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serai/crypto/frost/src/tests/vectors.rs

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use core::ops::Deref;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::str::FromStr;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
use group::{ff::PrimeField, GroupEncoding};
use dkg::tests::key_gen;
use crate::{
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curve::Curve,
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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ThresholdCore, ThresholdKeys, FrostError,
algorithm::{Schnorr, Hram},
sign::{
Nonce, GeneratorCommitments, NonceCommitments, Commitments, Writable, Preprocess, SignMachine,
SignatureMachine, AlgorithmMachine,
},
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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tests::{clone_without, recover_key, algorithm_machines, commit_and_shares, sign},
};
pub struct Vectors {
pub threshold: u16,
pub group_secret: String,
pub group_key: String,
pub shares: Vec<String>,
pub msg: String,
pub included: Vec<u16>,
pub nonces: Vec<[String; 2]>,
pub sig_shares: Vec<String>,
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pub sig: String,
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl From<serde_json::Value> for Vectors {
fn from(value: serde_json::Value) -> Vectors {
let to_str = |value: &serde_json::Value| value.as_str().unwrap().to_string();
Vectors {
threshold: u16::from_str(value["config"]["NUM_PARTICIPANTS"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap(),
group_secret: to_str(&value["inputs"]["group_secret_key"]),
group_key: to_str(&value["inputs"]["group_public_key"]),
shares: value["inputs"]["participants"]
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.values()
.map(|share| to_str(&share["participant_share"]))
.collect(),
msg: to_str(&value["inputs"]["message"]),
included: to_str(&value["round_one_outputs"]["participant_list"])
.split(',')
.map(u16::from_str)
.collect::<Result<_, _>>()
.unwrap(),
nonces: value["round_one_outputs"]["participants"]
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.values()
.map(|value| [to_str(&value["hiding_nonce"]), to_str(&value["binding_nonce"])])
.collect(),
sig_shares: value["round_two_outputs"]["participants"]
.as_object()
.unwrap()
.values()
.map(|value| to_str(&value["sig_share"]))
.collect(),
sig: to_str(&value["final_output"]["sig"]),
}
}
}
// Load these vectors into ThresholdKeys using a custom serialization it'll deserialize
fn vectors_to_multisig_keys<C: Curve>(vectors: &Vectors) -> HashMap<u16, ThresholdKeys<C>> {
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let shares = vectors
.shares
.iter()
.map(|secret| C::read_F::<&[u8]>(&mut hex::decode(secret).unwrap().as_ref()).unwrap())
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.collect::<Vec<_>>();
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let verification_shares = shares.iter().map(|secret| C::generator() * secret).collect::<Vec<_>>();
let mut keys = HashMap::new();
for i in 1 ..= u16::try_from(shares.len()).unwrap() {
// Manually re-implement the serialization for ThresholdCore to import this data
let mut serialized = vec![];
serialized.extend(u32::try_from(C::ID.len()).unwrap().to_be_bytes());
serialized.extend(C::ID);
serialized.extend(vectors.threshold.to_be_bytes());
serialized.extend(u16::try_from(shares.len()).unwrap().to_be_bytes());
serialized.extend(i.to_be_bytes());
serialized.extend(shares[usize::from(i) - 1].to_repr().as_ref());
for share in &verification_shares {
serialized.extend(share.to_bytes().as_ref());
}
let these_keys = ThresholdCore::<C>::deserialize::<&[u8]>(&mut serialized.as_ref()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(these_keys.params().t(), vectors.threshold);
assert_eq!(usize::from(these_keys.params().n()), shares.len());
assert_eq!(these_keys.params().i(), i);
assert_eq!(these_keys.secret_share().deref(), &shares[usize::from(i - 1)]);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(these_keys.group_key().to_bytes().as_ref()), vectors.group_key);
keys.insert(i, ThresholdKeys::new(these_keys));
}
keys
}
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pub fn test_with_vectors<R: RngCore + CryptoRng, C: Curve, H: Hram<C>>(
rng: &mut R,
vectors: Vectors,
) {
// Test a basic Schnorr signature
{
let keys = key_gen(&mut *rng);
let machines = algorithm_machines(&mut *rng, Schnorr::<C, H>::new(), &keys);
const MSG: &[u8] = b"Hello, World!";
let sig = sign(&mut *rng, Schnorr::<C, H>::new(), keys.clone(), machines, MSG);
assert!(sig.verify(keys[&1].group_key(), H::hram(&sig.R, &keys[&1].group_key(), MSG)));
}
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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// Test blame on an invalid Schnorr signature share
{
let keys = key_gen(&mut *rng);
let machines = algorithm_machines(&mut *rng, Schnorr::<C, H>::new(), &keys);
const MSG: &[u8] = b"Hello, World!";
let (mut machines, mut shares) = commit_and_shares(&mut *rng, machines, |_, _| {}, MSG);
let faulty = *shares.keys().next().unwrap();
