::EdwardsPoint(self.key_image_generator) * view.offset());
+    }
+
+    // Transcript this participant's contribution
+    self.transcript.append_message(b"participant", l.to_bytes());
+    self
+      .transcript
+      .append_message(b"key_image_share", addendum.key_image_share.compress().to_bytes());
+
+    // Accumulate the interpolated share
+    let interpolated_key_image_share =
+      addendum.key_image_share * lagrange::<dfg::Scalar>(l, view.included());
+    *self.image.as_mut().unwrap() += interpolated_key_image_share;
+
+    self
+      .key_image_shares
+      .insert(view.verification_share(l).to_bytes(), interpolated_key_image_share);
+
+    Ok(())
+  }
+
+  fn transcript(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Transcript {
+    &mut self.transcript
+  }
+
+  fn sign_share(
+    &mut self,
+    view: &ThresholdView<Ed25519>,
+    nonce_sums: &[Vec<dfg::EdwardsPoint>],
+    nonces: Vec<Zeroizing<dfg::Scalar>>,
+    msg: &[u8],
+  ) -> dfg::Scalar {
+    // Use the transcript to get a seeded random number generator
+    //
+    // The transcript contains private data, preventing passive adversaries from recreating this
+    // process even if they have access to the commitments/key image share broadcast so far
+    //
+    // Specifically, the transcript contains the signer's index within the ring, along with the
+    // opening of the commitment being re-randomized (and what it's re-randomized to)
+    let mut rng = ChaCha20Rng::from_seed(self.transcript.rng_seed(b"decoy_responses"));
+
+    self.msg = Some(msg.try_into().expect("CLSAG message should be 32-bytes"));
+
+    let sign_core = Clsag::sign_core(
+      &mut rng,
+      &self.image.expect("verifying a share despite never processing any addendums").0,
+      &self.context,
+      self.mask.expect("mask wasn't set"),
+      self.msg.as_ref().unwrap(),
+      nonce_sums[0][0].0,
+      nonce_sums[0][1].0,
+    );
+    self.interim = Some(Interim {
+      p: sign_core.key_challenge,
+      c: sign_core.challenged_mask,
+      clsag: sign_core.incomplete_clsag,
+      pseudo_out: sign_core.pseudo_out,
+    });
+
+    // r - p x, where p is the challenge for the keys
+    *nonces[0] - dfg::Scalar(sign_core.key_challenge) * view.secret_share().deref()
+  }
+
+  #[must_use]
+  fn verify(
+    &self,
+    _: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
+    _: &[Vec<dfg::EdwardsPoint>],
+    sum: dfg::Scalar,
+  ) -> Option<Self::Signature> {
+    let interim = self.interim.as_ref().unwrap();
+    let mut clsag = interim.clsag.clone();
+    // We produced shares as `r - p x`, yet the signature is actually `r - p x - c x`
+    // Substract `c x` (saved as `c`) now
+    clsag.s[usize::from(self.context.decoys.signer_index())] = sum.0 - interim.c;
+    if clsag
+      .verify(
+        self.context.decoys.ring(),
+        &self.image.expect("verifying a signature despite never processing any addendums").0,
+        &interim.pseudo_out,
+        self.msg.as_ref().unwrap(),
+      )
+      .is_ok()
+    {
+      return Some((clsag, interim.pseudo_out));
+    }
+    None
+  }
+
+  fn verify_share(
+    &self,
+    verification_share: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
+    nonces: &[Vec<dfg::EdwardsPoint>],
+    share: dfg::Scalar,
+  ) -> Result<Vec<(dfg::Scalar, dfg::EdwardsPoint)>, ()> {
+    let interim = self.interim.as_ref().unwrap();
+
+    // For a share `r - p x`, the following two equalities should hold:
+    // - `(r - p x)G == R.0 - pV`, where `V = xG`
+    // - `(r - p x)H == R.1 - pK`, where `K = xH` (the key image share)
+    //
+    // This is effectively a discrete log equality proof for:
+    // V, K over G, H
+    // with nonces
+    // R.0, R.1
+    // and solution
+    // s
+    //
+    // Which is a batch-verifiable rewrite of the traditional CP93 proof
+    // (and also writable as Generalized Schnorr Protocol)
+    //
+    // That means that given a proper challenge, this alone can be certainly argued to prove the
+    // key image share is well-formed and the provided signature so proves for that.
+
+    // This is a bit funky as it doesn't prove the nonces are well-formed however. They're part of
+    // the prover data/transcript for a CP93/GSP proof, not part of the statement. This practically
+    // is fine, for a variety of reasons (given a consistent `x`, a consistent `r` can be
+    // extracted, and the nonces as used in CLSAG are also part of its prover data/transcript).
