Files
serai/tests/coordinator/src/lib.rs

397 lines
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Rust
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#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_ref_mut)] // False positives
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use std::{
sync::{OnceLock, Arc},
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time::Duration,
};
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use tokio::{
task::AbortHandle,
sync::{Mutex as AsyncMutex, mpsc},
};
use rand_core::{RngCore, OsRng};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use ciphersuite::{
group::{ff::PrimeField, GroupEncoding},
Ciphersuite, Ristretto,
};
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
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use embedwards25519::Embedwards25519;
use secq256k1::Secq256k1;
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use serai_client::primitives::NetworkId;
use messages::{
coordinator::{SubstrateSignableId, SubstrateSignId, cosign_block_msg},
CoordinatorMessage, ProcessorMessage,
};
use serai_message_queue::{Service, Metadata, client::MessageQueue};
use serai_client::{primitives::Signature, Serai};
use dockertest::{PullPolicy, Image, TestBodySpecification, DockerOperations};
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#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
pub fn coordinator_instance(
name: &str,
message_queue_key: <Ristretto as Ciphersuite>::F,
) -> TestBodySpecification {
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serai_docker_tests::build("coordinator".to_string());
TestBodySpecification::with_image(
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Image::with_repository("serai-dev-coordinator").pull_policy(PullPolicy::Never),
)
.replace_env(
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[
("MESSAGE_QUEUE_KEY".to_string(), hex::encode(message_queue_key.to_repr())),
("DB_PATH".to_string(), "./coordinator-db".to_string()),
("SERAI_KEY".to_string(), {
use serai_client::primitives::insecure_pair_from_name;
hex::encode(&insecure_pair_from_name(name).as_ref().secret.to_bytes()[.. 32])
}),
(
"RUST_LOG".to_string(),
"serai_coordinator=trace,".to_string() + "tributary_chain=trace," + "tendermint=trace",
),
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]
.into(),
)
}
pub fn serai_composition(name: &str, fast_epoch: bool) -> TestBodySpecification {
(if fast_epoch {
serai_docker_tests::build("serai-fast-epoch".to_string());
TestBodySpecification::with_image(
Image::with_repository("serai-dev-serai-fast-epoch").pull_policy(PullPolicy::Never),
)
} else {
serai_docker_tests::build("serai".to_string());
TestBodySpecification::with_image(
Image::with_repository("serai-dev-serai").pull_policy(PullPolicy::Never),
)
})
.replace_env(
[("SERAI_NAME".to_string(), name.to_lowercase()), ("KEY".to_string(), " ".to_string())].into(),
)
.set_publish_all_ports(true)
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}
fn is_cosign_message(msg: &CoordinatorMessage) -> bool {
matches!(
msg,
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::CosignSubstrateBlock { .. }
)
) || matches!(
msg,
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::SubstratePreprocesses {
id: SubstrateSignId { id: SubstrateSignableId::CosigningSubstrateBlock(_), .. },
..
}
),
) || matches!(
msg,
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::SubstrateShares {
id: SubstrateSignId { id: SubstrateSignableId::CosigningSubstrateBlock(_), .. },
..
