Files
serai/processor/src/batch_signer.rs

422 lines
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use core::{marker::PhantomData, fmt};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use rand_core::OsRng;
use frost::{
curve::Ristretto,
ThresholdKeys, FrostError,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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algorithm::Algorithm,
sign::{
Writable, PreprocessMachine, SignMachine, SignatureMachine, AlgorithmMachine,
AlgorithmSignMachine, AlgorithmSignatureMachine,
},
};
use frost_schnorrkel::Schnorrkel;
use log::{info, debug, warn};
use serai_client::{
primitives::{ExternalNetworkId, BlockHash},
in_instructions::primitives::{Batch, SignedBatch, batch_message},
validator_sets::primitives::Session,
};
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use messages::coordinator::*;
use crate::{Get, DbTxn, Db, create_db};
create_db!(
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BatchSignerDb {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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CompletedDb: (id: u32) -> (),
AttemptDb: (id: u32, attempt: u32) -> (),
BatchDb: (block: BlockHash) -> SignedBatch
}
);
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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type Preprocess = <AlgorithmMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel> as PreprocessMachine>::Preprocess;
type SignatureShare = <AlgorithmSignMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel> as SignMachine<
<Schnorrkel as Algorithm<Ristretto>>::Signature,
>>::SignatureShare;
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pub struct BatchSigner<D: Db> {
db: PhantomData<D>,
network: ExternalNetworkId,
session: Session,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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keys: Vec<ThresholdKeys<Ristretto>>,
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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signable: HashMap<u32, Batch>,
attempt: HashMap<u32, u32>,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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preprocessing: HashMap<u32, (Vec<AlgorithmSignMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel>>, Vec<Preprocess>)>,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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signing: HashMap<u32, (AlgorithmSignatureMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel>, Vec<SignatureShare>)>,
}
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impl<D: Db> fmt::Debug for BatchSigner<D> {
fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
fmt
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.debug_struct("BatchSigner")
.field("signable", &self.signable)
.field("attempt", &self.attempt)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
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impl<D: Db> BatchSigner<D> {
pub fn new(
network: ExternalNetworkId,
session: Session,
keys: Vec<ThresholdKeys<Ristretto>>,
) -> BatchSigner<D> {
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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assert!(!keys.is_empty());
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BatchSigner {
db: PhantomData,
network,
session,
keys,
signable: HashMap::new(),
attempt: HashMap::new(),
preprocessing: HashMap::new(),
signing: HashMap::new(),
}
}
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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fn verify_id(&self, id: &SubstrateSignId) -> Result<(Session, u32, u32), ()> {
let SubstrateSignId { session, id, attempt } = id;
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let SubstrateSignableId::Batch(id) = id else { panic!("BatchSigner handed non-Batch") };
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
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assert_eq!(session, &self.session);
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
// Check the attempt lines up
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
match self.attempt.get(id) {
// If we don't have an attempt logged, it's because the coordinator is faulty OR because we
// rebooted OR we detected the signed batch on chain
// The latter is the expected flow for batches not actively being participated in
None => {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
warn!("not attempting batch {id} #{attempt}");
Err(())?;
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
Some(our_attempt) => {
if attempt != our_attempt {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
warn!("sent signing data for batch {id} #{attempt} yet we have attempt #{our_attempt}");
Err(())?;
}
}
}
Ok((*session, *id, *attempt))
}
#[must_use]
fn attempt(
&mut self,
txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>,
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
id: u32,
attempt: u32,
) -> Option<ProcessorMessage> {
// See above commentary for why this doesn't emit SignedBatch
if CompletedDb::get(txn, id).is_some() {
return None;
}
// Check if we're already working on this attempt
if let Some(curr_attempt) = self.attempt.get(&id) {
if curr_attempt >= &attempt {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