+
+    let key_image_share = self.key_image_shares[&verification_share.to_bytes()];
+
+    // Hash every variable relevant here, using the hash output as the random weight
+    let mut weight_transcript =
+      RecommendedTranscript::new(b"monero-serai v0.1 ClsagMultisig::verify_share");
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"G", dfg::EdwardsPoint::generator().to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"H", self.key_image_generator.to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"xG", verification_share.to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"xH", key_image_share.to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"rG", nonces[0][0].to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"rH", nonces[0][1].to_bytes());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"c", dfg::Scalar(interim.p).to_repr());
+    weight_transcript.append_message(b"s", share.to_repr());
+    let weight = weight_transcript.challenge(b"weight");
+    let weight = dfg::Scalar(Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(&weight.into()));
+
+    let part_one = vec![
+      (share, dfg::EdwardsPoint::generator()),
+      // -(R.0 - pV) == -R.0 + pV
+      (-dfg::Scalar::ONE, nonces[0][0]),
+      (dfg::Scalar(interim.p), verification_share),
+    ];
+
+    let mut part_two = vec![
+      (weight * share, dfg::EdwardsPoint(self.key_image_generator)),
+      // -(R.1 - pK) == -R.1 + pK
+      (-weight, nonces[0][1]),
+      (weight * dfg::Scalar(interim.p), key_image_share),
+    ];
+
+    let mut all = part_one;
+    all.append(&mut part_two);
+    Ok(all)
+  }
+}

networks/monero/ringct/clsag/src/tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+use core::ops::Deref;
+
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+use rand_core::{RngCore, OsRng};
+
+use curve25519_dalek::{constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, scalar::Scalar};
+
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+use transcript::{Transcript, RecommendedTranscript};
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+use frost::curve::Ed25519;
+
+use monero_generators::hash_to_point;
+use monero_primitives::{Commitment, Decoys};
+use crate::{ClsagContext, Clsag};
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+use crate::ClsagMultisig;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+use frost::{
+  Participant,
+  tests::{key_gen, algorithm_machines, sign},
+};
+
+const RING_LEN: u64 = 11;
+const AMOUNT: u64 = 1337;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+const RING_INDEX: u8 = 3;
+
+#[test]
+fn clsag() {
+  for real in 0 .. RING_LEN {
+    let msg = [1; 32];
+
+    let mut secrets = (Zeroizing::new(Scalar::ZERO), Scalar::ZERO);
+    let mut ring = vec![];
+    for i in 0 .. RING_LEN {
+      let dest = Zeroizing::new(Scalar::random(&mut OsRng));
+      let mask = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
+      let amount;
+      if i == real {
+        secrets = (dest.clone(), mask);
+        amount = AMOUNT;
+      } else {
+        amount = OsRng.next_u64();
+      }
+      ring
+        .push([dest.deref() * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, Commitment::new(mask, amount).calculate()]);
+    }
+
+    let (mut clsag, pseudo_out) = Clsag::sign(
+      &mut OsRng,
+      vec![(
+        secrets.0.clone(),
+        ClsagContext::new(
+          Decoys::new((1 ..= RING_LEN).collect(), u8::try_from(real).unwrap(), ring.clone())
+            .unwrap(),
+          Commitment::new(secrets.1, AMOUNT),
+        )
+        .unwrap(),
+      )],
+      Scalar::random(&mut OsRng),
+      msg,
+    )
+    .unwrap()
+    .swap_remove(0);
+
+    let image =
+      hash_to_point((ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE * secrets.0.deref()).compress().0) * secrets.0.deref();
+    clsag.verify(&ring, &image, &pseudo_out, &msg).unwrap();
+
+    // make sure verification fails if we throw a random `c1` at it.
+    clsag.c1 = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
+    assert!(clsag.verify(&ring, &image, &pseudo_out, &msg).is_err());
+  }
+}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
+#[test]
+fn clsag_multisig() {
+  let keys = key_gen::<_, Ed25519>(&mut OsRng);
+
+  let randomness = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
+  let mut ring = vec![];
+  for i in 0 .. RING_LEN {
+    let dest;
+    let mask;
+    let amount;
+    if i != u64::from(RING_INDEX) {
+      dest = &Scalar::random(&mut OsRng) * ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE;
+      mask = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
+      amount = OsRng.next_u64();
+    } else {
+      dest = keys[&Participant::new(1).unwrap()].group_key().0;
+      mask = randomness;
+      amount = AMOUNT;
+    }
+    ring.push([dest, Commitment::new(mask, amount).calculate()]);
+  }
+
+  let (algorithm, mask_send) = ClsagMultisig::new(
+    RecommendedTranscript::new(b"Monero Serai CLSAG Test"),
+    ClsagContext::new(
+      Decoys::new((1 ..= RING_LEN).collect(), RING_INDEX, ring.clone()).unwrap(),
+      Commitment::new(randomness, AMOUNT),
+    )
+    .unwrap(),
+  );
+  mask_send.send(Scalar::random(&mut OsRng));
+
+  sign(
+    &mut OsRng,
+    &algorithm,
+    keys.clone(),
+    algorithm_machines(&mut OsRng, &algorithm, &keys),
+    &[1; 32],
+  );
+}