DKG Blame (#196) * Standardize the DLEq serialization function naming They mismatched from the rest of the project. This commit is technically incomplete as it doesn't update the dkg crate. * Rewrite DKG encryption to enable per-message decryption without side effects This isn't technically true as I already know a break in this which I'll correct for shortly. Does update documentation to explain the new scheme. Required for blame. * Add a verifiable system for blame during the FROST DKG Previously, if sent an invalid key share, the participant would realize that and could accuse the sender. Without further evidence, either the accuser or the accused could be guilty. Now, the accuser has a proof the accused is in the wrong. Reworks KeyMachine to return BlameMachine. This explicitly acknowledges how locally complete keys still need group acknowledgement before the protocol can be complete and provides a way for others to verify blame, even after a locally successful run. If any blame is cast, the protocol is no longer considered complete-able (instead aborting). Further accusations of blame can still be handled however. Updates documentation on network behavior. Also starts to remove "OnDrop". We now use Zeroizing for anything which should be zeroized on drop. This is a lot more piece-meal and reduces clones. * Tweak Zeroizing and Debug impls Expands Zeroizing to be more comprehensive. Also updates Zeroizing<CachedPreprocess([u8; 32])> to CachedPreprocess(Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>) so zeroizing is the first thing done and last step before exposing the copy-able [u8; 32]. Removes private keys from Debug. * Fix a bug where adversaries could claim to be using another user's encryption keys to learn their messages Mentioned a few commits ago, now fixed. This wouldn't have affected Serai, which aborts on failure, nor any DKG currently supported. It's just about ensuring the DKG encryption is robust and proper. * Finish moving dleq from ser/deser to write/read * Add tests for dkg blame * Add a FROST test for invalid signature shares * Batch verify encrypted messages' ephemeral keys' PoP
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shares.get_mut(&faulty).unwrap().invalidate();
for (i, machine) in machines.drain() {
if i == faulty {
continue;
}
assert_eq!(
machine.complete(clone_without(&shares, &i)).err(),
Some(FrostError::InvalidShare(faulty))
);
}
}
// Test against the vectors
let keys = vectors_to_multisig_keys::<C>(&vectors);
let group_key =
<C as Curve>::read_G::<&[u8]>(&mut hex::decode(&vectors.group_key).unwrap().as_ref()).unwrap();
let secret =
C::read_F::<&[u8]>(&mut hex::decode(&vectors.group_secret).unwrap().as_ref()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(C::generator() * secret, group_key);
assert_eq!(recover_key(&keys), secret);
let mut machines = vec![];
for i in &vectors.included {
machines.push((i, AlgorithmMachine::new(Schnorr::<C, H>::new(), keys[i].clone()).unwrap()));
}
let mut commitments = HashMap::new();
let mut c = 0;
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let mut machines = machines
.drain(..)
.map(|(i, machine)| {
let nonce = |i| {
Zeroizing::new(
C::read_F::<&[u8]>(&mut hex::decode(&vectors.nonces[c][i]).unwrap().as_ref()).unwrap(),
)
};
let nonces = [nonce(0), nonce(1)];
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c += 1;
let these_commitments =
[C::generator() * nonces[0].deref(), C::generator() * nonces[1].deref()];
let machine = machine.unsafe_override_preprocess(
vec![Nonce(nonces)],
Preprocess {
commitments: Commitments {
nonces: vec![NonceCommitments {
generators: vec![GeneratorCommitments(these_commitments)],
dleqs: None,
}],
},
addendum: (),
},
);
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commitments.insert(
*i,
machine
.read_preprocess::<&[u8]>(
&mut [
these_commitments[0].to_bytes().as_ref(),
these_commitments[1].to_bytes().as_ref(),
]
.concat()
.as_ref(),
)
.unwrap(),
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);
(i, machine)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let mut shares = HashMap::new();
c = 0;
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let mut machines = machines
.drain(..)
.map(|(i, machine)| {
let (machine, share) =
machine.sign(clone_without(&commitments, i), &hex::decode(&vectors.msg).unwrap()).unwrap();
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let share = {
let mut buf = vec![];
share.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
buf
};
assert_eq!(share, hex::decode(&vectors.sig_shares[c]).unwrap());
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c += 1;
shares.insert(*i, machine.read_share::<&[u8]>(&mut share.as_ref()).unwrap());
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(i, machine)
})
.collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
for (i, machine) in machines.drain() {
let sig = machine.complete(clone_without(&shares, i)).unwrap();
let mut serialized = sig.R.to_bytes().as_ref().to_vec();
serialized.extend(sig.s.to_repr().as_ref());
assert_eq!(hex::encode(serialized), vectors.sig);
}
}