warn!("told to attempt {id} #{attempt} yet we're already working on {curr_attempt}");
return None;
}
}
// Start this attempt
let block = if let Some(batch) = self.signable.get(&id) {
batch.block
} else {
warn!("told to attempt signing a batch we aren't currently signing for");
return None;
};
// Delete any existing machines
self.preprocessing.remove(&id);
self.signing.remove(&id);
// Update the attempt number
self.attempt.insert(id, attempt);
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
info!("signing batch {id} #{attempt}");
// If we reboot mid-sign, the current design has us abort all signs and wait for latter
// attempts/new signing protocols
// This is distinct from the DKG which will continue DKG sessions, even on reboot
// This is because signing is tolerant of failures of up to 1/3rd of the group
// The DKG requires 100% participation
// While we could apply similar tricks as the DKG (a seeded RNG) to achieve support for
// reboots, it's not worth the complexity when messing up here leaks our secret share
//
// Despite this, on reboot, we'll get told of active signing items, and may be in this
// branch again for something we've already attempted
//
// Only run if this hasn't already been attempted
// TODO: This isn't complete as this txn may not be committed with the expected timing
if AttemptDb::get(txn, id, attempt).is_some() {
warn!(
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
"already attempted batch {id}, attempt #{attempt}. this is an error if we didn't reboot"
);
return None;
}
AttemptDb::set(txn, id, attempt, &());
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
let mut machines = vec![];
let mut preprocesses = vec![];
let mut serialized_preprocesses = vec![];
for keys in &self.keys {
// b"substrate" is a literal from sp-core
let machine = AlgorithmMachine::new(Schnorrkel::new(b"substrate"), keys.clone());
let (machine, preprocess) = machine.preprocess(&mut OsRng);
machines.push(machine);
serialized_preprocesses.push(preprocess.serialize().try_into().unwrap());
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
preprocesses.push(preprocess);
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
self.preprocessing.insert(id, (machines, preprocesses));
let id = SubstrateSignId { session: self.session, id: SubstrateSignableId::Batch(id), attempt };
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
// Broadcast our preprocesses
Some(ProcessorMessage::BatchPreprocess { id, block, preprocesses: serialized_preprocesses })
}
#[must_use]
pub fn sign(&mut self, txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, batch: Batch) -> Option<ProcessorMessage> {
debug_assert_eq!(self.network, batch.network);
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
let id = batch.id;
if CompletedDb::get(txn, id).is_some() {
debug!("Sign batch order for ID we've already completed signing");
// See batch_signed for commentary on why this simply returns
return None;
}
self.signable.insert(id, batch);
self.attempt(txn, id, 0)
}
#[must_use]
pub fn handle(
&mut self,
txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>,
msg: CoordinatorMessage,
) -> Option<messages::ProcessorMessage> {
match msg {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
CoordinatorMessage::CosignSubstrateBlock { .. } => {
2023-11-20 22:20:58 -05:00
panic!("BatchSigner passed CosignSubstrateBlock")
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
}
CoordinatorMessage::SignSlashReport { .. } => {
panic!("Cosigner passed SignSlashReport")
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
CoordinatorMessage::SubstratePreprocesses { id, preprocesses } => {
let (session, id, attempt) = self.verify_id(&id).ok()?;
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let substrate_sign_id =
SubstrateSignId { session, id: SubstrateSignableId::Batch(id), attempt };
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let (machines, our_preprocesses) = match self.preprocessing.remove(&id) {
// Either rebooted or RPC error, or some invariant
None => {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
warn!("not preprocessing for {id}. this is an error if we didn't reboot");
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
Some(preprocess) => preprocess,
};
let mut parsed = HashMap::new();
for l in {
2023-12-16 20:54:24 -05:00
let mut keys = preprocesses.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
keys.sort();
keys
} {
let mut preprocess_ref = preprocesses.get(&l).unwrap().as_slice();
let Ok(res) = machines[0].read_preprocess(&mut preprocess_ref) else {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
);
};
if !preprocess_ref.is_empty() {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
);
}
parsed.insert(l, res);
}
let preprocesses = parsed;
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
// Only keep a single machine as we only need one to get the signature
let mut signature_machine = None;
let mut shares = vec![];
let mut serialized_shares = vec![];
for (m, machine) in machines.into_iter().enumerate() {
let mut preprocesses = preprocesses.clone();
for (i, our_preprocess) in our_preprocesses.clone().into_iter().enumerate() {
if i != m {
assert!(preprocesses.insert(self.keys[i].params().i(), our_preprocess).is_none());
}
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let (machine, share) = match machine
