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serai/coins/monero/src/wallet/scan.rs

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use std::io::Cursor;
Utilize zeroize (#76) * Apply Zeroize to nonces used in Bulletproofs Also makes bit decomposition constant time for a given amount of outputs. * Fix nonce reuse for single-signer CLSAG * Attach Zeroize to most structures in Monero, and ZOnDrop to anything with private data * Zeroize private keys and nonces * Merge prepare_outputs and prepare_transactions * Ensure CLSAG is constant time * Pass by borrow where needed, bug fixes The past few commitments have been one in-progress chunk which I've broken up as best read. * Add Zeroize to FROST structs Still needs to zeroize internally, yet next step. Not quite as aggressive as Monero, partially due to the limitations of HashMaps, partially due to less concern about metadata, yet does still delete a few smaller items of metadata (group key, context string...). * Remove Zeroize from most Monero multisig structs These structs largely didn't have private data, just fields with private data, yet those fields implemented ZeroizeOnDrop making them already covered. While there is still traces of the transaction left in RAM, fully purging that was never the intent. * Use Zeroize within dleq bitvec doesn't offer Zeroize, so a manual zeroing has been implemented. * Use Zeroize for random_nonce It isn't perfect, due to the inability to zeroize the digest, and due to kp256 requiring a few transformations. It does the best it can though. Does move the per-curve random_nonce to a provided one, which is allowed as of https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-frost/pull/231. * Use Zeroize on FROST keygen/signing * Zeroize constant time multiexp. * Correct when FROST keygen zeroizes * Move the FROST keys Arc into FrostKeys Reduces amount of instances in memory. * Manually implement Debug for FrostCore to not leak the secret share * Misc bug fixes * clippy + multiexp test bug fixes * Correct FROST key gen share summation It leaked our own share for ourself. * Fix cross-group DLEq tests
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use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
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use curve25519_dalek::{constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE, scalar::Scalar, edwards::EdwardsPoint};
use crate::{
Commitment,
serialize::{read_byte, read_u32, read_u64, read_bytes, read_scalar, read_point, read_raw_vec},
transaction::{Timelock, Transaction},
block::Block,
rpc::{Rpc, RpcError},
wallet::{PaymentId, Extra, Scanner, uniqueness, shared_key, amount_decryption, commitment_mask},
};
Utilize zeroize (#76) * Apply Zeroize to nonces used in Bulletproofs Also makes bit decomposition constant time for a given amount of outputs. * Fix nonce reuse for single-signer CLSAG * Attach Zeroize to most structures in Monero, and ZOnDrop to anything with private data * Zeroize private keys and nonces * Merge prepare_outputs and prepare_transactions * Ensure CLSAG is constant time * Pass by borrow where needed, bug fixes The past few commitments have been one in-progress chunk which I've broken up as best read. * Add Zeroize to FROST structs Still needs to zeroize internally, yet next step. Not quite as aggressive as Monero, partially due to the limitations of HashMaps, partially due to less concern about metadata, yet does still delete a few smaller items of metadata (group key, context string...). * Remove Zeroize from most Monero multisig structs These structs largely didn't have private data, just fields with private data, yet those fields implemented ZeroizeOnDrop making them already covered. While there is still traces of the transaction left in RAM, fully purging that was never the intent. * Use Zeroize within dleq bitvec doesn't offer Zeroize, so a manual zeroing has been implemented. * Use Zeroize for random_nonce It isn't perfect, due to the inability to zeroize the digest, and due to kp256 requiring a few transformations. It does the best it can though. Does move the per-curve random_nonce to a provided one, which is allowed as of https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-frost/pull/231. * Use Zeroize on FROST keygen/signing * Zeroize constant time multiexp. * Correct when FROST keygen zeroizes * Move the FROST keys Arc into FrostKeys Reduces amount of instances in memory. * Manually implement Debug for FrostCore to not leak the secret share * Misc bug fixes * clippy + multiexp test bug fixes * Correct FROST key gen share summation It leaked our own share for ourself. * Fix cross-group DLEq tests
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct AbsoluteId {
pub tx: [u8; 32],
pub o: u8,
}
impl AbsoluteId {