}),
)
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct Handles {
pub(crate) serai: String,
pub(crate) message_queue: String,
}
pub struct Processor {
network: NetworkId,
serai_rpc: String,
#[allow(unused)]
handles: Handles,
msgs: mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<messages::CoordinatorMessage>,
queue_for_sending: MessageQueue,
abort_handle: Option<Arc<AbortHandle>>,
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
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evrf_public_keys: ([u8; 32], Vec<u8>),
substrate_key: Arc<AsyncMutex<Option<Zeroizing<<Ristretto as Ciphersuite>::F>>>>,
}
impl Drop for Processor {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Some(abort_handle) = self.abort_handle.take() {
abort_handle.abort();
};
}
}
impl Processor {
pub async fn new(
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
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name: &'static str,
network: NetworkId,
ops: &DockerOperations,
handles: Handles,
processor_key: <Ristretto as Ciphersuite>::F,
) -> Processor {
let message_queue_rpc = ops.handle(&handles.message_queue).host_port(2287).unwrap();
let message_queue_rpc = format!("{}:{}", message_queue_rpc.0, message_queue_rpc.1);
// Sleep until the Substrate RPC starts
let serai_rpc = ops.handle(&handles.serai).host_port(9944).unwrap();
let serai_rpc = format!("http://{}:{}", serai_rpc.0, serai_rpc.1);
// Bound execution to 60 seconds
for _ in 0 .. 60 {
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tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
let Ok(client) = Serai::new(serai_rpc.clone()).await else { continue };
if client.latest_finalized_block_hash().await.is_err() {
continue;
}
break;
}
// The Serai RPC may or may not be started
// Assume it is and continue, so if it's a few seconds late, it's still within tolerance
// Create the queue
let mut queue = (
0,
Arc::new(MessageQueue::new(
Service::Processor(network),
message_queue_rpc.clone(),
Zeroizing::new(processor_key),
)),
);
let (msg_send, msg_recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
use serai_client::primitives::insecure_arbitrary_key_from_name;
let substrate_key = Arc::new(AsyncMutex::new(None));
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
let embedwards25519_evrf_key = (Embedwards25519::generator() *
insecure_arbitrary_key_from_name::<Embedwards25519>(name))
.to_bytes();
let mut res = Processor {
network,
serai_rpc,
handles,
queue_for_sending: MessageQueue::new(
Service::Processor(network),
message_queue_rpc,
Zeroizing::new(processor_key),
),
msgs: msg_recv,
abort_handle: None,
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
evrf_public_keys: (
embedwards25519_evrf_key,
match network {
NetworkId::Serai => panic!("mock processor for the serai network"),
NetworkId::Bitcoin | NetworkId::Ethereum => {
let key = (Secq256k1::generator() *
insecure_arbitrary_key_from_name::<Secq256k1>(name))
.to_bytes();
let key: &[u8] = key.as_ref();
key.to_vec()
}
NetworkId::Monero => embedwards25519_evrf_key.to_vec(),
},
),
substrate_key: substrate_key.clone(),
};
// Spawn a task to handle cosigns and forward messages as appropriate
let abort_handle = tokio::spawn({
async move {
loop {
// Get new messages
let (next_recv_id, queue) = &mut queue;
let msg = queue.next(Service::Coordinator).await;
assert_eq!(msg.from, Service::Coordinator);
assert_eq!(msg.id, *next_recv_id);
queue.ack(Service::Coordinator, msg.id).await;
*next_recv_id += 1;
let msg_msg = borsh::from_slice(&msg.msg).unwrap();
// Remove any BatchReattempts clogging the pipe
// TODO: Set up a wrapper around serai-client so we aren't throwing this away yet
// leave it for the tests
if matches!(
msg_msg,
messages::CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::BatchReattempt { .. }
)
) {
continue;
}
if !is_cosign_message(&msg_msg) {
msg_send.send(msg_msg).unwrap();
continue;
}
let msg = msg_msg;
let send_message = |msg: ProcessorMessage| async move {
queue
.queue(
Metadata {
from: Service::Processor(network),
to: Service::Coordinator,
intent: msg.intent(),
},
borsh::to_vec(&msg).unwrap(),
)
.await;
};
struct CurrentCosign {
block_number: u64,
block: [u8; 32],
}
static CURRENT_COSIGN: OnceLock<AsyncMutex<Option<CurrentCosign>>> = OnceLock::new();
let mut current_cosign =
CURRENT_COSIGN.get_or_init(|| AsyncMutex::new(None)).lock().await;
match msg {
// If this is a CosignSubstrateBlock, reset the CurrentCosign
// While technically, each processor should individually track the current cosign,
// this is fine for current testing purposes
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::CosignSubstrateBlock { id, block_number },
) => {
let SubstrateSignId {
id: SubstrateSignableId::CosigningSubstrateBlock(block), ..
