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use borsh::{BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize};
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2024-01-29 03:48:53 -05:00
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use sp_core::{ConstU32, bounded::BoundedVec};
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use serai_primitives::{
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crypto::{ExternalKey, EmbeddedEllipticCurveKeys, KeyPair, Signature},
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address::SeraiAddress,
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balance::Amount,
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network_id::*,
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validator_sets::*,
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};
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/// A call to the validator sets.
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
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pub enum Call {
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/// Set the keys for a validator set.
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set_keys {
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/// The validator set which is setting their keys.
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validator_set: ExternalValidatorSet,
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/// The keys being set.
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key_pair: KeyPair,
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/// The participants in the validator set who signed off on these keys.
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// TODO: Bound
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#[borsh(
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serialize_with = "serai_primitives::sp_borsh::borsh_serialize_bitvec",
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deserialize_with = "serai_primitives::sp_borsh::borsh_deserialize_bitvec"
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)]
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One Round DKG (#589)
* Upstream GBP, divisor, circuit abstraction, and EC gadgets from FCMP++
* Initial eVRF implementation
Not quite done yet. It needs to communicate the resulting points and proofs to
extract them from the Pedersen Commitments in order to return those, and then
be tested.
* Add the openings of the PCs to the eVRF as necessary
* Add implementation of secq256k1
* Make DKG Encryption a bit more flexible
No longer requires the use of an EncryptionKeyMessage, and allows pre-defined
keys for encryption.
* Make NUM_BITS an argument for the field macro
* Have the eVRF take a Zeroizing private key
* Initial eVRF-based DKG
* Add embedwards25519 curve
* Inline the eVRF into the DKG library
Due to how we're handling share encryption, we'd either need two circuits or to
dedicate this circuit to the DKG. The latter makes sense at this time.
* Add documentation to the eVRF-based DKG
* Add paragraph claiming robustness
* Update to the new eVRF proof
* Finish routing the eVRF functionality
Still needs errors and serialization, along with a few other TODOs.
* Add initial eVRF DKG test
* Improve eVRF DKG
Updates how we calculcate verification shares, improves performance when
extracting multiple sets of keys, and adds more to the test for it.
* Start using a proper error for the eVRF DKG
* Resolve various TODOs
Supports recovering multiple key shares from the eVRF DKG.
Inlines two loops to save 2**16 iterations.
Adds support for creating a constant time representation of scalars < NUM_BITS.
* Ban zero ECDH keys, document non-zero requirements
* Implement eVRF traits, all the way up to the DKG, for secp256k1/ed25519
* Add Ristretto eVRF trait impls
* Support participating multiple times in the eVRF DKG
* Only participate once per key, not once per key share
* Rewrite processor key-gen around the eVRF DKG
Still a WIP.
* Finish routing the new key gen in the processor
Doesn't touch the tests, coordinator, nor Substrate yet.
`cargo +nightly fmt && cargo +nightly-2024-07-01 clippy --all-features -p serai-processor`
does pass.
* Deduplicate and better document in processor key_gen
* Update serai-processor tests to the new key gen
* Correct amount of yx coefficients, get processor key gen test to pass
* Add embedded elliptic curve keys to Substrate
* Update processor key gen tests to the eVRF DKG
* Have set_keys take signature_participants, not removed_participants
Now no one is removed from the DKG. Only `t` people publish the key however.
Uses a BitVec for an efficient encoding of the participants.
* Update the coordinator binary for the new DKG
This does not yet update any tests.
* Add sensible Debug to key_gen::[Processor, Coordinator]Message
* Have the DKG explicitly declare how to interpolate its shares
Removes the hack for MuSig where we multiply keys by the inverse of their
lagrange interpolation factor.
* Replace Interpolation::None with Interpolation::Constant
Allows the MuSig DKG to keep the secret share as the original private key,
enabling deriving FROST nonces consistently regardless of the MuSig context.
* Get coordinator tests to pass
* Update spec to the new DKG
* Get clippy to pass across the repo
* cargo machete
* Add an extra sleep to ensure expected ordering of `Participation`s
* Update orchestration
* Remove bad panic in coordinator
It expected ConfirmationShare to be n-of-n, not t-of-n.
* Improve documentation on functions
* Update TX size limit
We now no longer have to support the ridiculous case of having 49 DKG
participations within a 101-of-150 DKG. It does remain quite high due to
needing to _sign_ so many times. It'd may be optimal for parties with multiple
key shares to independently send their preprocesses/shares (despite the
overhead that'll cause with signatures and the transaction structure).
* Correct error in the Processor spec document
* Update a few comments in the validator-sets pallet
* Send/Recv Participation one at a time
Sending all, then attempting to receive all in an expected order, wasn't working
even with notable delays between sending messages. This points to the mempool
not working as expected...