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 1);
res.extend(&self.tx);
res.push(self.o);
res
}
pub fn deserialize<R: std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<AbsoluteId> {
Ok(AbsoluteId { tx: read_bytes(r)?, o: read_byte(r)? })
}
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct OutputData {
pub key: EdwardsPoint,
// Absolute difference between the spend key and the key in this output
pub key_offset: Scalar,
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pub commitment: Commitment,
}
impl OutputData {
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 32 + 40);
res.extend(self.key.compress().to_bytes());
res.extend(self.key_offset.to_bytes());
res.extend(self.commitment.mask.to_bytes());
res.extend(self.commitment.amount.to_le_bytes());
res
}
pub fn deserialize<R: std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<OutputData> {
Ok(OutputData {
key: read_point(r)?,
key_offset: read_scalar(r)?,
commitment: Commitment::new(read_scalar(r)?, read_u64(r)?),
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct Metadata {
// Does not have to be an Option since the 0 subaddress is the main address
pub subaddress: (u32, u32),
// Can be an Option, as extra doesn't necessarily have a payment ID, yet all Monero TXs should
// have this
// This will be gibberish if the payment ID wasn't intended for the recipient or wasn't included
// 0xff was chosen as it'd be distinct from [0; 8], enabling atomically incrementing IDs (though
// they should be randomly generated)
pub payment_id: [u8; 8],
// Arbitrary data
pub arbitrary_data: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl Metadata {
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(4 + 4 + 8 + 1);
res.extend(self.subaddress.0.to_le_bytes());
res.extend(self.subaddress.1.to_le_bytes());
res.extend(self.payment_id);
if let Some(data) = self.arbitrary_data.as_ref() {
res.extend(&[1, u8::try_from(data.len()).unwrap()]);
res.extend(data);
} else {
res.extend(&[0]);
}
res
}
pub fn deserialize<R: std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Metadata> {
Ok(Metadata {
subaddress: (read_u32(r)?, read_u32(r)?),
payment_id: read_bytes(r)?,
arbitrary_data: {
if read_byte(r)? == 1 {
let len = read_byte(r)?;
Some(read_raw_vec(read_byte, usize::from(len), r)?)
} else {
None
}
},
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct ReceivedOutput {
pub absolute: AbsoluteId,
pub data: OutputData,
pub metadata: Metadata,
}
impl ReceivedOutput {
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pub fn key(&self) -> EdwardsPoint {
self.data.key
}
pub fn key_offset(&self) -> Scalar {
self.data.key_offset
}
pub fn commitment(&self) -> Commitment {
self.data.commitment.clone()
}
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut serialized = self.absolute.serialize();
serialized.extend(&self.data.serialize());
serialized.extend(&self.metadata.serialize());
serialized
}
pub fn deserialize<R: std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<ReceivedOutput> {
Ok(ReceivedOutput {
absolute: AbsoluteId::deserialize(r)?,
data: OutputData::deserialize(r)?,
metadata: Metadata::deserialize(r)?,
})
}
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
pub struct SpendableOutput {
pub output: ReceivedOutput,
pub global_index: u64,
}
impl SpendableOutput {
pub async fn refresh_global_index(&mut self, rpc: &Rpc) -> Result<(), RpcError> {
self.global_index =
rpc.get_o_indexes(self.output.absolute.tx).await?[usize::from(self.output.absolute.o)];
Ok(())
}
pub async fn from(rpc: &Rpc, output: ReceivedOutput) -> Result<SpendableOutput, RpcError> {
let mut output = SpendableOutput { output, global_index: 0 };
output.refresh_global_index(rpc).await?;
Ok(output)
}
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pub fn key(&self) -> EdwardsPoint {
self.output.key()
}
pub fn key_offset(&self) -> Scalar {
self.output.key_offset()
}
pub fn commitment(&self) -> Commitment {
self.output.commitment()
}
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut serialized = self.output.serialize();
serialized.extend(&self.global_index.to_le_bytes());
serialized
}
pub fn deserialize<R: std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<SpendableOutput> {
Ok(SpendableOutput { output: ReceivedOutput::deserialize(r)?, global_index: read_u64(r)? })
}
}
#[derive(Zeroize)]
pub struct Timelocked<O: Clone + Zeroize>(Timelock, Vec<O>);
impl<O: Clone + Zeroize> Drop for Timelocked<O> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.0.zeroize();
self.1.zeroize();
}
}
impl<O: Clone + Zeroize> ZeroizeOnDrop for Timelocked<O> {}
impl<O: Clone + Zeroize> Timelocked<O> {
pub fn timelock(&self) -> Timelock {
self.0
}
pub fn not_locked(&self) -> Vec<O> {
if self.0 == Timelock::None {
return self.1.clone();
}
vec![]
}