} = id
else {
panic!("CosignSubstrateBlock didn't have CosigningSubstrateBlock ID")
};
let new_cosign = CurrentCosign { block_number, block };
if current_cosign.is_none() || (current_cosign.as_ref().unwrap().block != block) {
*current_cosign = Some(new_cosign);
}
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
let mut preprocess = [0; 64];
preprocess[.. name.len()].copy_from_slice(name.as_ref());
send_message(
messages::coordinator::ProcessorMessage::CosignPreprocess {
id: id.clone(),
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
preprocesses: vec![preprocess],
}
.into(),
)
.await;
}
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::SubstratePreprocesses { id, .. },
) => {
// TODO: Assert the ID matches CURRENT_COSIGN
// TODO: Verify the received preprocesses
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
let mut share = [0; 32];
share[.. name.len()].copy_from_slice(name.as_bytes());
send_message(
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
messages::coordinator::ProcessorMessage::SubstrateShare { id, shares: vec![share] }
.into(),
)
.await;
}
CoordinatorMessage::Coordinator(
messages::coordinator::CoordinatorMessage::SubstrateShares { .. },
) => {
// TODO: Assert the ID matches CURRENT_COSIGN
// TODO: Verify the shares
let block_number = current_cosign.as_ref().unwrap().block_number;
let block = current_cosign.as_ref().unwrap().block;
let substrate_key = substrate_key.lock().await.clone().unwrap();
// Expand to a key pair as Schnorrkel expects
// It's the private key + 32-bytes of entropy for nonces + the public key
let mut schnorrkel_key_pair = [0; 96];
schnorrkel_key_pair[.. 32].copy_from_slice(&substrate_key.to_repr());
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut schnorrkel_key_pair[32 .. 64]);
schnorrkel_key_pair[64 ..].copy_from_slice(
&(<Ristretto as Ciphersuite>::generator() * *substrate_key).to_bytes(),
);
let signature = Signature(
schnorrkel::keys::Keypair::from_bytes(&schnorrkel_key_pair)
.unwrap()
.sign_simple(b"substrate", &cosign_block_msg(block_number, block))
.to_bytes(),
);
send_message(
messages::coordinator::ProcessorMessage::CosignedBlock {
block_number,
block,
signature: signature.0.to_vec(),
}
.into(),
)
.await;
}
_ => panic!("unexpected message passed is_cosign_message"),
}
}
}
})
.abort_handle();
res.abort_handle = Some(Arc::new(abort_handle));
res
}
One Round DKG (#589) * Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++ * Initial eVRF implementation Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then be tested. * Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary * Add implementation of secq256k1 * Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined keys for encryption. * Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro * Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key * Initial eVRF-based DKG * Add embedwards25519 curve * Inline the eVRF into the DKG library Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time. * Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG * Add paragraph claiming robustness * Update to the new eVRF proof * Finish routing the eVRF functionality Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs. * Add initial eVRF DKG test * Improve eVRF DKG Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it. * Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG * Resolve various TODOs Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG. Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations. Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS. * Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements * Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519 * Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls * Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG * Only participate once per key, not once per key share * Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG Still a WIP. * Finish routing the new key gen in the processor Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet. `cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor` does pass. * Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen * Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen * Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass * Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate * Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG * Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however. Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants. * Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG This does not yet update any tests. * Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message * Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their lagrange interpolation factor. * Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key, enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context. * Get coordinator tests to pass * Update spec to the new DKG * Get clippy to pass across the repo * cargo machete * Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s * Update orchestration * Remove bad panic in coordinator It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n. * Improve documentation on functions * Update TX size limit We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure). * Correct error in the Processor spec document * Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet * Send/Recv Participation one at a time Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool not working as expected... * Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test * Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters * Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI * Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests Fault identified by akil. * Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)? Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory). * Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests * Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key * cargo fmt * Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test The key_gen function expects the random values already decided. * Big-endian secq256k1 scalars Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
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pub fn network(&self) -> NetworkId {
self.network
}
pub fn evrf_public_keys(&self) -> ([u8; 32], Vec<u8>) {
self.evrf_public_keys.clone()
}
pub async fn serai(&self) -> Serai {
Serai::new(self.serai_rpc.clone()).await.unwrap()
}
/// Send a message to the coordinator as a processor.
pub async fn send_message(&mut self, msg: impl Into<ProcessorMessage>) {
let msg: ProcessorMessage = msg.into();
self
.queue_for_sending
.queue(
Metadata {
from: Service::Processor(self.network),
to: Service::Coordinator,
intent: msg.intent(),
},
borsh::to_vec(&msg).unwrap(),
)
.await;
}
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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/// Receive a message from the coordinator as a processor.
pub async fn recv_message(&mut self) -> CoordinatorMessage {
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// Set a timeout of 20 minutes to allow effectively any protocol to occur without a fear of
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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// an arbitrary timeout cutting it short
tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(20 * 60), self.msgs.recv()).await.unwrap().unwrap()
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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}
pub async fn set_substrate_key(
&mut self,
substrate_key: Zeroizing<<Ristretto as Ciphersuite>::F>,
) {
*self.substrate_key.lock().await = Some(substrate_key);
}
}