Files
serai/crypto/dkg/src/tests/frost.rs

299 lines
9.4 KiB
Rust
Raw Normal View History

use std::collections::HashMap;
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
use crate::{
Ciphersuite, ThresholdParams, ThresholdCore,
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
frost::{KeyGenMachine, SecretShare, KeyMachine},
encryption::{EncryptionKeyMessage, EncryptedMessage},
tests::{THRESHOLD, PARTICIPANTS, clone_without},
};
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
// Needed so rustfmt doesn't fail to format on line length issues
type FrostEncryptedMessage<C> = EncryptedMessage<C, SecretShare<<C as Ciphersuite>::F>>;
type FrostSecretShares<C> = HashMap<u16, FrostEncryptedMessage<C>>;
// Commit, then return enc key and shares
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
fn commit_enc_keys_and_shares<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Ciphersuite>(
rng: &mut R,
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
) -> (HashMap<u16, KeyMachine<C>>, HashMap<u16, C::G>, HashMap<u16, FrostSecretShares<C>>) {
let mut machines = HashMap::new();
let mut commitments = HashMap::new();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
let mut enc_keys = HashMap::new();
for i in 1 ..= PARTICIPANTS {
let machine = KeyGenMachine::<C>::new(
ThresholdParams::new(THRESHOLD, PARTICIPANTS, i).unwrap(),
"DKG Test Key Generation".to_string(),
);
let (machine, these_commitments) = machine.generate_coefficients(rng);
machines.insert(i, machine);
commitments.insert(
i,
EncryptionKeyMessage::read::<&[u8]>(
&mut these_commitments.serialize().as_ref(),
ThresholdParams { t: THRESHOLD, n: PARTICIPANTS, i: 1 },
)
.unwrap(),
);
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
enc_keys.insert(i, commitments[&i].enc_key());
}
let mut secret_shares = HashMap::new();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
let machines = machines
.drain()
.map(|(l, machine)| {
let (machine, mut shares) =
machine.generate_secret_shares(rng, clone_without(&commitments, &l)).unwrap();
let shares = shares
.drain()
.map(|(l, share)| {
(
l,
EncryptedMessage::read::<&[u8]>(
&mut share.serialize().as_ref(),
ThresholdParams { t: THRESHOLD, n: PARTICIPANTS, i: 1 },
)
.unwrap(),
)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
secret_shares.insert(l, shares);
(l, machine)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
(machines, enc_keys, secret_shares)
}
fn generate_secret_shares<C: Ciphersuite>(
shares: &HashMap<u16, FrostSecretShares<C>>,
recipient: u16,
) -> FrostSecretShares<C> {
let mut our_secret_shares = HashMap::new();
for (i, shares) in shares {
if recipient == *i {
continue;
}
our_secret_shares.insert(*i, shares[&recipient].clone());
}
our_secret_shares
}
/// Fully perform the FROST key generation algorithm.
pub fn frost_gen<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Ciphersuite>(
rng: &mut R,
) -> HashMap<u16, ThresholdCore<C>> {
let (mut machines, _, secret_shares) = commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, C>(rng);
let mut verification_shares = None;
let mut group_key = None;
machines
.drain()
.map(|(i, machine)| {
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let these_keys = machine.calculate_share(rng, our_secret_shares).unwrap().complete();
// Verify the verification_shares are agreed upon
if verification_shares.is_none() {
verification_shares = Some(these_keys.verification_shares());
}
assert_eq!(verification_shares.as_ref().unwrap(), &these_keys.verification_shares());
// Verify the group keys are agreed upon
if group_key.is_none() {
group_key = Some(these_keys.group_key());
}
assert_eq!(group_key.unwrap(), these_keys.group_key());
(i, these_keys)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>()
}
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
2023-01-01 01:54:18 -05:00
#[cfg(test)]
mod literal {
use rand_core::OsRng;
use ciphersuite::Ristretto;
use crate::{DkgError, encryption::EncryptionKeyProof, frost::BlameMachine};
use super::*;
fn test_blame(
machines: Vec<BlameMachine<Ristretto>>,
msg: FrostEncryptedMessage<Ristretto>,
blame: Option<EncryptionKeyProof<Ristretto>>,
) {
for machine in machines {
let (additional, blamed) = machine.blame(1, 2, msg.clone(), blame.clone());
assert_eq!(blamed, 1);
// Verify additional blame also works
assert_eq!(additional.blame(1, 2, msg.clone(), blame.clone()), 1);
}
}
// TODO: Write a macro which expands to the following
#[test]
fn invalid_encryption_pop_blame() {
let (mut machines, _, mut secret_shares) =
commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, Ristretto>(&mut OsRng);