/// Returns None if the Timelocks aren't comparable. Returns Some(vec![]) if none are unlocked
pub fn unlocked(&self, timelock: Timelock) -> Option<Vec<O>> {
// If the Timelocks are comparable, return the outputs if they're now unlocked
self.0.partial_cmp(&timelock).filter(|_| self.0 <= timelock).map(|_| self.1.clone())
}
pub fn ignore_timelock(&self) -> Vec<O> {
self.1.clone()
}
}
impl Scanner {
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pub fn scan_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction) -> Timelocked<ReceivedOutput> {
let extra = Extra::deserialize(&mut Cursor::new(&tx.prefix.extra));
let keys;
let extra = if let Ok(extra) = extra {
keys = extra.keys();
extra
} else {
return Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, vec![]);
};
let payment_id = extra.payment_id();
let mut res = vec![];
for (o, output) in tx.prefix.outputs.iter().enumerate() {
// https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/106
if let Some(burning_bug) = self.burning_bug.as_ref() {
if burning_bug.contains(&output.key) {
continue;
}
}
let output_key = output.key.decompress();
if output_key.is_none() {
continue;
}
let output_key = output_key.unwrap();
for key in &keys {
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let (view_tag, shared_key, payment_id_xor) = shared_key(
if self.burning_bug.is_none() { Some(uniqueness(&tx.prefix.inputs)) } else { None },
&self.pair.view,
key,
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o,
);
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let payment_id =
if let Some(PaymentId::Encrypted(id)) = payment_id.map(|id| id ^ payment_id_xor) {
id
} else {
payment_id_xor
};
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if let Some(actual_view_tag) = output.view_tag {
if actual_view_tag != view_tag {
continue;
}
}
// P - shared == spend
let subaddress = self
.subaddresses
.get(&(output_key - (&shared_key * &ED25519_BASEPOINT_TABLE)).compress());
if subaddress.is_none() {
continue;
}
let subaddress = *subaddress.unwrap();
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// If it has torsion, it'll substract the non-torsioned shared key to a torsioned key
// We will not have a torsioned key in our HashMap of keys, so we wouldn't identify it as
// ours
// If we did though, it'd enable bypassing the included burning bug protection
debug_assert!(output_key.is_torsion_free());
let key_offset = shared_key + self.pair.subaddress(subaddress);
// Since we've found an output to us, get its amount
let mut commitment = Commitment::zero();
// Miner transaction
if output.amount != 0 {
commitment.amount = output.amount;
// Regular transaction
} else {
let amount = match tx.rct_signatures.base.ecdh_info.get(o) {
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Some(amount) => amount_decryption(*amount, shared_key),
// This should never happen, yet it may be possible with miner transactions?
// Using get just decreases the possibility of a panic and lets us move on in that case
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None => break,
};
// Rebuild the commitment to verify it
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commitment = Commitment::new(commitment_mask(shared_key), amount);
// If this is a malicious commitment, move to the next output
// Any other R value will calculate to a different spend key and are therefore ignorable
if Some(&commitment.calculate()) != tx.rct_signatures.base.commitments.get(o) {
break;
}
}
if commitment.amount != 0 {
res.push(ReceivedOutput {
absolute: AbsoluteId { tx: tx.hash(), o: o.try_into().unwrap() },
data: OutputData { key: output_key, key_offset, commitment },
metadata: Metadata { subaddress: subaddress, payment_id, arbitrary_data: extra.data() },
});
if let Some(burning_bug) = self.burning_bug.as_mut() {
burning_bug.insert(output.key);
}
}
// Break to prevent public keys from being included multiple times, triggering multiple
// inclusions of the same output
break;
}
}
Timelocked(tx.prefix.timelock, res)
}
pub async fn scan(
&mut self,
rpc: &Rpc,
block: &Block,
) -> Result<Vec<Timelocked<SpendableOutput>>, RpcError> {
let mut index = rpc.get_o_indexes(block.miner_tx.hash()).await?[0];
let mut txs = vec![block.miner_tx.clone()];
txs.extend(rpc.get_transactions(&block.txs).await?);
let map = |mut timelock: Timelocked<ReceivedOutput>, index| {
if timelock.1.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(Timelocked(
timelock.0,
timelock
.1
.drain(..)
.map(|output| SpendableOutput {
global_index: index + u64::from(output.absolute.o),
output,
})
.collect(),
))
}
};
let mut res = vec![];
for tx in txs {
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if let Some(timelock) = map(self.scan_transaction(&tx), index) {
res.push(timelock);
}
index += u64::try_from(tx.prefix.outputs.len()).unwrap();
}
Ok(res)
}
}