.sign(preprocesses, &batch_message(&self.signable[&id]))
{
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => match e {
FrostError::InternalError(_) |
FrostError::InvalidParticipant(_, _) |
FrostError::InvalidSigningSet(_) |
FrostError::InvalidParticipantQuantity(_, _) |
FrostError::DuplicatedParticipant(_) |
FrostError::MissingParticipant(_) => unreachable!(),
FrostError::InvalidPreprocess(l) | FrostError::InvalidShare(l) => {
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
)
}
},
};
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
if m == 0 {
signature_machine = Some(machine);
}
let mut share_bytes = [0; 32];
share_bytes.copy_from_slice(&share.serialize());
serialized_shares.push(share_bytes);
shares.push(share);
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
self.signing.insert(id, (signature_machine.unwrap(), shares));
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
// Broadcast our shares
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
Some(
(ProcessorMessage::SubstrateShare { id: substrate_sign_id, shares: serialized_shares })
.into(),
)
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
CoordinatorMessage::SubstrateShares { id, shares } => {
let (session, id, attempt) = self.verify_id(&id).ok()?;
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let substrate_sign_id =
SubstrateSignId { session, id: SubstrateSignableId::Batch(id), attempt };
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let (machine, our_shares) = match self.signing.remove(&id) {
// Rebooted, RPC error, or some invariant
None => {
// If preprocessing has this ID, it means we were never sent the preprocess by the
// coordinator
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
if self.preprocessing.contains_key(&id) {
panic!("never preprocessed yet signing?");
}
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
warn!("not preprocessing for {id}. this is an error if we didn't reboot");
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
Some(signing) => signing,
};
let mut parsed = HashMap::new();
for l in {
2023-12-16 20:54:24 -05:00
let mut keys = shares.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>();
keys.sort();
keys
} {
let mut share_ref = shares.get(&l).unwrap().as_slice();
let Ok(res) = machine.read_share(&mut share_ref) else {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
);
};
if !share_ref.is_empty() {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
);
}
parsed.insert(l, res);
}
let mut shares = parsed;
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 19:26:13 -04:00
for (i, our_share) in our_shares.into_iter().enumerate().skip(1) {
assert!(shares.insert(self.keys[i].params().i(), our_share).is_none());
}
let sig = match machine.complete(shares) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => match e {
FrostError::InternalError(_) |
FrostError::InvalidParticipant(_, _) |
FrostError::InvalidSigningSet(_) |
FrostError::InvalidParticipantQuantity(_, _) |
FrostError::DuplicatedParticipant(_) |
FrostError::MissingParticipant(_) => unreachable!(),
FrostError::InvalidPreprocess(l) | FrostError::InvalidShare(l) => {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
return Some(
(ProcessorMessage::InvalidParticipant { id: substrate_sign_id, participant: l })
.into(),
)
}
},
};
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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info!("signed batch {id} with attempt #{attempt}");
let batch =
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
SignedBatch { batch: self.signable.remove(&id).unwrap(), signature: sig.into() };
// Save the batch in case it's needed for recovery
BatchDb::set(txn, batch.batch.block, &batch);
CompletedDb::set(txn, id, &());
// Stop trying to sign for this batch
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
assert!(self.attempt.remove(&id).is_some());
assert!(self.preprocessing.remove(&id).is_none());
assert!(self.signing.remove(&id).is_none());
Some((messages::substrate::ProcessorMessage::SignedBatch { batch }).into())
}
CoordinatorMessage::BatchReattempt { id } => {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 16:57:21 -05:00
let SubstrateSignableId::Batch(batch_id) = id.id else {
panic!("BatchReattempt passed non-Batch ID")
};
self.attempt(txn, batch_id, id.attempt).map(Into::into)
}
}
}
pub fn batch_signed(&mut self, txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, id: u32) {
// Stop trying to sign for this batch
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
CompletedDb::set(txn, id, &());
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 12:28:53 -05:00
self.signable.remove(&id);
self.attempt.remove(&id);
self.preprocessing.remove(&id);
self.signing.remove(&id);
// This doesn't emit SignedBatch because it doesn't have access to the SignedBatch
// This function is expected to only be called once Substrate acknowledges this block,
// which means its batch must have been signed
// While a successive batch's signing would also cause this block to be acknowledged, Substrate
// guarantees a batch's ordered inclusion
// This also doesn't return any messages since all mutation from the Batch being signed happens
// on the substrate::CoordinatorMessage::SubstrateBlock message (which SignedBatch is meant to
// end up triggering)
}
}