// Mutate the PoP of the encrypted message from 1 to 2
secret_shares.get_mut(&1).unwrap().get_mut(&2).unwrap().invalidate_pop();
let mut blame = None;
let machines = machines
.drain()
.filter_map(|(i, machine)| {
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let machine = machine.calculate_share(&mut OsRng, our_secret_shares);
if i == 2 {
assert_eq!(machine.err(), Some(DkgError::InvalidShare { participant: 1, blame: None }));
// Explicitly declare we have a blame object, which happens to be None since invalid PoP
// is self-explainable
blame = Some(None);
None
} else {
Some(machine.unwrap())
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
test_blame(machines, secret_shares[&1][&2].clone(), blame.unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn invalid_ecdh_blame() {
let (mut machines, _, mut secret_shares) =
commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, Ristretto>(&mut OsRng);
// Mutate the share to trigger a blame event
// Mutates from 2 to 1, as 1 is expected to end up malicious for test_blame to pass
// While here, 2 is malicious, this is so 1 creates the blame proof
// We then malleate 1's blame proof, so 1 ends up malicious
// Doesn't simply invalidate the PoP as that won't have a blame statement
// By mutating the encrypted data, we do ensure a blame statement is created
secret_shares.get_mut(&2).unwrap().get_mut(&1).unwrap().invalidate_msg(&mut OsRng, 2);
let mut blame = None;
let machines = machines
.drain()
.filter_map(|(i, machine)| {
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let machine = machine.calculate_share(&mut OsRng, our_secret_shares);
if i == 1 {
blame = Some(match machine.err() {
Some(DkgError::InvalidShare { participant: 2, blame: Some(blame) }) => Some(blame),
_ => panic!(),
});
None
} else {
Some(machine.unwrap())
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
blame.as_mut().unwrap().as_mut().unwrap().invalidate_key();
test_blame(machines, secret_shares[&2][&1].clone(), blame.unwrap());
}
// This should be largely equivalent to the prior test
#[test]
fn invalid_dleq_blame() {
let (mut machines, _, mut secret_shares) =
commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, Ristretto>(&mut OsRng);
secret_shares.get_mut(&2).unwrap().get_mut(&1).unwrap().invalidate_msg(&mut OsRng, 2);
let mut blame = None;
let machines = machines
.drain()
.filter_map(|(i, machine)| {
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let machine = machine.calculate_share(&mut OsRng, our_secret_shares);
if i == 1 {
blame = Some(match machine.err() {
Some(DkgError::InvalidShare { participant: 2, blame: Some(blame) }) => Some(blame),
_ => panic!(),
});
None
} else {
Some(machine.unwrap())
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
blame.as_mut().unwrap().as_mut().unwrap().invalidate_dleq();
test_blame(machines, secret_shares[&2][&1].clone(), blame.unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn invalid_share_serialization_blame() {
let (mut machines, enc_keys, mut secret_shares) =
commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, Ristretto>(&mut OsRng);
secret_shares.get_mut(&1).unwrap().get_mut(&2).unwrap().invalidate_share_serialization(
&mut OsRng,
b"FROST",
1,
enc_keys[&2],
);
let mut blame = None;
let machines = machines
.drain()
.filter_map(|(i, machine)| {
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let machine = machine.calculate_share(&mut OsRng, our_secret_shares);
if i == 2 {
blame = Some(match machine.err() {
Some(DkgError::InvalidShare { participant: 1, blame: Some(blame) }) => Some(blame),
_ => panic!(),
});
None
} else {
Some(machine.unwrap())
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
test_blame(machines, secret_shares[&1][&2].clone(), blame.unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn invalid_share_value_blame() {
let (mut machines, enc_keys, mut secret_shares) =
commit_enc_keys_and_shares::<_, Ristretto>(&mut OsRng);
secret_shares.get_mut(&1).unwrap().get_mut(&2).unwrap().invalidate_share_value(
&mut OsRng,
b"FROST",
1,
enc_keys[&2],
);
let mut blame = None;
let machines = machines
.drain()
.filter_map(|(i, machine)| {
let our_secret_shares = generate_secret_shares(&secret_shares, i);
let machine = machine.calculate_share(&mut OsRng, our_secret_shares);
if i == 2 {
blame = Some(match machine.err() {
Some(DkgError::InvalidShare { participant: 1, blame: Some(blame) }) => Some(blame),
_ => panic!(),
});
None
} else {
Some(machine.unwrap())
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
test_blame(machines, secret_shares[&1][&2].clone(), blame.unwrap());
}
}