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Get the repo to compile again

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This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker
2024-06-23 10:08:51 -04:00
parent 11dba9173f
commit 0b20004ba1
40 changed files with 1452 additions and 777 deletions
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28
coins/monero/wallet/src/scan.rs
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@@ -334,22 +334,22 @@ impl Scanner {
/// Scan a transaction to discover the received outputs.
pub fn scan_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Timelocked<ReceivedOutput> {
// Only scan RCT TXs since we can only spend RCT outputs
if tx.prefix.version != 2 {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, vec![]);
if tx.version() != 2 {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix().timelock, vec![]);
}
let Ok(extra) = Extra::read::<&[u8]>(&mut tx.prefix.extra.as_ref()) else {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, vec![]);
let Ok(extra) = Extra::read::<&[u8]>(&mut tx.prefix().extra.as_ref()) else {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix().timelock, vec![]);
};
let Some((tx_keys, additional)) = extra.keys() else {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, vec![]);
return Timelocked(tx.prefix().timelock, vec![]);
};
let payment_id = extra.payment_id();
let mut res = vec![];
for (o, output) in tx.prefix.outputs.iter().enumerate() {
for (o, output) in tx.prefix().outputs.iter().enumerate() {
// https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/106
if let Some(burning_bug) = self.burning_bug.as_ref() {
if burning_bug.contains(&output.key) {
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ impl Scanner {
}
};
let (view_tag, shared_key, payment_id_xor) = shared_key(
if self.burning_bug.is_none() { Some(uniqueness(&tx.prefix.inputs)) } else { None },
if self.burning_bug.is_none() { Some(uniqueness(&tx.prefix().inputs)) } else { None },
self.pair.view.deref() * key,
o,
);
@@ -419,7 +419,11 @@ impl Scanner {
commitment.amount = amount;
// Regular transaction
} else {
commitment = match tx.proofs.base.encrypted_amounts.get(o) {
let Transaction::V2 { proofs: Some(ref proofs), .. } = &tx else {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix().timelock, vec![]);
};
commitment = match proofs.base.encrypted_amounts.get(o) {
Some(amount) => amount.decrypt(shared_key),
// This should never happen, yet it may be possible with miner transactions?
// Using get just decreases the possibility of a panic and lets us move on in that case
@@ -428,7 +432,7 @@ impl Scanner {
// If this is a malicious commitment, move to the next output
// Any other R value will calculate to a different spend key and are therefore ignorable
if Some(&commitment.calculate()) != tx.proofs.base.commitments.get(o) {
if Some(&commitment.calculate()) != proofs.base.commitments.get(o) {
break;
}
}
@@ -452,7 +456,7 @@ impl Scanner {
}
}
Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, res)
Timelocked(tx.prefix().timelock, res)
}
/// Scan a block to obtain its spendable outputs. Its the presence in a block giving these
@@ -493,13 +497,13 @@ impl Scanner {
res.push(timelock);
}
index += u64::try_from(
tx.prefix
tx.prefix()
.outputs
.iter()
// Filter to v2 miner TX outputs/RCT outputs since we're tracking the RCT output index
.filter(|output| {
let is_v2_miner_tx =
(tx.prefix.version == 2) && matches!(tx.prefix.inputs.first(), Some(Input::Gen(..)));
(tx.version() == 2) && matches!(tx.prefix().inputs.first(), Some(Input::Gen(..)));
is_v2_miner_tx || output.amount.is_none()
})
.count(),