* Correct ThresholdKeys serialization in modular-frost test
* Updating existing TX size limit test for the new DKG parameters
* Increase time allowed for the DKG on the GH CI
* Correct construction of signature_participants in serai-client tests
Fault identified by akil.
* Further contextualize DkgConfirmer by ValidatorSet
Caught by a safety check we wouldn't reuse preprocesses across messages. That
raises the question of we were prior reusing preprocesses (reusing keys)?
Except that'd have caused a variety of signing failures (suggesting we had some
staggered timing avoiding it in practice but yes, this was possible in theory).
* Add necessary calls to set_embedded_elliptic_curve_key in coordinator set rotation tests
* Correct shimmed setting of a secq256k1 key
* cargo fmt
* Don't use `[0; 32]` for the embedded keys in the coordinator rotation test
The key_gen function expects the random values already decided.
* Big-endian secq256k1 scalars
Also restores the prior, safer, Encryption::register function.
2024-08-16 11:26:07 -07:00
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signature_participants: bitvec::vec::BitVec<u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0>,
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/// The signature confirming these keys are valid.
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signature: Signature,
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},
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/// Report a validator set's slashes onto Serai.
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report_slashes {
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/// The validator set which is setting their keys.
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validator_set: ExternalValidatorSet,
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/// The slashes they're reporting.
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slashes: SlashReport,
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/// The signature confirming the validity of this slash report.
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signature: Signature,
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},
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/// Set a validator's keys on embedded elliptic curves for a specific network.
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set_embedded_elliptic_curve_keys {
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/// The network the origin is setting their embedded elliptic curve keys for.
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network: ExternalNetworkId,
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/// The keys on the embedded elliptic curves.
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#[borsh(
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serialize_with = "serai_primitives::sp_borsh::borsh_serialize_bounded_vec",
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deserialize_with = "serai_primitives::sp_borsh::borsh_deserialize_bounded_vec"
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)]
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keys: EmbeddedEllipticCurveKeys,
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},
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/// Allocate stake to a network.
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allocate {
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/// The network to allocate stake to.
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network: NetworkId,
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/// The amount of stake to allocate.
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amount: Amount,
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},
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/// Deallocate stake from a network.
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///
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/// This deallocation may be immediate or may be delayed depending on if the origin is an
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/// active, or even recent, validator. If delayed, it will have to be claimed at a later time.
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deallocate {
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/// The network to deallocate stake from.
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network: NetworkId,
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/// The amount of stake to deallocate.
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amount: Amount,
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},
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/// Claim a now-unlocked deallocation.
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claim_deallocation {
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/// The validator set which claiming the deallocation was delayed until.
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deallocation: ValidatorSet,
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},
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}
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impl Call {
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pub(crate) fn is_signed(&self) -> bool {
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match self {
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Call::set_keys { .. } | Call::report_slashes { .. } => false,
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Call::set_embedded_elliptic_curve_keys { .. } |
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Call::allocate { .. } |
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Call::deallocate { .. } |
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Call::claim_deallocation { .. } => true,
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}
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}
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}
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/// An event from the validator sets.
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
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pub enum Event {
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/// A new validator set was declared.
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NewSet {
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/// The set declared.
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set: ValidatorSet,
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},
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/// A validator set has set their keys.
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SetKeys {
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/// The set which set their keys.
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set: ExternalValidatorSet,
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/// The keys sets.
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key_pair: KeyPair,
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},
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/// A validator set has accepted responsibility from the prior validator set.
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AcceptedHandover {
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/// The set which accepted responsibility from the prior set.
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set: ValidatorSet,
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},
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/// A validator set has retired.
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SetRetired {
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/// The set retired.
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set: ValidatorSet,
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},
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/// A validator's allocation to a network has increased.
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Allocation {
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/// The validator who increased their allocation.
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validator: SeraiAddress,
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/// The network the stake was allocated to.
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network: NetworkId,
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/// The amount of stake allocated.
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amount: Amount,
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},
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/// A validator's allocation to a network has decreased.
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Deallocation {
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/// The validator who decreased their allocation.
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validator: SeraiAddress,
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/// The network the stake was deallocated from.
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network: NetworkId,
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/// The amount of stake deallocated.
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amount: Amount,
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/// The session which claiming the deallocation was delayed until.
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delayed_until: Option<Session>,
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},
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/// A validator's deallocation from a network has been claimed.
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///
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/// This is only emited for deallocations which were delayed and has to be explicitly claimed.
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DeallocationClaimed {
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/// The validator who claimed their deallocation.
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validator: SeraiAddress,
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/// The validator set the deallocation was delayed until.
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deallocation: ValidatorSet,
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},
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}
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